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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters exploring the determinants of pupil performance 
in high-stakes exams in UK and Pakistan.  
 
The first empirical chapter looks at the effect of parents’ education on their children’s 
education adopting Instrumental Variable (IV) methodology. I exploit the 1972 UK 
RoSLA (raising of school leaving age) as a source of exogenous variation using the 
Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) dataset linked to the 
National Pupil Database (NPD). The results show that parental education has a 
significant and positive impact on their children’s educational outcomes, as measured 
by performance in GCSE examinations taken at age 16. 
 
The subsequent chapter explores key issues relating to teacher quality. Firstly, it 
investigates the impact of being taught by high quality or low quality teachers on 
students’ performance in exams, and secondly, which teacher characteristics are 
associated with student performance. It uses the survey data of 611 pupils from one 
region of Pakistan studying in Year 9 which is also linked to the administrative data on 
the students’ exam scores.  
 
The unique feature of the data tracks students’ scores across multiple subjects at a 
single point in time. Teacher fixed effects and pupil fixed effects methods are used. 
First stage results show that there are significant variations in teacher fixed effects 
within the schools, suggesting important unobservable differences among teachers. A 
good teacher, defined as being at the 75
th
 percentile of the teacher fixed effects 
distribution, is related to an increase in score by 0.15 standard deviations relative to the 
omitted teacher, while a bad teacher decreases the score by 0.77 standard deviations. 
Therefore, a pupil having been taught by a good teacher scores 0.92 standard deviations 
more than the pupil who is taught by a bad teacher (25
th
 percentile teacher) leaving a 
significant effect on pupil performance. Second stage results suggest that teacher 
observed characteristics do not explain the variation in teacher quality. 
 
ii 
 
The final chapter studies the effect of distance on participation in post-compulsory 
education in the Pakistan context, and whether socioeconomic characteristics have an 
effect on achievement in a value-added model taking selection into secondary education 
into account using a survey dataset on pupils studying in the post-compulsory grade 
(Year 12) in 2011-2012 from one district of the Punjab province of Pakistan. In this 
chapter I used two variables as instruments: one is the log of distance to nearest post-
compulsory education institution, as a measure of proximity to an educational 
institution and the second is urban location. The results show that participation and 
performance in post-compulsory education are two different processes, with 
participation being driven by availability of post-compulsory institutions within travel 
distance, while performance once in post-compulsory education is determined by 
ability. 
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Chapter 1:  
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Aims and Motivations 
 
Human capital is the stock of knowledge, skills and abilities that enables individuals to 
be productive and thus earn income. It can be accumulated through investment in 
education, training, and other factors that increase productivity and earnings. The 
significance of the role of human capital cannot be denied in economic development 
during the last half century, for economists and international development organizations 
(Mankiw et al., 1992). Simultaneously, it has also been proved that people-oriented 
human resources provide any organization an edge by creating superior share-holder 
value, so the education component of human capital is a key motivational force for 
economic growth (UNDP, 2003). 
 
Economics has provided great insights into a multitude of topics surrounding education; 
most notably, human capital theory pioneered by Becker (1964) assisted in explaining 
why individuals choose to invest in education and training, while Mincer (1974) 
developed the earnings function which has been widely used to estimate returns to 
education.  
 
Recent growth in the economics of education research has come in the form of 
improved data availability and development of new methodological approaches 
(Machin, 2008). This has improved understanding of issues relating to intergenerational 
mobility, the impact of school choice and competition on pupil outcomes, and the link 
between teacher quality and student performance (Dickson et al., 2016; Gibbons et al., 
2008; Azam and Kingdon, 2015; Bohlmark and Lindahl, 2007). In addition, the 
economics of education has expanded to include policy evaluation research, which has 
made the field more relevant for informing policy makers. 
 
In particular, major developments have been made in explaining the determinants of 
pupil outcomes. Several studies have explored the various determinants of educational 
attainment or performance, which are mainly family characteristics, teachers and 
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schools (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2012; Vignoles and Meschi, 2010). These studies 
consider the primary, secondary and post-compulsory level of education in different 
countries. Pupil outcomes are likely to play a significant role in an individual’s life 
chances and adult outcomes (Blanden et al., 2012; Field, 2010; OECD, 2007, ONS, 
2011). It is therefore crucial to understand the determinants of pupil outcomes such as 
individual, family, teacher, and school characteristics. Equally, it is important to 
understand how policies and interventions may be used to improve outcomes. 
 
Each chapter of this thesis looks at different determinants of performance in high stakes 
exams. The GCSEs exams in England at age 16 (chapter 2) and the Year 9 exams in 
Pakistan (chapter 3) which are held at the age of 14-15 are high stakes tests and are the 
key gateway exams into post-compulsory education and also very important for labour 
market outcomes. Further, performance in these high stakes exams determines the sixth 
form pupils go to, the qualifications they take next, the eligibility for a university 
course, the universities they can apply to and future prospects. The grade 12 exams in 
Pakistan (chapter 4) taken in the age group of 17 to 18 are also crucial as they provide 
access to university and renowned fields such as medicine, engineering, etc. In 
Pakistan, Year 10 at age 15-16 is equivalent to O-Level exams in UK, and Year 9, the 
exam preceding GCSE and taken at age 14 or later. Years 11 and 12 are equivalent to 
A-Levels exams usually sat at age 18 or later. 
 
Every chapter is a micro-econometric investigation of the determinants of pupil 
performance in high stakes exams. Chapter 2 uses the Longitudinal Study of Young 
People in England (LSYPE) and National Pupil Database (NPD) of the UK adopting an 
Instrumental Variable (IV) methodology. Chapter 3 uses survey panel data for Pakistan 
collected by the author in order to discuss the issue of teacher quality using teacher 
fixed effects and pupil fixed effects approaches. Chapter 4 uses the same dataset for 
Pakistan looking at the determinants of performance and participation in higher grades 
using Probit and Heckman Selection Models. Overall, the thesis uses a range of 
econometric methodologies and number of different datasets to study the pupil 
outcomes in high stakes exams in a developed (UK) and developing country (Pakistan). 
 
1.2 Structure and content of the thesis: 
The thesis consists of three different chapters: The first chapter is based on the 
intergenerational mobility of education in England, whereas the other two chapters 
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address the issue of teachers’ quality and determinants of sustained academic 
achievements in Pakistan. Thus, the present study has serious implications for both 
developed (UK) and developing (Pakistan) countries particularly in an educational 
context. 
 
1.2.1  Brief overview of chapter 2 
Recent studies provide evidence that an intergenerational correlation exists between the 
education of parents and their children. There are two possible explanations of a 
positive intergenerational correlation: one is direct and the other is indirect. The first, 
and direct, cause states that it could be the result of the genetic transmission of ability 
such that talented parents have more able children. If this is the sole reason for the 
intergenerational relationship, then the issue of higher achievements amongst future 
generations can be ignored when evaluating educational policy aimed at raising present 
education levels, since the inherited genes will not have been affected by the existing 
situation.  
 
The second and indirect cause of the intergenerational correlation works through two 
routes. One indirect route functions via the direct transfer of knowledge: for example, 
the more motivated and educated parents are in a better position to help and push their 
children as they have experienced the benefits of education themselves. The other 
indirect route works through income and lifestyle. It argues that more educated parents 
have higher incomes which can buy many things like private schooling, books, tutors 
and an affluent neighbourhood. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the causal mechanism underpinning this intergenerational 
correlation – vis-à-vis the established link between parents’ and children’s educational 
outcomes – using the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) 
dataset. Using the raising of the school leave age (RoSLA) in 1972 as an instrument for 
parental education allows us to isolate the exogenous variation in parents’ education. 
 
The results confirm that parental education is positively related to their children’s 
educational outcomes, as measured by performance in GCSE examinations taken at age 
16, and suggest that the effect of nurture (upbringing) is mainly responsible for the 
intergenerational relationship. Further results suggest that controlling for both parents’ 
education, mothers’ education is positively related to children’s education while the 
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effects of fathers’ education disappear. These findings are robust across boys and girls 
samples. 
 
1.2.2 Brief overview of chapter 3 
Teachers differ significantly in how they teach their students, but little is known about 
which teacher attributes account for this. Improving weak teaching may be one of the 
most effective means of raising pupil achievement. Teacher quality is a question of 
interest for education policy-makers and researchers. 
 
The majority of studies estimate teacher effects at elementary/primary school level. 
However studies addressing the issue of teacher quality at high school level are limited. 
Slater et al. (2012) estimate teacher effects at senior secondary level, Aaronson et al. 
(2007); Azam and Kingdon (2015); and Kingdon (2006) study teacher quality at high 
school level. Chapter 3 also discusses teacher quality at higher secondary level, as one 
of the concerns about estimating teacher effects using school data at primary grades is 
that all students are taught by the same teacher in primary grades. This implies that one 
cannot estimate the effect of multiple teachers on the same student in different subjects. 
 
Chapter 3 uses the survey data of 611 pupils, from one of the districts of Punjab, 
(Pakistan), studying in Year 9 (age 14-15) in 2008-09, from both private and public 
schools; the survey data is linked with the administrative data of the student exam 
scores, to address the issue of teacher quality using a teacher fixed effects approach. 
The present study takes the direct approach, linking teacher characteristics to student 
outcomes in an achievement production function, but with two innovations. 
 
Firstly, it estimates the effect of teachers on student achievement (exam score) using 
teacher fixed effects models. Secondly, it relates the estimated teacher effects to the 
observable characteristics of the teachers. 
 
First stage results show that there are significant variations in teacher fixed effects 
within the schools, suggesting important unobservable differences among teachers. A 
good teacher, defined as being at the 75
th
 percentile of the teacher fixed effects 
distribution, is related to an increase in score by 0.15 standard deviations relative to the 
omitted teacher, while a bad teacher decreases the score by 0.77 standard deviations. 
Therefore, a pupil having been taught by a good teacher scores 0.92 standard deviations 
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more than the pupil who is taught by a bad teacher (25
th
 percentile teacher) leaving a 
significant effect on pupil performance. Second stage results suggest that teacher 
characteristics do not explain the variation in teacher quality. 
 
1.2.3 Brief overview of chapter 4 
The fourth chapter is an investigation of the determinants of participation and 
performance in post-compulsory education, controlling for the selection into post-
compulsory education and prior ability, using a unique primary dataset on pupils 
studying in the post -compulsory grade (Year 12) in 2011-2012 from one district of the 
Punjab province of Pakistan.  
 
The results show that participation and performance in post-compulsory education are 
two different processes, with participation being driven by availability of post-
compulsory institutions within travel distance, while performance once in post-
compulsory education is determined by ability.  
 
This is an important and interesting result with obvious policy relevance - those 
participating in post-compulsory education are not necessarily the most able, but rather 
those with the best access to post-compulsory education. 
 
To provide context for Chapters 3 and 4, the following section will discuss the structure 
of compulsory schooling in Pakistan.  
 
1.2.4 Brief Overview of the Education System in Pakistan 
The education system in Pakistan is divided into five different levels. 
1) Primary Level (grades 1 to 5) 
2) Middle Level (grades 6 to 8) 
3) High/Secondary Level (grades 9 and 10, leading to the Secondary School 
Certificate or SSC) 
4) Intermediate/Higher/Higher Secondary Level (grades 11 and 12, leading to the 
Higher Secondary Certificate or HSC) 
5) University Level (leading to undergraduate and graduate degree and research). 
 
The Secondary School Certificate (SSC) includes the grades 9 and 10 examinations, 
and is equivalent to GCSE/O level in England, while the Higher Secondary School 
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Certificate includes grades 11 and 12 examinations, also known as HSC, is equivalent 
to GCE A Level in England. Both SSC and HSC exams are conducted through the 
Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE). There are also alternative 
qualifications available in Pakistan, where SSC and HSC are replaced by Ordinary 
Level (O Level) and Advanced Level (A Level) which are managed by the British 
examination boards of Cambridge University, however the present study does not 
include these alternatives.  
 
There is also vocational and technical education available for the development of the 
skilled workforce. Technical education comprises of three years of education after 
matriculation/Grade10. Vocational training consists of 6 months to two years duration 
after Grade 8
 
or Grade 10.  Analysis done here focuses only on formal academic 
education, and does not consider technical or vocational training. According to Article 
25-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, the state must provide free and compulsory 
education from age 5 to 16 years, i.e. for Grades 1 to 10. 
 
There are two main types of schools that exist in Pakistan, private and public schools, 
different to England, where mainly school types are community schools, foundation 
schools, independent schools and voluntary schools. Although similar in terms of their 
education structures they both differ in terms of finances and regulations. Most of the 
cost of operating the public school system is borne by the public exchequer.  
 
Private schools are owned by sole proprietors, trusts or non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) or other forms of management, work for profit and follow either the national 
curriculum or a curriculum approved by foreign educational institutions and are fee-
charging schools. In public schools, female students are always taught by female 
teachers and male students by male teachers, while in private school, it could be male 
or female teachers depending upon the availability.  
 
Public schools follow the national curriculum, charge no tuition fee and are registered 
with the Education Department. Although every private school is required to be 
registered with the Education Department, most of the schools remain unregistered and 
consequently the size of the private school sector is unmeasured in government 
statistics (Aslam, 2009). In this way such schools avoid large taxation and other costs. 
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All schools, private or public, which are registered with the Education Department, are 
linked with the administrative data, from which the test scores of the pupils can be 
obtained (similar to the National Pupil Database (NPD) in the UK). If a private school 
is not registered with the Education Department then they cannot be linked with the 
administrative data.  
 
In my sample I have pupils from both the private and public schools, and all the private 
schools are registered with the Education Department, so I can link them up to the 
administrative data. It is generally believed that private schools provide a better 
education as compared to public schools. Also previous research has shown that pupils 
from private schools perform better than those from public schools at both primary and 
middle levels of education (Alderman et al., 2001; and Aslam, 2009). 
   
As previously discussed above, the private and public schools are the main education 
providers in Pakistan. All Public schools are free in providing education from Grade 1 
to Grade 10, including free books and uniforms, while private schools charge fees 
ranging from 500 to 12,000 rupees per month depending on their standard and location 
etc. Also there is a separate charge for examination fees, books and uniform. 
 
Turning to post-compulsory education, both private and public colleges charge fees. 
Public colleges charge fees up to 8,000 rupees, while private college fees vary a lot 
between 15,000 to 150,000 Rs.  Mostly, private colleges offer A-levels with traditional 
academic tracks in a variety of subjects while some public colleges offer vocational 
education with other traditional academic routes in a variety of subjects. Most of the 
private colleges have co-education while all public colleges are single sex. Some 
private colleges involve entry tests at the time of admission but public colleges do not.  
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Chapter 2:  
 
Measuring the Nature and Nurture Effects in 
Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital in 
England 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There is an established link between parents’ and children’s educational outcomes as 
parents always play an important role in their children’s education regarding their 
human capital investments. The children of highly educated parents have higher 
educational levels and better labour market outcomes as compared to those children 
who grow up in less educated families. Why does this happen - “Is it that more able 
parents have more able children”? This chapter considers the ideas of selection and 
causation. The selection theory states that the parents, who are highly educated, have 
children with higher educational levels, regardless.  The story of causation works 
through another way, parents with more education are in an improved position to assist 
their children by not only giving them motivation and encouragement but also 
providing resources. So, it is very important to distinguish between these scenarios 
particularly from a policy perspective. 
 
There is a vast literature examining educational choices and the determinants of 
children’s educational attainment. Recent research has shown an intergenerational 
correlation with respect to education, income and occupational status between present 
and previous generations. Typically, the studies in the US (Solon, 1999) and in the UK 
(Dearden et al., 1997) have found an intergenerational correlation between the earnings 
of fathers and sons of 0.40 and 0.60 respectively. 
 
The present study is conducted in order to investigate the cause of this intergenerational 
correlation i.e. the established link between parents’ and children’s educational 
outcomes, as it is not only important for the evaluation of educational policy but for 
also designing policies reducing educational inequality. Particularly in Britain it is a 
very important issue as the recent government have planned to lower the number of 
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children leaving school at 18. Young people now must remain in education or training 
until age 18. Since education is a main priority of governments, these results are 
important for policy-makers in order to design policies for those children who are at 
risk of under-achievement. Also findings that educational investment on present 
generations has a positive effect on future generations in terms of higher productivity 
plus non-economic social benefits for the society, indicating higher social returns to 
education,  has a very important role in the cost-benefit analysis of educational 
investment.  
 
There are two possible explanations of a positive intergenerational correlation, one is 
direct and the other is indirect. The first and direct cause states that it could be the result 
of the genetic transmission of ability such that talented parents have more able children. 
If this is the sole reason for the intergenerational relationship, then the issue of higher 
achievements amongst the future generations can be ignored when evaluating the 
educational policy of raising the present education levels since the inherited genes have 
not been affected in this situation. It might be the field of a genetic engineer. 
 
The indirect cause of intergenerational correlation works through two routes. The first 
indirect route functions via the direct transfer of knowledge for example the more 
motivated and educated parents are in a better position to help and push their children 
as they have experienced the benefits of education themselves. The second indirect way 
works through income and lifestyle. It argues that more educated parents have higher 
incomes which can buy many things such as private schooling, books, tutors and an 
affluent neighbourhood. 
 
Recent research has investigated whether the intergenerational link is causal and 
whether the link is due to nature (inherited genes) or nurture (upbringing). The main 
difficulty in sorting the intergenerational link into nature and nurture is separating the 
genetic effects and other characteristics explaining the educational outcome that might 
be transmitted from parents to children. 
 
The present study investigates the causal mechanism underpinning this 
intergenerational correlation – vis-à-vis the established link between parents’ and 
children’s educational outcomes using the Longitudinal Study of Young People in 
England (LSYPE) dataset linked with the National Pupil Database (NPD). Using the 
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raising of the school leaving age (RoSLA) implemented in 1972 as an instrument for 
parental education allows us to isolate the exogenous variation in parents’ education. 
The OLS and IV results confirm that parental education is positively related to their 
children’s educational outcomes, as measured by performance in GCSE examinations 
taken at age 16, and suggest that the effect of nurture (upbringing) is mainly responsible 
for the intergenerational relationship. Further results suggest that when controlling for 
both parents’ education, mothers’ education is positively related to children’s education 
while the effects of fathers’ education disappears after applying IV. These findings are 
robust across the boys and girls samples.     
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: section 2.2 reviews previous literature, section 2.3 
and 2.4 describe the data and methodology, section 2.5 presents the results and 2.6 
presents robustness checks and section 2.7 then concludes.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 Intergenerational Mobility in Education 
Fewer studies have analyzed the intergenerational mobility in education, compared to 
income. The estimated elasticity for intergenerational mobility in education varies 
widely from 0.14 to 0.45 in the US (Mulligan, 1999) and 0.25 to 0.40 in the UK 
(Dearden et al., 1997). The estimates of the elasticity vary based on the data, methods 
used, and the specific outcomes being looked at. 
 
The nature versus nurture argument is about the relative influence of an individual’s 
innate attributes as opposed to the acquired attributes from social and environmental 
factors in which one is brought up. For example nature counts as the physical and 
personality traits determined by your genes which remain the same irrespective of 
where you were born and raised, while nurture is how you were brought up. The main 
identification issue is decomposing the total effect of parental schooling into nature and 
nurture effects. Three identification strategies exist in the literature: twin parents, 
adoptees children or instrumental variable (IV) studies. 
 
(1) The twins approach holds genetic effects constant between twin parents as the genes 
passed on should be identical, so any observed difference in the relationship between 
parents’ and children’s schooling within twin pairs can be attributed to upbringing 
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effects.  Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) first applied this approach using Minnesota 
data on female and male twin pairs to difference out any intergenerational correlation 
attributable to genetics. Results from ordinary least square estimates, even after 
controlling for fathers’ schooling and earnings, reveal large effects: an additional year 
of maternal schooling causes an increase in the children’s years of education by 13% 
while the effect of fathers’ schooling was approximately double (25%) that of mothers’ 
schooling. However when they look within female identical twin pairs, thereby 
eliminating mothers’ unobservable characteristics that are shared by twins and holding 
genetic ability constant, they find no impact of mothers’ education on children’s 
educational attainment , although  the effect of fathers’ education is still positive and 
significant.  
 
One critical issue with such studies is that some part of the influence of mothers’ 
education is still transmitted via her partner’s genes due to assortative mating effects1. 
Obviously, this would not be an issue if the parents would have randomly met and 
married as in this case inclusion of the partners’ schooling would have no impact on 
mobility estimates. But in the case of inclusion of the partner’s schooling the mobility 
estimates measure the impact of increased parents’ schooling on the children’s 
schooling, net of the assortative mating effects. 
 
However the above specification (assortative mating) depends upon the nature of the 
analyzed policy. If, for example, the policy makers are interested in raising the 
education of parents, they should not worry how it works either through assortative 
mating or not. But if they are interested in exploring the consequences of gender 
specific programs
 
such as School Age Mothers
2
 (SAM) Programme that are aiming to 
increase the schooling of mothers’ but not fathers’, they need to control for assortative 
mating effects and should include the fathers’ and mothers’ schooling simultaneously. 
In the context of the current study, there is another issue: in countries such as Pakistan 
and Bangladesh marriages/partnerships are not formed by the choice of women.  They 
are ‘arranged’ by families, based on a wider set of characteristics which may/may not 
include education. So, the assortative mating argument is still applicable, as arranged 
                                                          
1
 Assortative mating occurs when individuals select partners non-randomly from within their population, 
on the basis of a trait that both they and their partners express,  for example,  more educated women in 
almost all societies marry more educated men, given own ability-schooling correlations. 
2
 The aim of the School Age Mothers Programme is to support young women of school age, who are 
pregnant or parenting, to continue in compulsory education and beyond if this is appropriate. 
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marriages make assortative mating more likely. There is at least a chance marriage is 
random if based on attraction and love but not if arranged on the specific basis of 
observed characteristics. So assortative mating is more of an issue in countries like 
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Although the research in this chapter is not based on 
these countries, but still it controls for the assortative mating effect. 
 
The finding of the Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) study, that the impact of father’s 
education via the upbringing route is more than that of the mother’s education has been 
replicated in the literature of twin studies, in Scandinavian countries, by Holmlund et al. 
(2011) for Sweden and Pronzato (2012) for Norway, using both monozygotic 
(identical) and dizygotic (non-identical) twins. The study of Behrman and Rosenzweig 
(2002) is only about monozygotic (identical) twins, as it has to be, otherwise it would 
not be identical genes. Another study by Antonovics and Goldberger (2005), however, 
calls into question the results of the study of Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), and 
suggests that these results are sensitive to educational measurement issues and coding 
of data. Behrman et al. (2005) replicate the original study with a larger Chinese dataset 
and find the same results as the previous Minnesota analysis. Moreover Bingley et al.’s 
(2009) study shows no correlation between mothers’ schooling and children’s 
educational attainment in the case of the identical twins.  
 
Overall, there are numerous problems with twin studies. Firstly, they make 
measurement issues worse, since the method relies on differences between twins, many 
of which will be zero, and so measurement error will be a higher proportion of the 
differences than it would have been of the levels. Secondly, there will be a small 
sample size of twins and finally, there is concern of non random occurrence of different 
educational levels in two twins perhaps being due to twins’ unobservable 
characteristics. The possibility that twins have different educational levels not by 
random but because of the difference between unobservable characteristics of twins 
again produces an unobserved ability bias.  
 
(2) The second identification strategy to account for genetic effects compares natural 
born and adopted children, who share the same family environment but not their 
parents’ genetic inheritance; therefore, any differences in educational attainment among 
children in the same family are driven by nature effects not by nurture. Sacerdote 
(2007) uses data on Korean American Adoptees, and reports a positive impact of 
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mothers’ education on children’s outcomes, after controlling for ability and assortative 
mating. In the economics literature, many researchers (Dearden et al., 1997; Bjorklund 
et al., 2006; Plug, 2004 & 2006; and Sacerdote, 2007) have estimated the 
intergenerational schooling effects using data on parents and their adoptees. 
 
Bjorklund et al. (2006) uses a large sample of adoptees born between 1962 and 1966 in 
Sweden containing also information on adopted children’s new siblings in adopted 
families and their biological parents as well. By using such data they are able to 
separate the genetic components through biological parents, and upbringing effects 
through adopted parents. The results depict that in the case of fathers’ education, 
education works equally through genes and upbringing, while a genetic effect 
dominates in the case of maternal education. To put it simply, the education of both the 
natural father and adoptee father matter, but for the mother it is only the biological 
mother’s education that matters. 
 
Another study of adoptees undertaken by Plug (2004) using data from the American 
Wisconsin Longitudinal Study finds that parental education effects are not high but 
remain significant in the case of adoptees. Therefore the studies of Plug and Sacerdote 
highlight that nurture effects outweigh the nature effects. The adoptee studies have their 
own limitations, for example, small sample size; the methodology of these studies 
assumes that children are randomly allocated to new families and the adoption takes 
place at birth so that means adoptees spent no time with natural parents, which are not 
necessarily the case.  
 
The adoptees studies (Wisconsin, Sweden, UK and other US states) always find 
positive and significant schooling effects of fathers’ and mothers’ schooling, provided 
that mothers’ and fathers’ schooling are included as separate regressors. Provided that 
these models are correctly specified, after allowing for the assortative mating effects, 
when fathers’ and mothers’ schooling are included simultaneously, they find that the 
father’s schooling effect is bigger than that of mothers. Therefore, mostly the evidence 
in the literature gives support in favour of the argument: nurture effects are certainly 
important for a child’s educational outcome. However these studies also indicate that 
the contribution of paternal schooling is bigger than maternal schooling. Despite the 
fact that adoptees studies take a different route for the effect to take by eliminating the 
genetic link between both parents and child, whereas, the twin approach differences out 
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the genetic effect for only one parent, another angle of this debate suggests that, there is 
still a non-genetic effect transmitted from parents to children via parenting style, which 
leads to the correlation of parents’ education with children’s education. More to the 
point, small sample size even in a registry dataset and non-random placement of 
adoptees children limit the usefulness of this approach. 
 
(3) The third and final identification strategy, IV methods, is based on natural 
experiments, and the one adopted in this study, uses educational policy reforms (e.g. 
raising of school leaving age, RoSLA) as an instrument, in order to isolate the 
exogenous variation in parents’ schooling, without directly affecting the children. This 
approach separates the nature and nurture transmission factors since the variation 
exploited in parental education is orthogonal to the unobservables. Therefore, any 
association of parents’ education on children’s education remaining will be attributed to 
nurture effects only; as such variation will be orthogonal to genes.  Chevalier (2004); 
Brown et al. (2011); Chevalier et al. (2013) for UK; Black et al. (2005) for Norway; 
Holmlund et al. (2011) for Sweden; Oreopoulous et al. (2006) for U.S., are the 
followers of this strategy. 
 
Other researchers used different instruments depending upon the nature of study and 
data availability, such as: Brown et al. (2011) use age at which NCDS respondents start 
full time schooling determined by the Local Education Authority (LEA) policy, and 
Carneiro et al. (2007) use exogenous changes in the cost of education. All of these 
instruments find a positive correlation among parental education and children’s 
education. 
 
Brown et al. (2011) use the British National Child Development Study to contribute to 
the intergenerational literature by investigating the relationship between the ability test 
scores (literacy and numeracy) of parents and children. They find that parents’ 
performance in reading and mathematics test scores is positively associated with the 
corresponding test scores of their children at a similar age. Further, the results of the 
study suggest that nurture effects are mainly responsible for the intergenerational 
correlation in literacy while inheritance is more important with respect to numeracy.   
 
Black et al. (2005) found high correlations between parents’ and children’s schooling 
mainly because of selection not causation. In order to generate exogenous variation in 
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parents’ education that is independent of endowments, they use changes in compulsory 
schooling laws as an instrument, introduced in different Norwegian municipalities in 
the 1960s in which compulsory schooling increased from 7 to 9 years. Due to this 
reform some parents experienced two extra years of schooling who wanted to leave 
school at their first opportunity. They found a small but significant relationship between 
mothers’ and sons’ schooling and no significant relationship between mothers’ and 
daughters’ schooling or fathers’ and sons’ schooling.  
 
Chevalier (2004) investigates the causal relationship between parental education and 
children’s education using a change in SLA in Britain (British Family Resource 
Survey) over a period of 1994-2002 on the probability of staying in full time education 
at age 16-18 using a probit model. He initially finds a positive impact of parental 
schooling on child’s educational outcomes: an additional year of parent’s education 
increases the probability of staying on by 4 to 8 percentage points. However the study is 
limited because there is no cross-sectional variation in the British compulsory schooling 
law, as legislation was implemented nationwide. The larger the variation in compulsory 
schooling reforms, the more precise the estimates. For example, Black et al. using 
Norwegian reforms exploit a larger variation across municipalities (700 municipalities). 
So, using such a big source of municipality - variation, they arrive at more precise 
estimates. While considering the nationwide implementation of the law, it is possible 
that the changes in the law intermingle with the trend changes in parental income.  
 
In order to investigate the discrepancies across methods Holmlund et al. (2008) applied 
three identification strategies: identical twins; adoptees; and instrumental variables to 
one particular Swedish data set.  The results of their study are consistent with the results 
of previous studies. They found that the maternal effect is half the paternal effect in 
twin samples. On the contrary the opposite holds in the case of adoptees samples. 
Instrumental variable estimates give no significant paternal schooling effect but a quite 
large maternal effect. In addition to the above, they find non linearity in the effect of 
education indicating larger parental education effects at higher levels of education. 
 
Finally a recent study by Dickson et al. (2016) studies the intergenerational mechanism 
between parents’ and children’s educational outcomes using the 1972 reform of school 
leaving age as an instrument in England and Wales using data from The Avon 
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Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) in the Avon
3
 area. Parents’ 
education is positively related to child educational outcomes at age 4 and continues 
until high stake exams taken at age 16. The parents who are affected by the reform gain 
results 0.1 standard deviations more than those parents who remain unaffected. The 
impact is stronger for the parents who are at the bottom of the educational distribution. 
He finds no difference across numeracy and literacy test scores. 
 
The main criticism of using changes in the minimum school leaving age as an 
instrument is that it only provides the LATE
4
 (Local Average Treatment Effect) 
estimates, certainly not comparable to OLS estimates, as the effect of this instrument on 
the population lying at the bottom of the schooling distribution is likely to be larger 
than at the top. It is due to the fact, that reform of school leaving age induce certain 
cohorts (with lower prior educational attainment) to increase their schooling as 
compared to previous cohorts. These changes are most likely to affect the proportion of 
people already at the margin of deciding whether to stay on or not.  
 
On the other hand such estimates are worth noting for the educational economists who 
are particularly interested about early school leavers. 
 
2.2.2 Intergenerational Mobility of Income 
Researchers have also looked at the effect of parents’ income on children’s educational 
outcomes as well when studying determinants of educational outcomes. Many studies 
do find an important effect for family income. A broad literature is based on the 
intergenerational transmission of income in the United States. Solon (1999) finds the 
more compressed income distribution leads to smaller correlations between parents’ 
and children’s outcomes. Despite the fact that children who are nurtured in less 
favourable circumstances achieve lower qualifications, Carnerio and Heckman (2003) 
find parental income does not affect children’s educational decisions, while parental 
education has a positive effect on children’s outcomes. Similarly, Mayer (1997) finds 
                                                          
3
 This is former administrative area in South West of England, which includes the city of Bristol. 
4
 The average treatment effect (ATE) is a measure used to compare treatments (or 'interventions) in 
randomized experiments, evaluation of policy interventions, and medical trials. The ATE measures the 
average causal difference in outcomes under the treatment and under the control. The Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) is the average of the unit level causal effect for the compliers. The use of 
RoSLA as an instrument identifies a local average treatment effect, since it has only relevance for those 
who are affected by the RoSLA. 
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only modest and a sometimes negligible effect of parents’ long-run income on 
children’s educational attainment in Norway. 
 
Chevalier (2004) finds that when fathers’ income is added to the schooling choice 
equation it shows no significant impact on the parental educational estimates, even 
though income on its own has a positive and significant effect. Blanden and Gregg 
(2004) using UK data find a positive relationship between parental income and the 
child’s educational outcome, although the study does not simultaneously provide the 
estimates for parental education. Loken (2010) using oil shocks as an instrument, finds 
no causal relationship between family income and children’s education in Norway. 
 
Chevalier et al. (2013) is notable for being one of the studies that control for both 
income and education as it distinguishes between the causal effects of parental income 
and parental education levels. The outcome variable in this study is a dummy variable 
defined as participation in post-compulsory education taken at age 16-18 estimated 
using a probit model. They use the Labour Force Survey (LFS) which is a quarterly 
survey of households in U.K. pooled it over the period 1993-2012. They use the 1972 
reform of school leaving age and month of birth to instrument the parents’ education. 
Least squares estimates reveal the same results consistent with previous literature, using 
IV methodology: larger effects of maternal schooling than paternal schooling. Income 
has a strong and significant impact on the children’s educational attainment. Further, 
controlling for parental income, IV results using a dummy variable for reform of school 
leaving age as an instrument reinforce the role of mothers’ education, particularly for 
daughters, whilst fathers’ education has no significant impact on sons’ or daughters’ 
schooling. 
 
In summary, there is consensus in the literature that these studies (twin, adoptees and 
IV) find that: more educated parents have more educated children because of higher 
education. So, there is not intergenerational mobility. If there is intergenerational 
mobility then one generation’s outcomes do not depend on the pervious generation’s 
outcomes. However it is uncertain, whether it is the education of mother, the education 
of fathers or the education of both parents that is crucial. In the same way it is unclear 
while measuring the total effect of parents’ education whether it is the nature or nurture 
that is the decisive factor. The present study is conducted in order to find out the cause 
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in the intergenerational literature mainly focusing on the nature and nurture effects of 
this mobility. 
 
It is well documented that compulsory schooling laws are good instruments as natural 
experiments providing the involuntary increases in schooling for those cohorts who 
want to leave school at their first opportunity. They are therefore frequently used as 
instruments as they are exogenously driven irrespective of gender, ethnicity, income, 
education, location and timing. 
 
Within the UK compared to Chevalier (2004) and Chevalier et al. (2013) the current 
study is using child education outcomes as attainment. Both the above studies are 
limited in their analysis of child education measures i.e. both studies use the decision to 
participate in post compulsory education as an outcome measure at age 16-18 which is 
just a yes or no pupil outcome variable. Compared to all other studies on 
intergenerational mobility the current study uses the parents having no qualifications as 
a measure of parents’ education which is more relevant since such parents are the ones 
most likely to be affected by the raising of the school leaving age. Also no previous 
study uses the LSYPE (Longitudinal Study of Young People in England) linked with 
the National Pupil Database (NPD) to answer this question. There are the benefits of 
using this dataset relative to the other data sets that have already been used in the 
literature. For example, ALSPAC is limited to one specific region of the country; LFS 
and FRS are ongoing surveys, and cover the whole population, but they are not cohort 
surveys, and are unlikely to have sufficient numbers of observations on just young 
people. LSYPE is a cohort survey and represent the young people in England. Also due 
to its feature of matching the NPD it allows us to use richer dataset of pupils’ education 
and schools variables which Chevalier (2004) and Chevalier et al. (2013) do not have. 
 
Similar to Chevalier (2004); Chevalier et al. (2013); Dickson et al. (2016), the current 
study uses the RoSLA of 1972 in England and Wales as a source of exogenous 
variation in the parents’ education. 
 
2.3 Data 
The analysis is carried out using data from the LSYPE (Longitudinal Study of Young 
People in England). The LSYPE is a cohort study of young people (born between 1, 
September, 1989 and 31, August, 1990) first observed in 2004 (wave 1) when they 
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were aged between 13 and 14 in Year 9 (or equivalent) of schools in England. Using 
multi-stage stratified sampling LSYPE gathered information on 15,770 households in 
wave one (2004), 13,539 in wave two (2005), 12,439, in wave three (2006), 11,449 in 
wave four (2007), 10,430 in wave 5 (2008) and 9,779 in wave 6 (2009).  
 
In LSYPE, every wave until four contains three types of questionnaires: family 
background, parental attitudes and young person. In the first four waves at least one 
parent/guardian was interviewed where possible along with the young person while 
from the fifth wave onwards interviews only took place with the young person. The 
analysis of this chapter uses the first wave of this study by merging three types of files, 
which includes the information about parental socio-economic status, personal 
characteristics, attitudes, experiences and behaviour, attainment in education, income 
and family environment and deprivation, the school(s) the young person attends and the 
young person’s future plans. The unique feature of this data set is that we are able to 
match it with the NPD, which enables us to access information about the school level 
variables and exam results throughout schools at Key Stage4
5
. 
 
In the UK educational context the statistic of interest is the proportion of early school 
leavers which is considered a problem. Raising the school leaving age has been a 
priority of recent governments. For example, in England and Wales it has been 
increased numerous times since the introduction of compulsory Education Act in 1870. 
The RoSLA that occurred in 1972 extended the minimum school leaving age in 
England and Wales from 15 to 16. Further it was increased to 17 years in 2013 and to 
18 years in 2015. Basically the RoSLA aimed to generate more skilled labour by 
providing an additional year of schooling to gain additional qualifications and skills. 
Due to the Education Act of 1972 individuals born before September 1957 could leave 
school at age 15, on the other hand those born after this date had to stay for an 
additional year of schooling
6
. This RoSLA brings a discontinuity in the education 
attained by the parents of the LSYPE sample, so the RoSLA behaves as a regression 
                                                          
5
 The National Curriculum in all schools in England is divided into the following key stages: 
Key Stage, Year, Age 
KS 1, Foundation 1 2 , 5-7 
KS 2, 3 4 5 6, 8-11 
KS 3, 7 8 9, 12-14 
KS 4, 10 11, 15-16 
At the end of key Stage 4, all students sit for GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) in a 
variety of subjects. 
 
6
 It is worth noting that there was a strict compliance of the RoSLA (Harmon and Walker, 1995). 
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discontinuity and picks up the effects of the policy change. It can be seen from Figure 
2.1 and Figure 2.2. There is a noticeable jump in the education of fathers’ and mothers’ 
born after the RoSLA was implemented (a lower rate of no qualifications). 
 
Since not all parents are affected by ROSLA as the very specific sample used is of a 
cohort of 13-14 year olds in 2004, and their parents. I.e. the sample of parents is 
restricted to those who have a 13/14 year old child in year 9 in 2004. The average age 
of fathers and mothers in current sample is 44 and 41 years respectively. Parents with 
an age more than 46 could leave school at 15 while those aged 46 or younger had to 
stay school for another year, until they turn at least 16. So, the younger group will have 
an exogenous increase in their schooling due the act in 1972. In the current sample 65% 
of fathers and 81% mothers are affected by the reform, i.e. those who were born after 
1957. 
 
Table 2.1: Frequency distributions of the instrumental variable for mothers’ 
education 
 
RoSLA mother Frequency Percent 
0 2,043 18.04 
1 9,284 81.96 
Total 11,327 100.00 
 
 
Table 2.2: Frequency distributions of the instrumental variable for fathers’ 
education 
 
RoSLA father Frequency Percent 
0 3,893 34.37 
1 7,434 65.63 
Total 11,327 100.00 
     
 
The frequency distribution of the two instrumental variables used in this study as 
separate instruments for fathers’ and mothers’ education are given in Table 2.1 and 
Table 2.2. In our sample 81% of mothers are affected by this reform and 65% of fathers 
are affected. Due to this reform these fathers and mothers have to stay at schools for an 
additional year. The proportions of sampled individuals allowed to leave school at 15 
are 18% for mothers and 34% for fathers i.e. those who were born before 1957. These 
tables show that the proportion of mothers affected by the raising of school leaving age 
(RoSLA), is greater than the proportion of fathers. The average age of fathers and 
mothers in the current dataset is 44 and 41 years respectively. Given the three years age 
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difference in fathers’ and mothers’ age, it makes sense that the number of mothers 
affected by RoSLA is more than that of fathers.  
 
In the current dataset we have a mixture of variables indicating parents such as: main 
parent/father/mother. In order to define them consistently, we use all 'father' and 
'mother' variables, rather than the 'main parent' variables. We also run the equations 
separately for mothers and fathers, rather than using their respective instruments in the 
same equation, so as to make sure that the instrument is applying to the correct person 
(i.e. RoSLAd on father's education and RoSLAm on mother's education). 
 
The formal qualifications for each parent are categorized into the following levels: 1 for 
no qualifications, 2 for less than five GCSEs or equivalent, 3 for five or more GCSEs or 
equivalent, 4 for A levels, 5 for Higher education below degree and 6 for Degree/higher 
degree. 
 
The analysis uses two dependent variables to measure the educational outcomes of 
pupils. One is the total GCSE/GNVQ total point score, having a maximum value in the 
data set  of 886 (see Table 2.4), GCSE points score awards 8 points for an A*, 7 points 
for an A, 6 points for a B etc. It is a way of summing total performance across all the 
GCSEs taken. The second, dependent variable is pass_ac, total number of 
GCSE/GNVQ qualifications at grades A*-C having a maximum at 19. Both are the 
qualifications taken at the end of compulsory schooling at the age of 16 and measured 
at the individual level in high stake exams. 
 
Chevalier et al. (2013) use an indicator of attaining five or more GCSEs graded A to C 
(a standard measure of educational achievement in the UK). Achieving five or more 
GCSEs at grade C or above as an important cut off point. Most schools will not allow 
pupils to stay on to do A levels if they have not achieved at least five GCSEs at least 
grade C. It is not considered here as the main indicator of pupil success, since it is a 
simple yes/no binary indicator and discards a lot of information that is available from 
the NPD on performance in each exam (as Chevalier did not have this). 
 
Turning now to the control variables another important indicator of socio-economic 
background, being in receipt of free school meals (FSM) provided to the children from 
low income families was tried initially, but found to be strongly correlated with parents’ 
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education measured by having no qualifications. Therefore, the log of annual family 
income is used. 
 
Schools in England are mainly classified as: community schools, independent schools, 
foundation schools and voluntary schools. Community schools are run by the local 
authority that sets the admission criteria such as the catchment area, employs the staff 
in school and owns the land and building of schools. Pupils attending these schools 
have to follow the national curriculum. The independent schools are private schools 
that charge the fees towards the cost of running the school. The pupils do not 
necessarily follow the national curriculum and schools are maintained by a governing 
body instead of a local education authority and admission criteria and school policies 
are governed by the head teacher and governing body that supports the head teacher. 
 
The description of variables used in the study is given in Table 2.3. Descriptive 
statistics for these variables used in equation (1) are shown in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.3: Description of Variables 
 
Variables Description 
 
Total  GCSE point score (Dependent variable) 
 
Total GCSE/GNVQ point score 
 
Total number of GCSE passed (Dependent 
variable) 
 
Total number of GCSE/GNVQ qualifications 
at grades A*-C 
 
Female 
 
1= female 
0 = male 
 
Ethnicity 
[ Reference category = White] 
 
 
1= White 2= Mixed 3= Indian 4= Pakistani 5= 
Bangladeshi 6=  Otherasian 7= Black 
Health problems 1 = individual has no disability  
0 = otherwise  
  
Household income Log of household income 
 
Household income missing Household income missing 
 
Parents meeting Attend meeting of parents and teachers 
1 = yes  
0 = no 
 
Father’s education 
[ Reference category = Father edu: degree] 
 
1= Father edu: no qualifications 
2= Father edu: less than five GCSEs or 
equivalent 
3= Father edu: five or more GCSEs or 
equivalent 
4= Father edu: A levels 
5= Father edu: Higher education below degree 
level 
6= Father edu: higher degree/degree 
 
Mother’s education 
[ Reference category = Mother edu: degree] 
 
 
1= Mother edu: no qualifications 
2= Mother edu : less than five GCSEs or 
equivalent  
3= Mother edu: five or more GCSEs or 
equivalent 
4= Mother edu : A levels 
5= Mother edu: Higher education below 
degree level 
6= Mother edu: higher degree/degree 
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Average parental age 
 
Average of father’s age and mother’s age 
School pass rate Proportion of pupils getting 5 or more GCSEs 
 
Working status of parents 
[Reference category = Neither parents 
working] 
1= single parent working 
2= both parents working 
3 = neither parent working 
 
Help at home in studying 1= yes  
0= no 
 
Future aspirations 
 
1= continuing education 
0= otherwise 
 
Number of siblings 
 
Number of siblings of young person in 
household 
 
School type 
[ Reference category = community schools] 
 
1= community schools 
2= independent schools 
3=  foundation schools 
4 = voluntary schools 
 
House type 
[Reference category = rented house] 
1= owned house 
2 = rented house 
3= others 
 
Computer at home 
 
Computer at home 
1= yes 
0 = no 
 
Notes: The variable household income missing is to allow for the lower number of observations on 
this variable. 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  S.D Min. Max. 
Total GCSE point score  394.63 144.25 0 886 
Number of GCSE passed  6.69  4.09 0 19 
Female  0.49 0.49 0 1 
Mixed  0.04 0.21 0 1 
Indian 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Pakistani 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Bangladeshi 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Other Asians 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Black 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Whites (base category) 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Health status  0.12 0.33 0 1 
Log of household annual income  7.52  4.43 0 13.12 
Household Income missing 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Parents meeting  0.28  0.45 0 1 
Father no qualifications  0.24  0.42 0 1 
Father less than five GCSEs 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Father five or more GCSEs 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Father A levels 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Father Higher education  0.11 0.31 0 1 
Father degree (base category) 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Mother no qualifications  0.24 0.42 0 1 
Mother less than five GCSEs 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Mother five or more GCSEs 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Mother A levels 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Mother Higher education  0.13  0.33 0 1 
Mother degree (base category) 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Average parental age 43.22 5.70 28.5 65.5 
Working status of single parent 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Working status of both parent  0.67  0.47 0 1 
Neither parent working (base category) 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Help at home in studying  0.83 0.38 0 1 
Future aspiration  0.80  0.40 0 1 
No of siblings  1.67  1.19 0 11 
Independent  schools  0.05  0.21 0 1 
Foundation schools  0.17  0.37 0 1 
Voluntary schools  0.14  0.34 0 1 
Community schools (base category) 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Owned house  0.81  0.39 0 1 
Rented house (base category) 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Others  0.01 0.10 0 1 
Computer at home  0.56 0.34 0 1 
School pass rate 51.71 21.04 0 100 
Number of Observations fathers’ sample 8380    
Number of Observations mothers’ sample 8387    
Notes: The data were cleaned for measurement error in fathers’ age and mothers’ age variables since 
there were some extreme ages, for-example there were a few parents having recorded age as 18 years and 
97 years, who are unlikely to have 13/14 years old children. These parents are dropped from the analysis. 
They are probably data entry mistakes. Further, due to missing values on some of other control variables 
and having a common sample across all three specifications within fathers’ and mothers’ equations, the 
current analysis arrive at 8380 observations for fathers and 8387 for mothers. 
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2.4 Methodology 
 
This chapter is concerned with answering the question: What is the effect of parents’ 
education on their children’s education using OLS and IV methods, the latter 
accounting for the endogeneity bias? Initially, an OLS methodology is adopted. The 
OLS procedure includes all the controls for child, family and school characteristics. 
 
The specific issue in this chapter is that the parental education variable could 'pick up' 
the effect of both parents’ genes and parents' parenting style. IV is used purely to 
distinguish between these two 'causes' of the intergenerational correlation. So the IV is 
used to identify variation in parental education that could not possibly be correlated 
with genes, so if it still affects children's outcomes, then it must be working via the 
upbringing route. So if the analysis finds an exogenous increase in parents' education, it 
can only be correlated with (and so pick up) the effect of things that happen after that 
education (upbringing of their children) and not things that happen before that 
education (genetic make-up of the parents). 
 
The RoSLA of the school leaving age of 1972, which raised the school leaving age 
from 15 to 16 years, serves as a source of exogenous variation that is used as an 
instrument. Our empirical model is summarized as following: 
 
Yi
child
 = β0 + β1 Xi
child 
+ β2 Xi
family
+ β3 X i
school 
+ β4 Xi
 peer 
+ β5 FEdui / β6 MEdui + εi       (1) 
 
Where  i = 1.... n denotes the child. 
 
 Yi
child 
 = Student academic achievement in school (Total GCSE points score) 
Xi
child
  = Vector describing characteristics of the child 
Xi
family
  = Vector describing characteristics of the families 
Xi
school
  = Vector describing characteristics of the school 
Xi
peer  
= Vector capturing peer effects 
εi  =  Error term 
 
In equation (1) Yi
child
, is the children’s educational outcomes, as measured by 
performance in GCSE examinations taken at age 16,. Xi
child
 is a vector containing 
variables gender, ethnicity, health status and future aspirations, Xi
family
 indicates log of 
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household income, whether parents attend school meetings, parental age, working 
status of parents ( i.e. whether one, both or neither parents are working), home owned / 
rented, help at home in studying and number of siblings, X i
school
 includes school type 
(independent / foundation / voluntary), Xi
 peer 
indicates the proportion of pupils in the 
respondent's school who get 5 or more GCSEs. So it is a school level variable, and so 
can be used as an explanatory variable to pick up peer effects. FEdui and MEdui record 
the father’s and mother’s qualifications respectively. The εi is the error term which 
represents the effects of all other determinants of performance including the 
unobservable attributes of the child. 
 
Our interest lies in ascertaining whether there exists a positive relationship between 
children’s educational outcomes and parents’ qualifications, that is, whether β5 and β6 > 
0 and also to know the cause of any such positive relationship. Three possible reasons 
will be considered. The children who have parents with higher qualifications could 
benefit through genes, through higher income or through other factors related to high 
skill level via upbringing. Three versions of equation (1) are estimated. In the first, the 
only control variables are gender, ethnicity, health status, and numbers of siblings as all 
of these variables are the most exogenous variables in the model. This specification 
therefore estimates the raw (least conditioned) intergenerational coefficients between 
parents’ and children’s education. 
 
The second specification adds different school control variables namely school type, 
and proportion of children getting 5 or more GCSEs.  
 
The third specification includes family income variables such as whether the family 
owns their house or lives in rented accommodation, log of household income and 
working status of parents. In this way comparing the intergenerational coefficients 
before and after the inclusion of school related and family income variables will 
indicate whether this intergenerational relationship exists through the latter variables or 
there is no effect on intergenerational coefficients after controlling for these schools and 
family income attributes. 
 
The final specification is estimated using two stage least square (2SLS), where equation 
(2) and (3) serve as a first stage in which the RoSLA of school leaving age is used as an 
instrumental variable, and then replacing fathers’ and mothers’ education in the second- 
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stage regression (based on equation 1) with their predicted values,   Edui and   Edui 
based on estimating equations (2) and (3).  
 
FEdui = α0 + α1RoSLA
D + α 2Xi
c + α3Xi
f + α4Xi
s + α5Xi
p 
+ εi2                                       ( 2) 
 
MEdui = γ0 + γ1RoSLA
M + γ2Xi
c + γ3Xi
f + γ4Xi
s + γ5Xi
p
 + εi3    (3) 
 
The estimate of β5 and β6 therefore estimates, conditional on covariates, the effect of 
parents’ education on child schooling using only the part of the variation in parent’s 
education caused by the RoSLA. This strategy is the one we apply in this study and 
similar to other studies (Oreopoulos et al., 2003; 2006). 
 
In equation (2) and (3) RoSLA is the dummy variable, which takes the value of one if 
the individuals were affected by the RoSLA, and zero otherwise. RoSLA
D 
and RoSLA
M
 
are the dummies for the fathers’ and mothers’ respectively. In our dataset due to the 
RoSLA of 1972, parents born before September 1957 could leave school at 15, while 
the parents who were born after September 1957, are affected by this RoSLA as a result 
of which, they had to stay at school for an additional year. In this way the education act 
of 1972 brings a discontinuity in the education obtained by the parents. The use of this 
RoSLA can isolate the exogenous variation in parents’ education.  
 
With the instrumental variable (IV) technique, the identification depends on the quality 
of the instrument. In order to obtain consistent estimates of β5 using two stage least 
square (2SLS) on equation (1) and (2), two assumptions must be fulfilled by the 
instrument: 1)  RoSLA has to be correlated with parents’ education and 2) RoSLA has 
to be uncorrelated with the error term (εi1).  
 
So in order to identify the nurture effect, an instrumental variables approach is used. 
The selection process of an instrumental variable is not straightforward as, especially in 
small samples, IV estimation might produce biased estimates. Also, there is an 
additional problem of choosing a weak instrument even when benefitting from a large 
sample. The first step followed in order to choose a suitable instrumental variable was 
to test the validity of the first assumption, known as the test of relevance. In the first 
stage regression results it can be seen that in all models and samples the coefficient on 
the instrument is significant. 
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In order to test whether there is a weak instrument problem or not, two approaches are 
considered. Baum et al. (2007) and Stock et al. (2002) suggest that an F statistic in the 
first stage regression that exceeds 10 may be deemed reliable when one endogenous 
regressor exists. In addition the Cragg-Donald F-statistic must exceed the critical 
values, which were tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005) for the first-stage F-statistic to 
test whether instruments are weak. From Table 2.5, it may be seen that for the sample 
of mothers, the F-statistic is continuously over 10 for each of the outcome measures. 
For these samples, the instruments are seen as reliable and valid. 
 
It should be noted that the F-statistic to test for joint significance of the coefficients in 
the first stage regression is always found to be significant thus the instruments have 
significant explanatory power for fathers’ education and mothers’ education once 
controlling for other exogenous variables. It may be argued that although the instrument 
performs well for mothers’ and fathers’ case. However, for the fathers’ sample, only in 
specification 3, the F-statistic is just the borderline at 10.74.This will be considered 
when evaluating the results. 
 
To summarise, the instrument seems to perform well under the testing procedure and 
indicates validity, relevance and in most cases does not show any signs of the weak 
instrument problem except in model 3 in the fathers’ sample. The instrument does not 
seems to indicate complete weakness for the fathers’ sample so it is still worth 
comparing the IV results with the OLS results for this sample. 
 
 
Table 2.5: Instrumental variable testing 
 
 Fathers’ education Mothers’ education 
Specification 1 F-value = 23.09 F-value = 62.08 
Specification 2 F-value = 22.87 F-value = 55.39 
Specification 3 F-value = 10.74 F-value = 38.84 
 
Notes: Specification 1: Child characteristics. 
Specification 2: Child characteristics and school characteristics. 
Specification 3: Child characteristics, school characteristics and family characteristics. 
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In order to measure fathers’ and mothers’ education, dummy variables were used 
indicating if the father and mother have no qualifications. It can be seen from Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 given below that the RoSLA brings a shift in the scatter plot for both 
fathers’ education and mothers’ education when measured by no qualifications. Other 
measures of fathers’ and mothers’ education have been tried, but did not appear to be as 
closely related to parents’ age with a break in the series around the time of the RoSLA 
(see appendix, Figure A2.1 to A2.6). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and Proportion of 
Fathers’ Education (with no qualifications) by Age 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and Proportion of 
Mothers’ Education (with no qualifications) by Age 
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However the effect of the RoSLA is not identical for fathers and mothers.  Figure 2.1 
suggests that for fathers the relationship is more flat around the RoSLA time relative to 
mothers. The cut-off age is 46 years for fathers and mothers as the RoSLA affected 
anyone born after 1st September, 1957. LSYPE was first undertaken in 2004. So by 
2004, those affected would be 46 (or younger) as the survey was earlier in the year than 
September. So the cut-off age is 46. Any parent aged 46 or younger will have been 
affected by the RoSLA in 1972 and will have had to stay in school until at least 16. Any 
parent aged above 46 could have left school at 15.  So the younger group will have an 
exogenous increase in their education, due to the RoSLA. We focused on the group of 
parents who are most likely to be affected by the RoSLA, these are the people who 
have no qualifications (Black et al, 2003). 
 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the relationship between the instrument and the proportions of 
fathers and mothers with no qualifications, by age. The figures show that those 
individuals who left school before the RoSLA are more likely to have no qualifications. 
It is obvious from both graphs that the RoSLA of 1972 has created a discontinuity 
(break in the series around the time of the RoSLA) and captures the effect of the policy 
change. It is near the current age of those parents affected by RoSLA (age 46). This 
makes sense, since the RoSLA is likely to affect people at the bottom of education 
distribution the most. 
 
All the parents are not affected by the RoSLA since current sample is restricted to only 
those parents having children of age 13/14 years in 2004. Therefore, this is a very 
specific sample with some unusual patterns emerge in these graphs, Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
Further, these graphs seem to suggest that for the fathers the proportion with no 
qualifications does start increasing around the mid-forties, though it is quite slowly at 
first, and it only really takes off after the mid-50s. For mothers, there is a clearer rise in 
the proportion with no qualifications after the mid forties. It is true that the proportion 
with no qualifications rises again amongst the younger mothers aged less than mid-30s, 
but this is not surprising as if they are a mother of a 13/14 year old at this age, then they 
had their child around the age of 20. Girls who have children this young are likely to 
have dropped out early from education. 
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Regarding the other graphs in the appendix, the story across all of these other graphs 
remains that there does not seem to be as clear a break at age 46 for these other 
education categories, which is why the current study focuses on no qualifications as the 
main variable in the analysis. The fact that in current study we have a very particular 
sample of parents (parents of 13/14 year olds in 2004), this can also explain the unusual 
patterns on some of the other figures e.g. Figure A2.2 - the one for whether they hold a 
degree or not, in the same way as explained here the high proportion with no 
qualifications amongst young mothers. 
 
All three specifications estimated for fathers and mothers control for average parental 
age as parents’ age could have a differential impact while nurturing their children. 
Trillingsgaard and Sommer (2016) explore the association between maternal age and 
children’s socioeconomic development measured as behavioural, social and emotional 
difficulties at age 7, 11, and 15 and found that being an older mother is positively 
related to her child’s socioeconomic development. Results of this study highlight that 
patience, maturity, and mental flexibility that come along with age give a better 
parenting style. So it is important to control for parents’ age. In the current study the 
effect of average parental age is positive and strongly significant on children’s total 
points score in all specifications. The effect of this variable is strong to an extent that if 
models are estimated without these, the effects of parents’ education on children’s 
education are peculiar i.e., become negatively significant. This is due the correlation 
between parent education and parent age. 
 
 
While estimating fathers’ and mothers’ specifications, the possibility of controlling for 
their respective age was considered but the resulting IV estimates were meaningless due 
to the high correlation as parents' age is strongly related to the RoSLA instrument, since 
whether they are affected by the RoSLA is defined by their age.  The correlation 
between the RoSLA instrument for the mother and mother’s age and between the 
RoSLA instrument for the father and father’s age is 0.71 and 0.76 respectively. 
Therefore the average age of both parents is used since this picks up the general age 
effect of parents without being too strongly correlated with the RoSLA variable for one 
particular parent. 
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 Similar to other studies on intergenerational mobility in education, the current study 
faces the issue of high standard errors on coefficients on parents’ education. Although 
in the current study the standard errors on the instrumented parental education are high 
but still most of the IV results are significant. Silles (2011) finds very high standard 
errors on parents’ education leading to the IV estimates becoming insignificant on 
parents’ education.  
 
2.5 Results 
 
2.5.1 OLS Results 
Beyond this point, we use fathers’ education and mothers’ education measured by 
fathers and mothers having no qualifications respectively, remembering that the RoSLA 
has bite at the bottom of the education distribution. Throughout the chapter the 
coefficient on father’s and mother’s educations only are presented in all tables in the 
interest of brevity. 
 
The raw intergenerational education coefficient, controlling for child characteristics 
only, is -74.85 for fathers’ education and -76.61 for mothers’ education as shown in 
Table 2.6. This means that if the father and mother have no qualifications, it will lead to 
a 74 point and 76 point decrease in children’s total points score respectively. 
 
 
Table 2.6: Intergenerational coefficients on fathers’ and mothers’ education: OLS 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification l  
Pupil characteristics only  
-74.850*** 
(3.803) 
-76.607*** 
(4.072) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
R
2
 0.12 0.12 
Specification 2  
Pupil and school characteristics 
-54.475*** 
(3.626) 
-51.859*** 
(3.910) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
R
2
 0.23 0.22 
Specification 3  
Pupil, school & family characteristics 
-33.122*** 
(3.490) 
-27.442*** 
(3.825) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
R
2
 0.33 0.33 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Specification 2 includes numerous control variables for the school of the child, and the 
values of the intergenerational education coefficients of -54.47 and -51.86 show that 
these control variables have a clear impact on the intergenerational coefficients for 
fathers’ and mothers’ education. Thus, the effect of fathers’ and mothers’ education on 
children’s performance in GCSE exams is partly being transmitted through these school 
control variables, that is better educated parents sending their children to better schools. 
 
The third specification adds various family control variables, for example, household 
income, working status of parents, house tenure, parents’ meeting at schools etc. The 
results from this specification (with coefficients of -33.12 for fathers’ education and -
27.44 for mothers’ education) show that the effect of fathers’ and mothers’ education 
also exists through these latter variables. Thus, the source of the correlation between 
parents’ education and child performance occurs at least in part through the school and 
family variables i.e. parents with no qualifications have lower-achieving children, partly 
due to a lower income and other adverse upbringing effects. 
 
2.5.2 IV Results 
The IV method isolates random variation in fathers’ education and mothers’ education 
due to the RoSLA, raising of the school leaving age, as this cannot be transmitted 
genetically. Two- Stage Least Squares is used since a linear equation is estimated in the 
second stage. Again three specifications are estimated. The first one is just controlling 
for child characteristics only, the second adds numerous control variables for the school 
of the child, and the third specification includes various family control variables. 
Results from the IV method are higher than the corresponding OLS estimates which 
could be downward biased due to measurement error as measurement error biases 
towards zero. The coefficients on fathers’ education and mothers’ education are 
reported in Table 2.7.  
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Table 2.7: Intergenerational Coefficients on parents’ education: IV Results 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 4  
Pupil characteristics only  
-223.740*** 
(78.799) 
-161.464*** 
(48.650) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 23.09 62.08 
Specification 5  
Pupil and school characteristics 
-197.383*** 
(75.539) 
-121.216*** 
(49.077) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 22.87 55.39 
Specification 6  
Pupil, school & family characteristics 
-128.426 
(101.501) 
-103.912* 
(57.497) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 10.74 38.40 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
As found in the existing literature, the IV estimates of fathers’ education and mothers’ 
education are larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. The IV strategy isolates the 
exogenous variation in fathers’ and mothers’ education due to the effect of the 1972 
RoSLA and as such could not be passed on genetically to the children because such 
variation will be orthogonal to genes so any established link between parents and 
children education can be attributed to nurture effects only.  
 
The IV results, therefore, shows that having removed any genetic effect, there is an 
intergenerational relationship between parents’ education and children’s performance, 
suggesting that the source of relationship is not a genetic effect. The results further 
suggest that the effect of nurture (upbringing) is mainly responsible for the 
intergenerational relationship and rejects the idea that genetic effects are the dominant 
source of the intergenerational relationship. One possible reason for the fact that the IV 
coefficients not only lose none of their value compared to the OLS coefficients but are 
actually considerably larger is that our instrument is correcting for measurement error, 
that is, measurement error in the education variable causes the OLS estimates to be 
downward biased, but this is corrected by the IV procedure. However, it is also 
consistent with a LATE interpretation, as the parents who are affected by the RoSLA 
are most likely to have a lower level of educational qualifications as compared to the 
average parents and an increase in the education for parents at the lower end of the 
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distribution may have more effect on their children then a further increase in education 
for parents already at the top of the education distribution. These results are consistent 
with the study of Chevalier (2004).  
 
Within this chapter the standard errors on IV estimates
7
 are found to be higher, as 
studies by Silles (2011), Black et al. (2005) and Chevalier et al. (2013) also found 
higher standard errors on IV estimates. As a consequence of this they found 
insignificant IV estimates for fathers’ and mothers’ education. Compared to them, even 
though the standard errors are high, the current study finds most of the IV estimates are 
significant. 
 
From marriage market effects it is known that men and women tend to marry 
assortatively by qualification i.e. individuals who hold a CSE/O-level are much more 
likely to be married to someone with a qualification than is an unqualified individual. 
They also tend to marry with a couple of years’ age gap, with the man being a bit older. 
 
This raises the question of whether the positive correlation in partners’ qualifications is 
partially a causal relationship: does holding a qualification make one more likely to 
marry someone with a qualification. The evidence suggests yes (Anderberg and Zhu, 
2014). That would then make the partner’s qualification dependent on your own 
qualification which is a problem when we run regressions on e.g. only the mother or 
only the father. 
 
It is also not clear how this works over the RoSLA: consider the women born in 1957 
who have more qualifications due to the RoSLA. These women are now more likely to 
marry more qualified males. By the typical husband wife age gap, these first-affected 
women would tend to marry pre-RoSLA men. Hence their higher qualification may not 
have been associated with a higher rate of qualification among their husbands (but 
possibly better “quality” on other dimensions – ability, social background etc.). Hence 
the effect of a woman being RoSLA affected may be low since her qualification was 
not associated with higher qualifications for her husband.  
 
                                                          
7
 Results are checked after dropping these variables (parental aspiration and study support); the results 
remain qualitatively the same as the previous results. 
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In contrast, consider the first RoSLA affected men: they would typically marry women 
born around 1960 (that is, into the post-RoSLA period). For these first-RoSLA affected 
men, a qualification may well have ensured a qualified wife. Hence being RoSLA 
affected may have increased the spouse qualification more for men than for women. 
 
These effects may affect the validity of the IV approach, and may help account for the 
asymmetric findings for mother/father. 
 
In the present study, the standard errors in the fathers’ education equation are bigger 
than in the mothers’ education. It suggests that there is more noise in the IV estimates 
for fathers’ education relative to mothers’ education. It could be due to one of these 
things explained above. 
 
However, as far as the interpretation of the IV estimates is concerned, caution should be 
taken to account for the LATE (Local Average Treatment Effect) nature of these 
estimates, due to the fact that the IV estimate is specific to those affected by the 
instrument, RoSLA. This implies that the effects of education reform is not 
homogenous for all the parents, instead it is relevant to those parents who have a lower 
level of qualifications and lower preference for education (parents who wished to leave 
school at their earliest opportunity i.e. at 15), hence lying at the bottom of the education 
distribution. There is no effect for parents who are higher in the education distribution. 
This is consistent with (Chevalier, 2004; Imbens and Angrist, 1994) 
 
 
2.6 Robustness checks 
 
The identification strategy assumes that due to the RoSLA, there will be an increase in 
the amount of schooling of those parents who are affected by the RoSLA. In this 
section a number of modifications are made to the estimated relationships in the 
previous section, in order to assess the robustness of the results. 
 
2.6.1 Restricted Sample around the RoSLA 
The results for robustness checks are presented in the table below. In this study our 
identification strategy assumes that the RoSLA has increased the parents’ schooling. 
However, there is a possibility that the RoSLA has no identifying power and results 
might be caused by the unobservable differences between those affected and unaffected 
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by the RoSLA and cohort effects, although we have controlled for parents’ age. For 
example, current 60 years old and 30 years old parents may have had large differences 
in parenting their children as compared with the differences between the current 40 
years and 50 years old parents. For this reason, we restrict the sample to those parents 
in the close vicinity of the RoSLA (born five years before and after the RoSLA) to 
capture the treatment effect as tightly as possible. The frequency distribution of mothers 
and fathers affected by RoSLA for the restricted sample is given below in Table 2.8 and 
2.9.  
 
Table 2.8: Frequency distributions of the instrumental variable for mothers’ 
education in restricted sample 
 
RoSLA mother Frequency Percent 
0 1,381 28.14 
1 3,527 71.86 
Total 4,908 100.00 
 
 
Table 2.9: Frequency distributions of the instrumental variable for fathers’ 
education in restricted sample 
 
RoSLA dad Frequency Percent 
0 2,009 34.91 
1 3,745 65.09 
Total 5,754 100.00 
 
In choosing the size of window there is a trade off between comparing parents born just 
after and before the RoSLA and increasing the sample size by allowing a wider window 
on each side of the discontinuity. The former reduces any bias resulting from the 
treatment effect when moving further away from the time of the policy change and the 
latter improves the precision of the estimates. I chose the 5 years before and after the 
RoSLA to get a reasonable sample size so that precision of estimates is not sacrificed. 
This restricted sample therefore controls for these differences in unobserved 
characteristics by comparing people of similar age who were affected and unaffected by 
the RoSLA, thus enabling us to make a fairer comparison of parents.  
 
Comparing the results in Table 2.10 to Table 2.6 shows that estimating the sample in 
this way has not greatly affected the OLS results. Note that to have a common sample 
across fathers’ and mothers’ specifications, both parents would need to be in the 5 year 
age window. For any couple with a larger age difference, one parent could be outside 
40 
 
the window, and so both would be dropped when using a consistent sample. A 
consistent sample for the 5 year window robustness check and in other results is 
therefore not used. 
 
Table 2.10: OLS Results for 5 years restricted sample around the RoSLA 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
` 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 7  
Pupil characteristics only  
-83.955*** 
(5.275) 
-79.185*** 
(6.372) 
No. of observations 4362 3784 
R
2
 0.11 0.09 
Specification 8  
Pupil and school characteristics 
-63.422*** 
(5.047) 
-51.008*** 
(6.105) 
No. of observations 4362 3784 
R
2
 0.21 0.21 
Specification 9  
Pupil, school & family characteristics 
-39.989*** 
(4.880) 
-25.263*** 
(6.00) 
No. of observations 4362 3784 
R
2
 0.32 0.31 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 Looking at the IV results for the full set of controls in Table 2.11, and comparing them 
to the IV results in Table 2.7, the restricted results are similar, for fathers. 
 
Table 2.11: IV Results for 5 years Restricted Sample around the RoSLA 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification l0  
Pupil characteristics only  
-201.655** 
(87.762) 
25.236 
(117.305) 
No. of observations 4362 3784 
F 17.54 11.92 
Specification  11  
Pupil and school characteristics 
-199.114*** 
(84.711) 
-3.407 
(104.106) 
No. of observations 4362 3784 
F 18.00 13.15 
Specification 12  
Pupil, school & family characteristics 
-129.777 
(110.907)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
-71.316 
(86.690)
No. of observations 4362 3784 
F 9.02 18.26 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
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However, the results for mothers in the restricted sample are radically different as they 
become insignificant, but similar results have been found before in the literature - e.g. a 
famous study by Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) who found a significant effect of 
mothers' education in their OLS equation, but insignificant for their within-twin pair 
estimates (the latter blocking off the genetic effect and so isolating the upbringing 
effect).  
 
Another study by Silles (2011) found the instrumental variable estimates are not 
sufficiently precise to find that either parent’s schooling has a beneficial effect on 
children’s cognitive and non- cognitive development. In Britain Chevalier et al. (2013) 
found an insignificant IV effect of maternal education on their children’s decision to 
continue in education, using the 1972 RoSLA. 
 
These results confirm the validity of the identification strategy in that differences in the 
ages of parents affected by the RoSLA do not seem to be driving the results in case of 
fathers. Thus, the RoSLA has created an exogenous variation (increase) in fathers’ 
education. 
 
However, caution should be taken in the interpretation of the IV models. As in the 
present study the results for mothers are not robust for the restricted sample for five 
years around the RoSLA. It could be possible that the true upbringing effect for 
mothers is zero, and this analysis is accurately estimating that. But it should be noted 
that there is still some intergenerational effect coming through the other parent (father). 
However the instrumental variable estimates can only be interpreted as Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) – as the RoSLA has not a homogenous effect on the post-
RoSLA cohorts (as shown in the figures A2.1 to A2.6 in appendices). My results are 
conditional for being of stable homes and both parents. 
 
2.6.2 Using number of GCSEs passed as a dependent variable 
In this part again three specifications are estimated by OLS and IV, using number of 
GCSEs passed as another dependent variable. Although the total points score is a better 
measure of student outcome as it has a lot of variation, but an employer may be 
interested in knowing the number of GCSEs passed. The results given in Tables 2.12 
and 2.13 remain qualitatively the same as in the previous case when using total points 
score as a dependent variable. 
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Table 2.12: Intergenerational coefficients on fathers’ and mothers’ 
education using OLS. 
Dependent variable is children’s number of GCSE passed. 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 13  
Pupil characteristics only  
-2.069*** 
(0.108) 
-2.261*** 
(0.115) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
R
2
 0.11 0.12 
Specification 14  
Pupil and school characteristics 
-1.517*** 
(0.104) 
-1.597*** 
(0.111) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
R
2
 0.21 0.21 
Specification 15  
Pupil, school & family characteristics 
-0.902*** 
(0.098) 
-0.911*** 
(0.109) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
R
2
 0.32 0.32 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table 2.13: Intergenerational Coefficients on parents’ education: IV Results 
Dependent variable is children’s number of GCSE passed. 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 16  
Pupil characteristics only  
-6.656*** 
(2.274) 
-4.091*** 
(1.366) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 23.09 62.08 
Specification 17  
Pupil and school characteristics 
-6.015*** 
(2.201) 
-3.043*** 
(1.392) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 22.87 55.39 
Specification 18  
Pupil, school & family 
characteristics 
-4.236 
(2.959) 
-2.473* 
(1.621) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 10.74 38.84 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
2.6.3 Controlling for the education of both parents 
So far we have looked at the effect of father’s education and mother’s education on 
children’s education independently using their respective instruments. However one 
potential criticism could be that these estimates measure the direct effects of each 
parent’s education including the indirect effects coming through the assortative mating.   
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The current data reveals that 24% of mothers and 24% of fathers have education 
measured as no qualifications. Given that parents have identical schooling levels and 
due to potential correlations
8
 between each other’s endowments and schooling due to 
non-random marital sorting, then this may lead to upward biased estimates. 
 
Therefore it is important to consider the intergenerational effect of the partner’s 
schooling. Due to the endogenous nature of father’s education and mother’s education, 
we used the appropriate gender instrument for each. 
 
When including both parents’ education to isolate the direct effect of each parent’s 
education from indirect effects coming through assortative mating effects, we found an 
interesting results: the mother’s education effect outweighs the father's education effect. 
The coefficients on mother's education are significant in all three IV specifications but 
father's education has insignificant coefficients, once controlling for mother's education 
in all three specifications.  The IV results are given in Table 2.14. 
 
 
Table 2.14: Intergenerational Coefficients on parents’ education: IV Results 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
Controlling for both parents’ education: full sample 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 19 
Pupil characteristics only  
-96.817 
(74.230) 
-176.464*** 
(46.768) 
No. of observations 8367  
F 12.61  
Specification 20 
Pupil and school characteristics  
-94.484 
(68.624) 
-143.352*** 
(46.650) 
No. of observations 8367  
F 13.25  
Specification 21 
Pupil, school & family characteristics  
-62.290 
(85.877) 
-135.962** 
(63.755) 
No. of observations 8367  
F 6.15  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 These correlations arise from the fact that women with better levels of schooling tend to have children 
with better educated men who may also be better endowed. 
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In all specifications, the impact of mothers’ education is larger in terms of magnitudes 
and significance than fathers’ education (the latter being insignificant in all three IV 
specifications) as also found by Black et al. (2005). It could be due to the reason that 
children spend more time with their mother than their fathers. 
 
Another interesting point in the first stage regressions, when both of the RoSLA 
instruments are used, the appropriate gender one (i.e. RoSLAm for mothers and 
RoSLAf for fathers) is the one with the largest coefficient, and often is the significant 
one while the inappropriate-gender instrument gets an insignificant coefficient. This is 
re-assuring, and suggests the instruments used in this study contain real information. 
 
Another concern while using both parents’ education simultaneously is a potential high 
correlation between instruments used together in the same specification. Contrary to 
Chevalier et al.’s (2013) study who found a high correlation of 0.67 between the 
RoSLA instrument of father and mother, the correlation between the instruments for 
father and mother in the current study is 0.51, which is not as high compared to their 
study. So in this particular model while using both parents’ education simultaneously, it 
seems less likely that results are driven by the high correlation between instruments. 
 
Further, it is interesting to explore further the effect of both parents’ education on sons 
and daughters separately. And further, these IV results remain robust across 
specifications in most cases when splitting the sample for boys and girls. Results are 
given in Tables 2.15 and 2.16. These results confirm that mothers’ education has a 
bigger impact for both sons and daughters. This finding is contrary to Chevalier et al. 
(2013) who found strong IV effects of paternal education for daughters. 
 
 
  
45 
 
Table 2.15: Intergenerational Coefficients on parents’ education: IV Results 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
Controlling for both parents’ education: Girls sample 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 22 
Pupil characteristics only  
-188.343 
(146.253) 
-206.707*** 
(74.362) 
No. of observations 4114  
F 3.37  
Specification 23 
Pupil and school characteristics  
-162.125 
(135.351) 
-186.617*** 
(75.350) 
No. of observations 4114  
F 3.50  
Specification 24 
Pupil, school & family characteristics  
-189.637 
(260.025) 
-216.912 
(165.483) 
No. of observations 4114  
F 0.86  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table 2.16: Intergenerational Coefficients on parents’ education: IV Results 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
Controlling for both parents’ education: Boys sample 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 25 
Pupil characteristics only  
-46.962 
(86.638) 
-178.579*** 
(68.355) 
No. of observations 4253  
F 9.76  
Specification 26 
Pupil and school characteristics  
-63.129 
(78.804) 
-125.567*** 
(65.877) 
No. of observations 4253  
F 10.16  
Specification 27 
Pupil, school & family characteristics  
-25.979 
(83.194) 
-113.122 
(79.699) 
No. of observations 4253  
F 6.95  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
2.6.4 Highly educated  
The 1972 education act increased the compulsory schooling from age 15 to age 16. As 
previously explained in the chapter, as a result of this RoSLA, one should expect a 
small effect of the RoSLA on education attainment of those parents who are highly 
educated. 
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To verify this, we estimated the IV models on the restricted sample of those individuals 
who have highest qualifications as degree/high degree. 
 
The results given in Table 2.17 show that the first stage has no predictive power and the 
IV results are peculiar, with the coefficients on parents’ education being insignificant.  
This also supports that the argument that no qualifications used as in the main analysis 
as a measure of parents’ education is appropriate. The huge standard errors are a sign of 
miss-specification. 
 
The results confirm the previous finding that the effect of an exogenous increase in 
education via the raising of the school leaving age is confined to the lower part of 
education distribution, and that there is no effect of the RoSLA further up the education 
distribution (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). 
 
Table 2.17: Intergenerational Coefficients on parents’ education: IV Results 
Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( Degree) 
Mothers’ Education 
(Degree) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 28  
Pupil characteristics only  
-4507.704 
(17559.840) 
-824.309 
(562.948) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 0.07 3.22 
Specification 29  
Pupil and school characteristics 
-2726.956 
(7296.008) 
-499.371 
(331.595) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 0.15 4.41 
Specification 30  
Pupil, school & family 
characteristics 
-402.220 
(495.107) 
-281.402 
(196.096) 
No. of observations 8380 8387 
F 1.32 7.24 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
2.6.5 Fake RoSLA 
There may be concern that generating the RoSLA variable as an instrument using the 
age of the father and mother (the cut off age is 46) may not be  correctly modelling the 
discontinuity in education attainment and only pick up a general upward trend in 
parental education ( Chevalier et al., 2013). 
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In order to check this we created a fake RoSLA – to simulate the effect by miscoding 
the RoSLA to its actual introduction. For example, the RoSLA is set to have apparently 
happened in 1976 (so the cut off age for fathers and mothers is 42 to be affected by this 
fake RoSLA, i.e. they must be four years younger since the cut-off age was 46 for those 
affected by the 1972 RoSLA).  
 
The results are given in the Table 2.18 below and comparing them to the actual RoSLA 
results in Table 2.7, they suggest that the fake RoSLA has no identifying power in 
estimating the casual impact of father’s education and mother’s education on children’s 
education. There are positive and insignificant effects of fake RoSLA on both parents’ 
education with very low F- value in all specifications. Also, very high standard errors 
give an indication of an incorrect modelling. Hence it reassures that the actual RoSLA 
is picking up the discontinuity in parents’ education and is correctly modelled.  
 
 
Table 2.18: Intergenerational Coefficients on parents’ education: IV Results 
using fake RoSLA, Dependent variable is children’s total points score. 
 
 Fathers’ Education 
( no qualifications) 
Mothers’ Education 
(no qualifications) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 Standard errors Standard errors 
Specification 31  
Pupil characteristics only  
-26132.04* 
( 455783.7) 
2727.95 
(6593.915) 
No. of observations 8438 8445 
F 0.00 0.18 
Specification 32  
Pupil and school characteristics 
847.858 
(925.476) 
764.397 
(887.924) 
No. of observations 8438 8445 
F 1.08 1.01 
Specification 33  
Pupil, school & family characteristics 
241.002 
(190.725) 
165.354 
(190.475) 
No. of observations 8438 8445 
F 4.85 4.39 
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
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2.7 Conclusions 
 
In this study the key objective is to explore whether the established link between 
parents’ education and children’s educational outcomes is due to genes or upbringing. 
In order to identify the effect of parents’ education in two components, it is important to 
have a source of exogenous variation in parents’ education, i.e. the source must be 
correlated with parents’ educational choice and uncorrelated with the parent’s ability 
and other factors. 
 
Therefore, the chapter presents new evidence on the effect of fathers’ education and 
mothers’ education on children’s education using the Longitudinal Study of Young 
People in England (LSYPE) which is matched to the National Pupil Database (NPD). 
 
The initial OLS results, similar to other studies, suggest that parental education has a 
significant and positive impact on their children’s educational outcomes, as measured 
by performance in GCSE examinations taken at age 16. These results are consistent 
with the evidence found in the previous literature, as documented as a positive 
intergenerational correlation between parents’ education and their children’s 
educational outcomes.  
 
To identify the exogenous variation in parents’ education, we used the 1972 RoSLA 
(raising of school leaving age) as an instrument. The IV results, therefore, show that 
having removed any genetic effect, there is an intergenerational relationship between 
parents’ education and children’s performance, suggesting that the source of the 
relationship is not a genetic effect. The results further suggest that the effect of nurture 
(upbringing) is mainly responsible for the intergenerational relationship. However this 
identification strategy estimates a (LATE) local average treatment effect with no ripple 
effect further up (Chevalier, 2004; Imbens and Angrist, 1994), as only parents who 
wished to leave school at 15, those who have either a lower level of qualifications, a 
lower taste for education, a lower ability or poor resources (financial constraints), were 
affected by the RoSLA. The IV estimates are therefore not directly comparable to the 
initial estimates. 
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The estimates of fathers’ and mothers’ education are only convincing for those who 
have lower education level and these are relevant for the population targeted by the 
recent policies on school leaving age introduced in Britain. Those parents who already 
possess higher human capital, and have higher ability as well, for those an additional 
increase in their education will have less of an effect on their children’s performance, 
while, on the other hand, an additional increase in parents’ education to those with 
lower education will certainly increase their awareness, hence have a positive effect on 
their children’s performance. Increasing the education of the present generation has a 
positive impact on the future generation. 
 
Focusing on the characteristics of those who drop out from the sample, they are of a 
low level of education and this is to be expected due to less educated people/parents 
being less likely to respond to surveys. This is a worry, given the focus is on the parents 
with no qualifications. 
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 Appendices to Chapter 2 
 
 
Figure A2.1: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and 
Proportion of Fathers’ Education (Degree) by Age 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.2: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and 
Proportion of Mothers’ Education (Degree) by Age 
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Figure A2.3: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and 
Proportion of Fathers’ Education (Best GCSE) by Age 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.4: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and 
Proportion of Mothers’ Education (Best GCSE) by Age 
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Figure A2.5: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and 
Proportion of Fathers’ Education (Post compulsory Education) by Age 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.6: Relationship between Instrument (RoSLA) and Proportion of 
Mothers’ Education (Post compulsory Education) by Age 
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Table A2.1: OLS Results: Effects of Mothers’ Education on Children’s 
Education 
 
Variables Coefficients S.E. 
Female  21.187*** (2.625) 
Mixed  16.937*** (6.345) 
Indian 33.692*** (5.062) 
Pakistani 10.328 (6.454) 
Bangladeshi 52.512*** (7.518) 
Other Asians 28.867*** (11.719) 
Black 10.823* (6.409) 
Health status  -32.064*** (4.017) 
Log of household annual income  3.382** (1.634) 
Household Income missing 29.140* (16.583) 
Parents meeting  -36.222*** (2.939) 
Mother no qualifications  -27.442*** (3.825) 
Average parental age 1.538*** (0.250) 
Working status of single parent 18.102*** (5.623) 
Working status of both parent  22.777*** (5.891) 
Help at home in studying  9.662*** (3.483) 
Future aspiration  104.157*** (3.460) 
No of siblings  -8.305*** (1.244) 
Independent  schools  4.721 (6.953) 
Foundation schools  7.922** (3.698) 
Voluntary schools  13.308*** (4.013) 
Owned house  35.068*** (3.935) 
Others  16.023 (13.421) 
Computer at home  -55.654*** (5.477) 
School pass rate 1.520*** 90.076) 
Number of observations 8387  
R
2
 0.33  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A2.2: OLS Results: Effects of Fathers’ Education on Children’s 
Education 
 
Variables Coefficients S.E. 
Female  21.361*** (2.619) 
Mixed  16.540*** (6.323) 
Indian 33.333*** (5.062) 
Pakistani 9.780 (6.330) 
Bangladeshi 51.317*** (7.462) 
Other Asians 25.134** (11.620) 
Black 9.772 (6.381) 
Health status  -31.230*** (3.999) 
Log of household annual income  3.361** (1.630) 
Household Income missing 29.018* (16.545) 
Parents meeting  -36.577*** (2.931) 
Father no qualifications  -33.122*** (3.490) 
Average parental age 1.636*** (0.249) 
Working status of single parent 16.114*** (5.623) 
Working status of both parent  22.188*** (5.858) 
Help at home in studying  9.193*** (3.476) 
Future aspiration  102.944*** (3.457) 
No of siblings  -8.370*** (1.240) 
Independent  schools  -5.096 (6.933) 
Foundation schools  8.656*** (3.691) 
Voluntary schools  12.978*** (4.000) 
Owned house  34.196*** (3.919) 
Others  13.648 (13.372) 
Computer at home  -55.833*** (5.448) 
School pass rate 1.512 (0.076) 
Number of observations 8380  
R
2
 0.33  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A2.3: IV Results: Effects of Mothers’ Education on Children’s 
Education (First stage) 
 
Variables Coefficients S.E. 
Female  0.001 0.008 
Mixed  0.072*** 0.018 
Indian 0.282*** (0.014) 
Pakistani 0.427*** (0.018) 
Bangladeshi 0.446*** (0.021) 
Other Asians 0.362*** (0.331) 
Black 0.045** (0.018) 
Health status  -0.043*** (0.011) 
Log of household annual income  -0.017*** (0.005) 
Household Income missing -0.127*** (0.047) 
Parents meeting  -0.029*** (0.008) 
ReformM -0.079*** (0.013) 
Average parental age 0.001*** (0.000) 
Working status of single parent -0.111*** (0.016) 
Working status of both parent  -0.221*** (0.017) 
Help at home in studying  -0.047*** (0.009) 
Future aspiration  -0.030*** (0.002) 
No of siblings  0.017*** (0.003) 
Independent  schools  0.024 (0.020) 
Foundation schools  -0.010 (0.010) 
Voluntary schools  -0.007  (0.011) 
Owned house  -0.132*** (0.111) 
Others  -0.135*** (0.382) 
Computer at home  -0.123*** (0.016) 
School pass rate -0.003*** (0.000) 
Number of observations 8387  
F 38.84  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A2.4: IV Results: Effects of Fathers’ Education on Children’s 
Education (First stage) 
 
Variables Coefficients S.E. 
Female  -0.003 (0.008) 
Mixed  0.051*** (0.020) 
Indian 0.227*** (0.016) 
Pakistani 0.308*** (.0120) 
Bangladeshi 0.392*** (0.023) 
Other Asians 0.182*** (0.363) 
Black 0.001 (0.200) 
Health status  -0.014 (0.013) 
Log of household annual income  -0.018*** (0.005) 
Household Income missing -0.139*** (0.052) 
Parents meeting  -0.024*** (0.009) 
ReformF  -0.042*** (0.012) 
Average parental age 0.003*** (0.001) 
Working status of single parent -0.121*** (0.018) 
Working status of both parent  -0.174*** (0.018) 
Help at home in studying  -0.057*** (0.011) 
Future aspiration  -0.053*** (0.011) 
No of siblings  0.012*** (0.004) 
Independent  schools  0.009 (0.021) 
Foundation schools  0.007 (0.012) 
Voluntary schools  -0.009 (0.013) 
Owned house  -0.130*** (0.012) 
Others  -0.125*** (0.042) 
Computer at home  0.101*** (0.017) 
School pass rate -0.002*** (0.000) 
Number of observations 8380  
F 10.74  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A2.5: IV Results: Effects of Mothers’ Education on Children’s 
Education (Second stage) 
 
Variables Coefficients S.E. 
Female  21.744*** (2.690) 
Mixed  22.289*** (7.776) 
Indian 55.052*** (16.957) 
Pakistani 42.818* (25.335) 
Bangladeshi 87.387*** (26.502) 
Other Asians 56.175*** (24.012) 
Black 13.619** (6.981) 
Health status  -35.741*** (4.795) 
Log of household annual income  2.249 (1.959) 
Household Income missing 21.596 (18.540) 
Parents meeting  -38.114*** (3.431) 
Mother no qualifications  -103.912* (57.497) 
Average parental age 1.902*** (0.363) 
Working status of single parent 9.967 (8.547) 
Working status of both parent  6.264 (14.147) 
Help at home in studying  5.554 (4.537) 
Future aspiration  101.888*** (3.943) 
No of siblings  -7.212*** (1.562) 
Independent  schools  -2.852 (7.309) 
Foundation schools  7.296** (3.839) 
Voluntary schools  12.953 *** (4.130) 
Owned house  24.807*** (8.685) 
Others  3.803 (15.830) 
Computer at home  -46.151*** (9.108) 
School pass rate 1.307*** (0.167) 
Number of observations 8387  
F 38.84  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A2.6: IV Results: Effects of Fathers’ Education on Children’s 
Education (Second stage) 
 
Variables Coefficients S.E. 
Female  21.631*** (2.746) 
Mixed  21.182*** (8.428) 
Indian 55.157*** (23.767) 
Pakistani 39.562 (32.161) 
Bangladeshi 90.192*** (40.590) 
Other Asians 42.102** (21.939) 
Black 9.651* (6.677) 
Health status  -32.940*** (4.398) 
Log of household annual income  1.813 (2.527) 
Household Income missing 17.732 (22.463) 
Parents meeting  -38.527*** (3.891) 
Father no qualifications  -128.426 (101.500) 
Average parental age 2.265*** (0.691) 
Working status of single parent 4.760 (13.532) 
Working status of both parent  5.990 (0.32) 
Help at home in studying  3.291 (6.830) 
Future aspiration  97.781*** (6.531) 
No of siblings  -7.273*** (1.820) 
Independent  schools  -4.497 (7.302) 
Foundation schools  9.616*** (3.927) 
Voluntary schools  12.292*** (4.295) 
Owned house  21.609 (14.005) 
Others  1.364 (19.107) 
Computer at home  -46.025*** (11.829) 
School pass rate 1.264*** (0.257) 
Number of observations 8380  
F 10.74  
*** p<001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Chapter 3:  
 
Teacher Characteristics and Pupil Performance in 
Pakistan: A Teacher Fixed Effects Approach 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The most important subject in education policy is how to improve the educational 
outcome within schools. Various measures such as increasing school inputs, lowering 
class size, incentive based policies and teacher qualities have been discussed in this 
regard. Policymakers, scholars, parents and school administrators have profound belief 
that teacher quality is one of the important factors in raising pupils’ test scores 
performance. Improving weak teaching potentially improves the school quality 
(Glewwe and Kremer, 2006). 
 
Most of the research on teacher quality comes from the US (Aaronson et al., 2007; 
Chetty et al., 2014; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2012; Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004) 
while outside it, teacher quality is under researched as compared to other characteristics 
of schools. Further, recent research on teacher quality among developed and developing 
countries (Azam and Kingdon, 2015; Slater et al., 2012) focuses on high school exams, 
as discussing teacher effectiveness/quality at high school (high stakes) exams yields 
additional benefits: first, in order to participate in the political and economic life of 
knowledge–based economies, the minimum requirement is a high school diploma. 
Second, there is the existing link between poor performance in core high school exams 
and failure in graduating (Allenswoth and Easton, 2007). It is therefore, important to 
look at teacher quality in high school exams.    
 
So far research on teacher quality both in developed and developing countries has 
shown that there exists a significant variability in teacher quality, meaning that teachers 
differ to a great extent in what, or how, they teach their pupils (Azam and Kingdon, 
2015; Rockoff, 2004; Hanushek and Rivikin, 2006; Aaronson et al., 2007; Slater et al., 
2012; Leigh, 2010; Clotfelter et al., 2006). Assessing the relative effectiveness of 
teachers has an obvious policy implication for both developed and developing counties. 
However, a lack of evidence on the causal relationship between teacher characteristics 
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and teacher quality, has led researchers to conclude that it is hard to discover which 
particular observable characteristics explain the differences in teacher quality, so that 
what makes a teacher good or bad remains a puzzle in education policy (Metzler and 
Woessmann, 2012; Rivkin et al., 2005; Aaronson et al., 2007).  
 
The vagueness in assessing teacher quality arises due to different methodological 
challenges involved. First, is the data requirement, as Rockoff (2004) mentions that 
most issues in the field of teacher quality are due to data quality. To identify teacher 
quality, researchers have to focus on pupil-teacher data with rich information on pupil, 
family and school variables which is not easily available. Second, is the non-random 
matching of students and teachers to classrooms within school (Rothstein, 2009), 
leading to a possible correlation between observed teacher characteristics and 
unobserved student characteristics. Third, omitted variable bias in the form of 
unobserved teacher characteristics such as motivation and intelligence may exacerbate 
the results (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011). Fourth, it is often difficult to have detailed 
information on teacher credentials and teaching methods in classrooms simultaneously 
in the dataset affecting student performance. 
 
In this study I try to overcome these issues: such as non-random sorting of teachers and 
students to classes, non-random attrition and omitted variable bias. The current 
methodology uses controls for both teacher-fixed effects and pupil-fixed effects due to 
available variation within teachers and within pupils and presents new evidence about 
teacher quality. However, this study faces the similar challenge as other studies on 
teacher quality, it is not possible to isolate the pure teacher effect from the school 
effect, nevertheless, the present study can control for at least some observable school 
characteristics.  
 
The study uses unique survey data, designed and collected by me, which is linked to the 
administrative exams scores data of Year 9 pupils (taken at age 14-15) in private and 
public schools from one of the districts of the Punjab province in Pakistan in 2008-
2009. The survey data I collected has detailed information on pupils’ individual, family, 
peers, schools and teachers characteristics. The current dataset complements the 
previous leading datasets in the field of teacher effectiveness. For example, similar to 
Azam and Kingdon (2015), Aaronson et al. (2007), and Rockoff (2004), I can match 
pupils to their actual teachers rather than an average of teachers within a school; 
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dissimilar to Aaronson et al. (2007); Rockoff (2004); Kane et al. (2008); Rivkin et al. 
(2005); Clotfelter (2006) the current dataset examines pupils who are taking high stakes 
exams which are important for both schools and them. Despite the fact that my dataset 
carries advantages, there are shortcomings as well which I explain at the end. 
 
3.1.1 Objectives of the Study 
This chapter is concerned with answering two main research questions: 
1) Does teacher quality matter? By this question I mean measuring the variation in 
teacher quality, evaluating teachers in terms of exam results of their pupils i.e. what is 
the impact on pupil scores of being taught by a low or high quality teacher? 
2) What determines teacher quality? Under this question I am aiming to explore 
whether observed characteristics explain the variation in teacher quality. 
In addition, the study further aims to explore the following: 
3) What is more important in explaining pupil performance, teacher characteristics or 
process variables
9
? 
 
The present study works through two steps. In the first step, it estimates the model of 
pupils’ performance using an educational production function linking a substantial set 
of covariates of pupils’ own, their family and schools characteristics, and incorporating 
teacher fixed effects. This step yields estimates of a fixed effect for each teacher, which 
gives an indication of the teachers’ contributions towards student performance. Second, 
it relates the estimated teacher fixed effects to teachers’ own credentials by regressing 
measured teacher fixed effects onto different teacher own characteristics and classroom 
practices.  
 
First stage results show that there are significant variations in teacher fixed effects 
within the schools, suggesting important unobservable differences among teachers. A 
good teacher, defined as being at the 75
th
 percentile of the teacher fixed effects 
distribution, is related to an increase in the student test score of 0.15 standard deviations 
relative to the omitted teacher, while a bad teacher decreases the score by 0.77 standard 
                                                          
9In this study “process variables” defines  the variables that make the process of teaching more effective 
such as more time spent on teaching in a classroom, lower workload of teacher, planning lessons in 
advance, being more kind and helpful to students, behaving in a democratic way. They are included to 
capture the effect of teacher unobservables such as motivation, enthusiasm and ability (albeit 
imperfectly). 
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deviations. Therefore, a pupil having been taught by a good teacher (75
th
 percentile 
teacher) scores 0.92 standard deviations more than the pupil who is taught by a bad 
teacher (25
th
 percentile teacher) leaving a significant effect on pupil performance. 
 
To address non random sorting of pupils and teachers to classrooms a pupil fixed 
effects model is also estimated along with the teacher fixed effects approach as the 
dataset used in this study has variation in test scores for multiple subjects for the same 
student. Results from the pupil fixed effects specification are theoretically more 
relevant, given that they control for individual pupils’ characteristics (at least their fixed 
characteristics that are constant across teachers). Pupil fixed effect results highlight that 
teachers are important in explaining pupils’ performance even after controlling for 
pupils’ prior ability and home background effects.  
 
Turning to the second stage, the results reveal that teacher observed characteristics 
explain very little of the variation in estimated teacher quality, showing a negative 
relationship between training and teacher performance, at the 10 % level, which 
corroborates previous findings in the literature (Rivkin et al., 2005; Aaronson et al., 
2007). 
 
The findings of this chapter question the emphasis put on the teacher characteristics 
(qualification, teaching experience and teacher training) in developed and developing 
countries
10
. In the status quo teachers are being rewarded for the possession of 
characteristics that have nothing to do with pupils’ performance.  It may be hard to 
identify good teachers ex ante but administrative data can be used to identify them ex 
post (Slater et al., 2012). It implies that improving teaching quality is important but it is 
very difficult to measure the characteristics that are responsible for bringing variation in 
teacher quality or at least good teachers cannot be identified on the basis of teachers’ 
                                                          
10
 The importance of hiring more qualified teachers can be seen in public policy, for example, in the US, 
No Child Left Behind, 2002-2015, by law required highly qualified teachers within school to teach 
disadvantaged pupils. The program is aimed to be implemented on the basis of teacher qualification, as 
opposed to teacher effectiveness in classrooms. However, individual states were left to define what a 
‘highly qualified’ teacher is. According to Hanushek and Rivkin (2012) most states simply picked up the 
variants of the existing requirement of teacher certification. In India, Minister of State for Human 
Development, Dr. Shashi Tharoor, on 20
th
 August, 2013, introduced a three-points based strategy to 
improve the quality of teachers in school: 1) Strengthen the teacher education institutions; 2) The 
revision of teacher curriculum; and 3) Setting the minimum qualifications for Teacher Educators. 
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observable characteristics. However ex post evaluations, assessing teachers on the basis 
of their contributions towards pupils’ performance is more appropriate. But the ex post 
evaluations need rich matched student-teacher data that are often not available to 
researchers or do not exist in developing countries. 
 
Generally, teacher hiring or firing depends upon teacher certification. Results suggest 
that policy makers should move focus from policies rewarding teachers on the basis of 
credentials to performance based.  
 
This study contributes to the literature of teacher effectiveness in the following ways. 
(1) This is the first study (to my knowledge) investigating teacher quality, using a 
survey dataset, at high school level/senior secondary level in Pakistan.
11
 Aaronson et al. 
( 2007) argued that, although it is important to study teacher effects at all levels of the 
education process, studying at high school has an additional advantage as classrooms 
are subject specific and the teacher-student match really corresponds to what one thinks 
of as the teacher effect. Furthermore, the exams at senior secondary and secondary 
school levels are high stakes exams. (2) In terms of methodology, this study is only one 
of a very small number (including Slater et al., 2012; Metzler and Woessmann, 2010; 
and Azam and Kingdon, 2015) using both teacher fixed effects across pupils, rather 
than over time, and pupil fixed effects approaches to examine teacher quality. (3) The 
present study increases the confidence of the reader, by corroborating the findings of 
developed countries, such as the US and UK, irrespective of the context.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 presents the review of previous 
literature regarding the effectiveness of teachers, section 3.3 elaborates on data used, 
section 3.4 discusses the methods and variables used in this study, section 3.5 interprets 
the results from the analysis and the final section 3.6 presents the conclusions and 
policy implications for policies related to teacher effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
The study by Aslam and Kingdon (2011) is the only study for Pakistan on teacher effectiveness using a 
cross-sectional pupil fixed effects approach at the middle level of education (Year 8).   
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
3.2.1 Teacher Effectiveness 
Teacher quality is potentially a key determinant of student performance and teachers 
differ in terms of quality. Data requirements are complex to study teacher quality. 
Many previous studies in this field, surveyed by Hanushek (2002), do not allow 
matching students with their respective teachers. Also due to the nature of such data, 
these studies are not able to control for pupils’ characteristics. The literature probing 
teacher effectiveness has adopted two approaches. 
 
3.2.2 Teacher fixed effects approach 
 In the first approach teacher quality is measured as a teacher fixed effect in which 
different groups of students are taught by the same teacher in a given year or over time, 
while the performance of the same students with different teachers is also observed. 
This enables the researcher to calculate the total teacher effect on the basis that the 
better teachers would be the ones who produce higher marks for the students than other 
teachers with the same students. Several papers have used this approach (Aaronson et 
al., 2007; Azam and Kingdon, 2015; Hanushek et al., 2005; Hanushek and Rivkin, 
2006; Leigh, 2010; Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005; Slater et al., 2012).  
 
Rockoff (2004) identifies teacher effects using panel data covering over a decade 
(1989/90 to 2000/01) of students’ test scores in grades 2 to 6 and teacher assignments 
from two contiguous districts in New Jersey. The data on teachers in multiple 
classrooms and test scores in multiple years allow the author to measure teacher fixed 
effects and student fixed effects. Generally in primary schools, students are taught by a 
single teacher. The shortcoming of using such data is that one cannot identify the 
impact of different teachers on particular students in different subjects at the same time. 
Measuring teacher quality using the teacher fixed effects method, he finds significant 
differences among teachers i.e., a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality 
leads to a 0.20 and 0.24 standard deviation increase in reading and maths test scores, 
respectively. Controlling for teacher fixed quality, teaching experience has a positive 
effect on reading test scores, while the other teacher observable characteristics such as 
gender, ethnicity and education are found to have no significant impact.  
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Other studies using the US data and the teacher fixed effects approach are as follows. 
Rivkin et al. (2005) use a unique matched panel dataset which spans grades 3 to 7 for 
three cohorts of students across 3000 schools in the state of Texas in the mid -1990s. 
The limitation of their data was that it does not match individual students to their 
teachers, rather only to a set of teachers in a grade within schools which is likely to 
attenuate estimated teacher effects. Their findings from the semi-parametric lower 
bound estimates of the variance in teacher quality imply that teacher observable 
characteristics such as education and experience have little impact on student 
educational outcomes. Nevertheless teachers have a powerful impact on reading and 
mathematics achievement. The results also suggest that reduction in class size by a 
costly ten students has fewer effects than the positive effects of moving one standard 
deviation up the teacher quality distribution. 
 
Another study by Hanushek et al. (2005) estimates the variation in teacher quality using 
matched student and teacher data from grade 4 to 8 in the same schools as Rivkin et al. 
(2005) for the school years from 1995 to 2000 in a large district of Texas. They 
measured teacher quality using a semi-parametric approach based on value added 
student achievement. The findings of their study confirm the variation in teacher 
effectiveness within schools not between schools. Further, their findings confirm that 
teacher certification and experience explain little of the variation in teacher quality. 
 
Aaronson et al. (2007) use the administrative dataset of 9th grade students over three 
years from 1997 to 1999 in one school district in Chicago. In contrast to many other 
studies, the key advantages of their study are the ability to match teachers to their 
students in a particular classroom and the availability of data on prior achievement of 
students which they assume addresses the issue of student heterogeneity. They find an 
increase of 0.15 standard deviations in student maths scores, if there is an increase of 
one standard deviation in teacher quality.  Also they find that traditional human capital 
measures explain very little variation in estimated teacher quality. 
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Outside the United States, very little work has been done on the estimation of teacher 
quality using the teacher fixed effects approach. The only study in the UK by Slater et 
al. (2012) estimates the effect of individual teachers on student educational outcomes 
using the schools and teacher primary dataset for the England
12
. They also estimate the 
variability in teacher quality which they measured by the impact on test scores. The 
data used in this study relates 7305 pupils to their 740 teachers across 33 schools in 
England in each of the compulsory subjects; Maths, Science and English in GCSE 
exams taken at the age of 16. The model they use is the point-in-time fixed effects; to 
control for pupil heterogeneity, prior attainment is used. They find considerable 
variability in teacher effectiveness: a teacher being one-standard deviation better 
increases the student outcomes by 25% of a standard deviation which is a little higher 
than the estimates found in US studies. In addition, the results support the findings that 
observed teacher characteristics explain little of the differences in estimated 
effectiveness. 
 
Similarly, Leigh (2010) is the only study using data from Australia; he estimates the 
effectiveness of teachers in raising students’ test scores using a dataset covering 90,000 
students in primary grade 3 to 7 and 10,000 school teachers in one of the states of 
Australia, Queensland. Teacher fixed effects are jointly significant and highly 
dispersed, even after adjusting for measurement error. The study finds a strong positive 
relation between teachers’ gains in literacy and numeracy. Moving a teacher from the 
25
th
 percentile to the 75th percentile on the teacher quality distribution will increase 
student test scores by one-seventh of a standard deviation. Teacher experience is 
positively related to teacher effectiveness; however, there is no positive effect of 
teacher qualifications on pupils’ test scores. In literacy, female teachers do better than 
male teachers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 The dataset for this study was collected by CMPO, for the evaluation of project “Performance 
Threshold” for teachers. The description of the project is given in Atkinson et al., (2009). They match 
this dataset with school level variables from the National Pupil Database (NPD). 
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The teacher fixed effects approach does not require identification of certain 
characteristics that generate student achievement, instead it estimates the overall effect 
of each teacher that captures in a very general way the influence of a certain teacher 
relative to other teachers in the sample. However this approach assumes that a 
particular teacher is equally effective for all pupils, which may not be the case 
necessarily. 
 
In general, findings of all studies using the teacher fixed effects methodology suggest 
that teachers have a significant impact on student achievement that means teachers’ 
assignment is a relevant issue for education policy. However, when they regress 
estimated teacher fixed effects on teacher observable characteristics, such as education, 
experience, gender and training, they hardly find variation in teacher quality due to 
these characteristics.  
 
3.2.3 Direct approach 
The second approach in the literature considers an educational production model 
linking teacher characteristics to student performance, controlling for student attributes. 
This approach estimates the direct relationship between teacher characteristics and 
student achievement. Different studies use different methodologies under this approach. 
The most commonly used methodologies vary from a standard cross-sectional 
achievement production function (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011; and Kingdon, 2006); or 
panel data approach (Clotfelter et al., 2006 and 2010; Azam and Kingdon, 2015); to the 
instrumental variable method (Hoxby, 1996; Kingdon and Teal, 2010); and 
experimental methods measuring the impact of teacher incentives (Lavy, 2002; Glewwe 
et al., 2010; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011).  
 
Clotfelter et al. (2006, 2007a, 2007b) explore the relationship between different teacher 
credentials and student achievement by directly regressing student achievement on 
teacher characteristics using a detailed panel dataset from North Carolina, US. They use 
data of primary grades from 3 to 5 and use student fixed effects to address non-random 
matching of students and teachers. They conclude that the effect of teaching experience 
on student achievement is positive and larger for maths than for reading. Clotfelter, et 
al. (2010), study the above relationship in the context of high school end of course 
exams. 
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Using a direct approach, few papers in developing countries have studied teacher 
effectiveness. Azam and Kingdon (2015), using administrative panel data, estimate a 
direct teacher value added approach of 8319 pupils studying in grade 12 in private 
schools from one of the districts in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India. They use a pupil 
fixed effects approach controlling for prior ability using grade 10 exam scores. They 
find a considerable variation in teacher quality. The results suggest that being taught 
over a time period of two years by a good teacher, defined as being at the 75
th
 
percentile, is related to an increase in student achievement by 0.47 standard deviations 
relative to a low quality teacher,   defined as being at the 25
th
 percentile. However they 
find that observable teacher characteristics explain very little variability in teacher 
quality. 
 
Kingdon (2006) analyses the effect of teacher characteristics upon students’ 
performance using a dataset from 186 schools in India under the control of the Council 
for Indian Secondary Certificate Examinations (CISCE) which permits the matching of 
students’ subject test scores to the teachers who teach those subjects. The methodology 
uses the standard cross-sectional achievement production function allowing for pupil 
fixed effects. She assigns the average characteristics of all teachers in school to all 
students in grade 10 as she does not know the exact teacher who taught the student in a 
given subject. She finds teacher training and teacher qualifications (having a masters 
level or higher degree) would raise pupil performance by 0.09 standard deviations. She 
suggests that the above findings are upper bound estimates. However her study does not 
control for previous academic achievements of the pupils, hence she estimates the 
education production function in levels, not value added. 
 
Using the same data and an estimation methodology similar to Kingdon (2006), 
Kingdon and Teal (2010) study the relationship between teachers having union 
membership and student achievement. They find that a teacher with union membership 
is negatively related to student performance. Further results from a school fixed effects 
model suggest that a teacher having union membership has a positive impact on teacher 
pay. Like Kingdon (2006), the study does not control for previous attainment. 
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For Pakistan, Aslam and Kingdon (2011) is the only study on teacher effectiveness 
using a standard production function (cross-section) looking at pupils studying at the 
middle level of education, grade 8. They uncover teacher characteristics, from their 
CVs, such as education, teaching experience and teacher training and teaching methods 
that affect pupil achievement the most. The study uses data from government and 
private schools in Pakistan, 2002-2003. Instead of using variation across time they use 
the pupil fixed effect approach across different subjects. Their pupil fixed effect results 
highlight the importance of teaching practices in classrooms while the teacher 
credentials do not significantly matter to pupil achievement. 
 
The findings from the literature using the direct approach are not different to the ones 
measuring teacher quality using a teacher fixed effects approach, highlighting that 
teacher observable characteristics explain little of the variation in teacher quality. Use 
of the mentioned techniques, IV and panel data approach estimation, depends on 
availability of certain types of data. However statistical methodologies used in these 
studies are not above criticism. For example, instrumental variable methodology 
depends on a convincing instrument which is hard to find in reality. In most developing 
countries policies having exogenous variation, for example education policy regarding 
minimum school leaving age or maximum class size, exist in statutes, but are hardly 
ever adhered to in practice. Experimental methodology provides a good solution for the 
endogeneity issue, however, problems occur while researchers try to generalize the 
results outside the experiment (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Similarly, even if one keeps 
aside the issue of measurement error
13
 in panel data approaches, still it is a difficult task 
as data are hard to obtain and almost non-existent in developing countries. 
 
Looking at the literature on teacher quality from the very rich US literature to outside 
the US, though under researched, using any teacher fixed effects or the direct approach, 
it is clear that teachers are not the same in what they teach their students and in how 
they teach, which indicates that it is important to study the effects of teacher 
effectiveness for student achievement. For developing counties Azam and Kingdon 
(2015) is the only study that discusses teacher quality at high school exams. Therefore, 
                                                          
13
 There is missing information on variables of interest, and always, it is not possible to match who 
teaches which subject. Consequently, it is likely to induce error in calculating the percentage of teachers, 
and number of teachers per grade or the ratio of two, hence this may contain a nontrivial amount of noise 
(Rivkin et al., 2005). 
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research is still needed to see, just like in US studies, whether teachers matter to student 
achievement at higher grades in the context of developing countries. Also Aslam and 
Kingdon (2011) is the only paper in the field of teacher quality, looking at whether 
teacher characteristics are more important or the teaching ways chosen by a teacher (the 
process variables) in the classroom.  
 
The present study contributes to the literature on teacher quality studying the 
relationship between teacher characteristics and student achievement at higher levels of 
education in developing countries.  Different from Aaronson et al. (2007); Rockoff 
(2004); Kane et al. (2008); Rivkin et al. (2005) and Clotfelter (2006) but similar to 
Clotfelter et al. (2010) and Azam and Kingdon (2015), the current study examines 
teacher quality for pupils taking high stakes exams. Similar to Aaronson et al. (2007), 
the present study is able to match all pupils to their subject specific teachers, though 
while they attain a 75% student-teacher match, this study has a 100 % match. Further, 
like Kingdon (2006) and Kingdon and Teal (2010), the present study does not control 
for prior ability, though it does include pupil fixed effects.   
 
 
3.3 Data  
 
One of the contributions of this study is that it utilizes the survey dataset collected by 
myself involving rigorous field work, interviewing 611 pupils studying in Year 9, using 
a random sampling technique, as well as interviewing their family, subject teachers and 
the school head teachers and also tracking the examination scores information in Year 9 
of all pupils by linking them with administrative data. Thus, it is a comprehensive 
dataset containing rich information on all aspects of selected students which might 
affect their academic performance in a particular grade. 
 
In total there were 14 schools included in the sample, including 6 Government and 8 
Private schools in the Bahawalpur district, in the Punjab province of Pakistan. The 
choice of the Punjab and particularly the Bahawalpur district for the field survey was 
based on the following grounds: (1) Recent literature on private schooling in Pakistan 
has noticed that much of the expansion in private schooling has been particularly 
prominent in the province of the Punjab. (2) Bahawalpur is the largest district of the 
Punjab in terms of area; it has a high number of reputable educational institutions, and a 
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large number of public schools is also available in the city. All schools are affiliated to 
the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE) which is responsible for 
conducting exams in Year 9, 10, 11 and 12 in all private and public schools.  
 
Data were collected from 611 pupils, among them 396 in science and 215 in an arts 
field of study in Year 9, by using pupil questionnaires filled in by the pupils 
themselves.  Pupil questionnaires also provided information on personal characteristics 
such as gender, date of birth, physical activity, educational aspiration, hours of study at 
home, health status, and mode of transport, food frequency, and weekly eating pattern. 
In addition to this, each child’s weight and height was measured to calculate the body 
mass index. A family questionnaire was sent to the home of each child and returned to 
the school authorities the next day completed by either parent (or the child completed 
the questionnaire by asking the parent questions if the parent was illiterate), containing 
information on parents’ education, occupation, family size, family income, number of 
rooms, house tenure, neighbourhood, siblings’ educational record etc. 
 
The teacher dataset captured information not only on teachers’ traditional human 
capital measures (education, teacher salary, experience, and training) but also on the 
process variables (teaching methods used in the classroom and questions related to 
teacher behaviour) adopted by teachers in the classroom. This was done by 
interviewing all subject teachers who taught the pupils in Year 9 in sampled schools by 
asking a series of questions, for example, daily workload
14
, class size, lesson planning, 
behaviour with students (authoritarian or democratic behaviour), surprise tests or 
quizzes given to the students, class duration
15
 and subject taught to the sampled Year 9 
students. These process variables included in the teacher questionnaire are aimed to 
capture the effect of teacher “unobservables” to some extent. The intuition is that more 
efficient and motivated teachers spend more time in the classroom, have more 
involvement with students encouraging them to ask questions, give surprise tests and 
quizzes, and are more helpful to students behaving in a democratic way. This further 
suggests that teachers are more helpful to students who behave in a democratic way 
(Coe et al., 2014). In addition to the above, the comprehensive teachers’ data permits us 
to separate the effects of observed teacher characteristics from unobserved aspects of 
                                                          
14
  Daily workload is measured as the number of classes a teacher teaches per day such as 4 classes or 5 
classes. 
15
 Class duration is measured in minutes spent in a class, average class duration was less than an hour. 
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teacher quality. The data for this study provides us with a unique advantage: the ability 
to relate teachers with students in certain classrooms in a specific grade (Year 9). Many 
other studies are missing this advantage, as they have data which only allow them to 
match students to the average characteristics of all teachers in a specific grade. 
 
Further to making the dataset more useful, the school head of each sampled school was 
interviewed. School head questionnaires brought forth information on school head 
teacher characteristics such as education, gender, experience, training and 
characteristics of the school, such as enrolment in Year 9, number of teachers teaching 
to Year 9, school facilities and school resources such as number of books in the school 
library, number of computers, and area of playground etc. Overall, the private schools 
were better in responding relative to public schools.  
 
The Year 9 and 12 examinations are examinations conducted by the Board of 
Intermediate and Secondary Education, Bahawalpur (BISE). Marks obtained by the 
students in the central board examination are a reliable measure of students’ academic 
performance as the examination system is uniform all over the Punjab province. The 
only difference is that the medium of instruction is in the Urdu language in public 
schools and the English language in private schools.
16
 The exams are held at the same 
time, scheduled by the Ministry of Education. The exam papers are the same except that 
for the private school students’ exam papers are in English while they are in Urdu for 
the public school students. The exams are nationally set,  so marking standards are the 
same and exams are marked outside the schools by the same set of external examiners, 
leaving little chance of systematic manipulations, tempering results, leakages of exam 
papers and minimizing the incidence of cheating, which is a big worrying factor at the 
level of high school exams (Kingdon, 1996). 
 
The exam scores used in this study matter a great deal as good performance in these 
exams is considered by the universities and colleges in Pakistan at the time of giving 
admissions to higher education, hence they are a key gateway to further education for 
students having more scope and relevance for policy implications. Clotfelter et al. 
                                                          
16
 In Pakistan private schools could be English medium or Urdu medium, but all private schools in the 
current dataset are English medium. 
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(2010) argue that tests/exams being external to school as compared to within school 
means students are also more likely to take them seriously.  
 
The examination results data were provided by BISE  Bahawalpur, Punjab, using a 
unique pupil identifier code (called a board roll number or board registration number) 
of each individual student, provided by their schools and also for consistency double 
checked by asking the students for their board registration number. The mark sheets of 
students are made available online at the time of announcement of results on the BISE 
website and latter published in a gazette. As the data set contained information on 
student registration numbers, so I could search each sampled student score record 
online manually, by inputting the board number in the board number box and double 
checked this with the gazette marks record. In this way the information on examination 
score in this dataset is measured with little to no error.  
 
The marks sheet (for Year 9) produced by the BISE is based on all the seven different 
subjects’ marks and also the total marks obtained by a student which is the aggregate of 
all the subject marks. All science and arts field of study students have the same four 
compulsory subjects: Language
17
, English, Mathematics and Religion regardless of any 
field, while the other three subjects are different for science and arts fields of study. 
These three subjects which are different in both fields are dropped from the model (for 
example, Physics, Chemistry and Biology for the science group) and also teachers who 
teach these subjects are dropped, effectively leaving the total number of teachers as 56 
(down from 98) who teach Language, English, Mathematics and Religion, shared by 
both disciplines. 
 
I restrict the analysis in chapter 3 to the four common subjects, in order to include the 
pupil fixed effects, and then essentially look at whether some teachers are doing better 
than the other teachers with the same pupils. This avoids the problem that field of study 
is an endogenous variable itself, chosen by the individual student, and is subject to 
many of the same influences as performance. Including pupils from all compulsory 
subjects avoids the results being affected by any possible selection issues where when 
faced with a choice, pupils of different quality are choosing different subjects (so some 
                                                          
17
 Language subject is another language called “Urdu” which is the National language of Pakistan, and is 
different to the English subject. 
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subjects and hence teachers may have more of the good pupils while other subjects 
have more of the lower quality pupils).  
 
The final dataset for chapter 3 constitutes 2444 observations which records 4 
observations for each pupil matched with their respective subject teacher 
characteristics. Table 3.1 describes the proportion of pupils in the dataset on the basis of 
school type, gender, field of study and location. The percentage of pupils in private 
schools in the dataset is 32%. Male pupils are 49% of the total. The pupils having 
science as a field of study are 64% and 35% for arts. Therefore, the present sample is a 
combination of private and public schools in Punjab and also in terms of gender and 
field of study. 
 
It is very important to have a representative sample of all fields in the dataset for 
example as it is generally believed that people having science as a field of study are 
more able and motivated hence have better academic performance at schools relative to 
their counterparts. So if all pupils in the dataset are from one particular field this might 
create a sample selection problem. There were 14 schools in sample, and on average 43 
observations (43 students) are from each school. 
 
Table 3.1: Proportion of Pupils in Data by School Type, Gender, Field of 
Study and location in Year 9 
 
School Type 
School type  Frequency Percent 
Private schools Y9  197 32.30 
Public schools Y9 413 67.70 
Total 610 100.00 
Gender 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male  300 49.10 
Female 311 50.90 
Total 611 100.00 
Field of Study 
Field of Study Frequency Percent 
Science 394 64.48 
Arts 217 35.52 
Total 611 100.00 
Location 
Location Frequency Percent 
Urban 344 56.39 
Rural 266 43.61 
Total 611 100.00 
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3.3.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Data 
1) The dataset used is primary data collected by myself and is a fair mix of pupils 
regarding the proportion of private and public school, rural and urban areas, 
males and females, and science and arts field of study. 
2) It covers a wide range of characteristics of pupils and their families, which may 
affect their academic progress, such as: individual attributes, family attributes, 
subject teacher attributes, school head attributes. 
3) The data are designed in a way that makes it possible to match with the 
administrative dataset of BISE, academic scores, through an unique pupil 
identifier code, which further enhances its strength creating a richer dataset of 
academic score variables. 
4) Exam scores in Year 9 are high school exams, hence high stake exams. 
5) The timing of data collection is also important, pupils are chosen randomly at 
the beginning of Year 9, at that time schools and teachers are not aware of their 
potential performance in board exams. In other cases, picking a sample after the 
declaration of official results, there is risk of bias associated with teachers 
putting their most able students forward. However, one could argue against this 
as teachers are likely to have some inkling of student potential. As there is 
possibility that they may not know the performance of students in the board 
exams but school and teachers do know the past ability of the student (which I 
do not) and in so far as the past ability is a predictor of future ability there could 
be a selection here. Therefore, to address the issue of non availability of past 
ability in the dataset, I estimate the pupil fixed effects model to control for 
unobserved pupil characteristics. Another key feature of data is that it has 
variation within student across subjects that enable me to estimate a pupil fixed 
effects model due to observing pupils studying in multiple subjects/classrooms 
within the same school. 
 
Despite all the above mentioned strengths, it is true that sample size is small and so one 
has to be cautious when making claims for the entire population. In addition, data come 
from a specific region of Punjab, Pakistan, so generalisability of the findings outside 
this region should be done with caution. 
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3.4 Methodology 
 
The objectives of the study are twofold; one, is there any variation in teacher quality
18
; 
and two, is the variation in teacher quality explained by teacher observable 
characteristics? Therefore, the methodology proceeds in two steps: measuring variation 
in teacher quality and examining what explains teacher quality. 
 
3.4.1 Measuring variation in teacher quality 
The major tool of analysis, which measures the relationship between the school inputs, 
like teacher quality, school facilities, child attributes, family factors, and pupil 
achievement, is the educational production function (EPF). The objective of this study 
is to estimate the standard EPF in a consistent and unbiased manner. The model 
underlying this approach is straightforward and postulates that the output of the 
educational process is related to a series of measureable inputs. The model of the 
standard educational production function is specified as follows: 
 
Yijsk = β0 + β1Xi + β2 Sk+ εi    (Eq 1) 
 
Where Yijsk  is the academic performance, measured as the score obtained by the i
th
 
student in the class of the j
th
 teacher in subject s in the k
th 
school and is determined by 
the vector of his/her personal and family characteristics (X) and by school 
characteristics (S ); β’s are parameters of interest; and εi  is the error term. 
 
The dependent variable in the model is marks achieved by a student in the four 
subjects: Language, English, Mathematics and Religion. The most common use of fixed 
effects is when we have panel data, i.e. data on the same individual at different points in 
time. In that case, we can include a fixed effect to pick up unobserved characteristics of 
teachers that remain constant over time. In this study, we do not have panel data, but 
still have data on the same teacher across different pupils. We can see that the principle 
is the same - in panel data we have more than one observation on each individual 
spread across different points in time, and in this case we have more than one 
observation on each teacher spread across different pupils. So including fixed effects 
                                                          
18
 Throughout this chapter teacher quality means the impact of a teacher on students’ performance in 
exams. 
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for teachers will allow us to measure that part of teacher performance that is constant 
across pupils with different characteristics/abilities etc. In order to do this, we need to 
include a dummy variable for each teacher in the data set, which pick up the impact of 
all invariant (across pupils) teacher characteristics, whether observed or unobserved. 
The key point in the analysis is that I observe different teachers teaching the same 
pupils in the same schools. Therefore, pupil and school characteristics are in effect 
being held constant, and any variation in pupil performance across subjects for the same 
pupil is attributed to the effects of different teachers. Thus, the teacher fixed–effects 
achievement function can be estimated as follows: 
 
Yijsk = β0 + β1Xi + β2 Sk+ αj + δs
 + εijsk     (Eq 2) 
 
αj is treated as a set of fixed parameters, named as teacher fixed effects and  δs is the 
subject fixed effects to control for systematic variation in marks by subjects (for 
example if Mathematics systematically receives higher marks than English). Now the 
error term is εijsk capturing the effect of individual, teacher, subject and school level 
unobservables. 
 
This step (first stage) yields estimates of a fixed effect for each teacher, which gives an 
indication of teachers’ contributions towards pupil performance. Therefore, the 
coefficients estimated, due to the inclusion of teacher fixed effects, are looking at how 
each teacher does with the pupils (within a school) relative to other teachers with the 
same pupils.  
 
However, there are issues to be aware of. The main issue faced by every study in 
estimating the causal effect of teacher characteristics and student achievements is the 
potential bias due to non-random sorting of teachers and students to classrooms. For 
example, teachers with strong credentials may be assigned to the classes with 
unobservably more able and motivated students or indeed, vice versa.  
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This is particularly an important issue for any study taking into account the high school 
exams, as high school level students have more options and opportunities to choose 
their field of study,  and ability-tracking
19
 (ability grouping) is more prevalent than at 
the primary education level. However, ability grouping is not a common phenomenon 
in South Asia in general and particularly in Pakistan (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011). If the 
estimated teacher effect does not fully allow for non-random matching of pupils to 
teachers then it may be contaminated by pupils’ unobservable characteristics such as 
ability and motivation. The estimates of teacher effects would be biased upward if more 
motivated and greater ability students are assigned to more effective teachers, and vice 
versa if school policy or education administrators deliberately assigned lower ability 
pupils to the more effective teachers. 
 
The standard way to deal with this problem is to use longitudinal data. Longitudinal 
data provide the researcher with multiple measures, for instance, test score in 
mathematics for each student for multiple years. This property of data will allow a 
researcher to include in the model student fixed effects and thereby to control 
statistically for unobservable time invariant characteristics of individuals, such as 
ability and motivation, which could possibly be correlated with teacher characteristics 
(Kane et al., 2008).  
 
The pupil fixed effects approach, which is basically within student estimation, 
addresses the problem of non-random assignments of teacher to students by identifying 
the effects of teacher attributes through exploiting within student variation in the data. 
However, this approach is less suited for high school level as at that level multiple 
outcome measures for the same subject are not available over time and also it is costly 
and time consuming to collect such data. Alternatively, similar analysis can be possible 
when test scores are available for multiple subjects for the same student. It will produce 
similar benefits of multiple measures of score for a single pupil. The dataset used in this 
study has variation in test scores for multiple subjects for the same student. For 
example, each student has test scores recorded for four subjects: Language, English, 
Mathematics and Religion that enable me to incorporate student fixed effects to control 
                                                          
19
 The educational practice of ability grouping emerged around the turn of the 20th century as a way to 
prepare students for their "appropriate" place in the workforce. Students with high abilities and skills 
were given intense, rigorous academic training while students with lower abilities were given a 
vocational education. Evidence suggests this is prevalent in UK. 
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for non-random assignments of students and teachers and as a control for prior ability, 
which would otherwise be a limitation of the present study.  
 
However, one of the consequences of using the pupil fixed effects model is one cannot 
use any characteristics that do not vary across subject, such as gender, thus most of the 
student characteristics are lost. To resolve this issue a separate model will be estimated 
in addition to the previous one, using rich data on the students’ own, family and 
household characteristics, which are available in the current dataset. Results can then be 
compared for both models using either pupil fixed effects or pupil characteristics. 
Hence two models are estimated, one controlling for pupil fixed effects and the other 
for pupil characteristics to see which teachers are doing better with the same pupils 
(within the same school) and which teachers are doing better with pupils with the same 
observed characteristics. This is an advantage of the current study over other studies 
where they cannot estimate both a pupil fixed effects specification and a specification 
with pupil characteristics in the same study. For example, the Azam and Kingdon 
(2015) study lacks student characteristics in their administrative data. 
 
A second issue to consider when estimating the effects of teachers on pupil outcomes is 
the potential source of endogeneity due to the possible correlation between teacher 
unobservables such as ability, motivation and effort captured in the error-term and 
teacher characteristics used in an achievement equation. For example, teacher education 
and motivation may be positively related to each other. The studies by Kingdon (2006) 
and Aslam and Kingdon (2011), and other panel data studies, also face this problem. 
These studies incorporated pupil fixed effects in their equations, and used teacher 
characteristics as separate variables in an achievement equation. 
 
The teacher fixed effects approach used in this study does not include teacher 
characteristics as a separate vector in the first stage. Rather, it includes teacher fixed 
effects, which pick up all invariant characteristics of teachers across pupils, whether 
observed or unobserved, in order to get an idea of the relative influence of a particular 
teacher on pupils’ performance. This is aiming to identify the overall teacher quality, 
measured as the total effect of a teacher in a general way (Aaronson et al., 2007; 
Rockoff, 2004; and Rivkin et al., 2005). 
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Another methodological advantage of the teacher fixed effects approach is that it does 
not suffer from the problem of non- random attrition of pupils and teachers in a given 
sample over time that exists in panel data studies. Non-random attrition over time 
creates a bias, upward or downward, in the estimates of teachers’ effects depending on 
the characteristics of the teachers leaving the survey (Rivkin, 2005). The current 
methodology is exploiting the variation within teachers across different pupils at a 
single point in time (in Year 9). So I do not have the problem of non-random attrition 
due to the nature of analysis. 
 
3.4.2 What explains teacher quality? 
The additional feature of the analysis is that it regresses measured teacher quality on to 
different teacher and school characteristics in order to see whether observed teacher and 
school characteristics have any explanatory power on estimated teacher quality 
obtained from equation (2). Therefore, by the end of the analysis, it leads to an 
equivalent destination to that of the earlier studies, namely which particular teacher 
characteristics raise pupils’ performance, but in an unbiased and consistent way 
(Aronson et al., 2007). 
 
α^j =  λZj + uj 
 
In this equation α^j is the estimated teacher fixed effects, measured from the first stage 
regression using equation (2); Zj is the vector measuring teacher characteristics such as 
age, education, training experience, process variables and school variables (class size, 
private school); and  uj is the error term. The second stage relates the estimated teacher 
fixed effect to the teacher’s own characteristics and process variables by regressing 
measured teacher fixed effects on to teacher characteristics and classroom practices, in 
order to further know which specific characteristics drive the differences in 
performance picked up by these teacher fixed effects. So, the second stage determines 
which characteristics make a teacher better than other teachers.  
 
Another concern faced by different researchers is isolating the pure teacher effects from 
other inputs to the educational process, such as school variables and class-room 
variables. Slater et al. (2012) mentioned that all teachers in their sample remain in the 
same school over two periods. Thus, it is impossible to separate the pure teacher effect 
and the school effect. The present study faces a similar issue, since teachers do not 
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work in more than one school and so the school effect cannot be separately identified 
from the teacher fixed effects. In order to attempt to isolate the teacher effect, I also 
control for the quality of school in the second stage.  
 
3.4.3 Descriptions of variables 
Some of the variables used in this study are very different to those used in the previous 
literature investigating teacher characteristics and pupil performance in developed 
countries. For example pupil age is very important in the context of Pakistan. 
According to The World Bank data, the minimum age to start primary education in 
Pakistan is 5 years. However, there is no enforcement of this, parents can send their 
children late to schools, particularly in rural areas where children start their schooling 
late as compared to their counterparts in urban areas. The pupil age variable in my 
survey has a huge variation, the maximum is 25 years and the minimum is 15 years. 
The median value of age is 20. A description of variables used in this study is given in 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of variables are given in Table 3.3.  
 
Family income is the sum of income of all individuals in the pupil’s household. Most of 
the households live in a joint family system, where any individual such as elder siblings 
in addition to father and mother may also be working and have an income and be 
sharing towards family expenditure. Therefore, after asking about father’s and mother’s 
education, a separate question was designed in the family level questionnaires, to ask, 
who else is working at home and what their income was.  
 
Food frequency is measured as the number of meals taken per day, with the breakfast 
variable used additionally to see if the pupil has other meals but usually skips breakfast, 
as eating breakfast habitually boosts performance at school (Adolphus et al., 2013). It is 
very obvious that not having the basic three meals per day and missing breakfast can 
have a negative effect on the health of young people which further leads to poor 
academic performance due to them being malnourished. Food frequency and breakfast 
variables are likely to be highly correlated with the income variables but in this dataset 
the correlation between family income and breakfast and family income and food 
frequency is 0.09. The correlation between food frequency and breakfast is 0.28.  
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The mode of transport variable is used to proxy the level of poverty. The schools are 
not located in pupils’ postcode areas. Therefore, rich pupils can use a car, bus or 
motorcycle to reach schools while poor pupils use either cycle or they walk to schools. 
Both variables measuring food taking frequency and mode of transport are taken as 
proxies for a disadvantaged background. In a country like Pakistan where more than 
half of the population lives below the poverty line
20
 and do not have enough basic 
meals (breakfast, lunch and dinner), these variables in this context are very important to 
capture the effect of poverty/disadvantage. Generally, in Pakistan breakfast, lunch and 
dinner are considered as basic meals. However, due to poverty many people do not 
have all of them. 
 
The tuition variable is very important in the education system of developing countries, 
as in Pakistan in the evening most teachers provide children with extra tuition and earn 
extra income in addition to their school job.  
 
Studying time at home is also important as many students have to help at home in 
household chores, especially girls, which can negatively affect their performance at 
school.  
 
The health problems variable is not measuring minor ailment, instead the question is 
asked in pupil questionnaires “do you have any chronic health problems affecting your 
studies”. 
 
In the teacher dataset, the teacher training variable is given a value of 1, if a teacher has 
received a specialist training called B.Ed or M.Ed. B.Ed is the Bachelor of Education, 
and is a one year specialist course offered to those who wish to take up the teaching 
profession. The minimum qualification required for B.Ed is the Bachelor degree. 
Similarly, M.Ed is the Masters of Education, and is a one year course. The minimum 
requirement for doing the M. Ed is masters. In all government schools, it is mandatory 
for teachers to have specialist training in order to teach in primary or high schools, 
while it is not necessary for the teachers of private schools. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Pakistan Economic Survey (2013-2014) 
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Table 3.2 Description of variables 
 
Variables Description of variables used 
Pupil and home level variables  
Score Year 9 ( Dependent variable) Examination score measured in Year 9 
Pupil age Age of pupil measured in years 
Female Dummy variable 1= female 0 = male 
Log of family income Log of income of all persons’ earnings 
Own house Dummy variable 1=  parents own house 0= rented house 
Physical activity per week Dummy variable 1= yes 0 = no 
Study time at home per day Measured in hours studying at home 
Health problems affecting 
schooling 
Dummy variable 1=  yes 0 = no 
Mode of transport 
Dummy variable 1= if pupil reaches school by car or bus, 0= 
cycling or walk 
Fathers' education Father education measured in years of schooling 
Mothers' education Mother education measured in years of education 
Family size Number of persons living in house 
Birth order Individual’s standing among other siblings 
Siblings Number of brothers and sisters 
Food Frequency Number of meals per day 
Breakfast Dummy variable 1= yes 0 = no 
Tuition ( private coaching) Dummy variable 1= yes 0 = no 
Urban Dummy variable 1= urban 0 = rural 
Subject Variables  
Subjectdum1( Language Y 9) Dummy for subject 1 
Subjectdum2 ( English Y 9) Dummy for subject 2 
Subjectdum3 ( Mathematics Y 9) Dummy for subject 3 
Subjectdum4 ( Religion Y 9) Dummy for subject4 – omitted category 
Teacher Variables  
Teacher age Age of teacher measured in years 
Teacher education Education of teacher measured in  years of schooling 
Teacher training Dummy variable 1= if teacher has  a specialist training 0 = no 
Teacher experience Teaching experience measured in years 
Teacher experience2 Square of teaching experience 
Teacher workload Number of classes a teacher is teaching per day 
Authoritarian Behaviour 
Dummy variable 1= teacher has authoritarian behaviour in 
class 0 = Democratic behaviour 
Class duration Number of minutes spent in teaching a class in a day 
Class size Number of students in class room 
Teacher salary Monthly salary of teacher 
School Variables  
Private school Year 9 Dummy variable 1= private school 0= public school in Year 9 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive summary of variables 
 
Variables Observations Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Pupil and home level variables 
 
    
Score Year 9 1876 37.80 16.19 3 75 
Pupil age 1876 20.22 1.25 15 25 
Female 1876 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Log of family income 1876 9.39 0.98 6.90 13.81 
Own house 1876 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Physical activity 1876 0.88 0.30 0 1 
Study time at home 1876 2.32 1.31 0 10 
Health problems 1876 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Mode of transport 1876 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Fathers' education 1876 10.27 5.16 0 20 
Mothers' education 1876 6.80 5.81 0 18 
Family size 1876 7.70 3.10 3 32 
Birth order 1876 2.95 1.78 1 10 
Siblings 1876 4.58 1.99 0 16 
Food Frequency 1876 2.79 0.58 1 6 
Breakfast 1876 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Tuition 1876 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Urban 1876 0.92 0.27 0 1 
Subject Variables 
 
    
Subjectdum1( Language Y 9) 1876 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Subjectdum2 ( English Y 9) 1876 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Subjectdum3 ( Mathematics Y 9) 1876 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Subjectdum4 ( Religion Y 9) 1876 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Teacher Variables 
 
    
Teacher age 56 36.80 9.55 22 59 
Teacher education 56 15.76 0.73 14 18 
Teacher training 56 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Teacher experience 56 11.61 8.40 0 33 
Teacher workload 56 4.35 1.52 2 7 
Authoritarian Behaviour 56 0.32 0.47 1 0 
Class duration 56 39.73 1.13 35 40 
Class size 56 47.32 31.35 12 110 
Teacher salary 56 10071 4499.92 4500 15000 
School Variables 
 
    
Private school 56 0.57 0.49 0 1 
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Figure 3.1 and 3.2 shows the average score across the 4 subjects for each pupil in 
private and public schools. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Average score of pupils in private schools using Kernel density 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Average score of pupils in public schools using Kernel density 
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3.5 Results 
 
This section considers what is the size of the teacher effects (3.5.1 below) - i.e. what is 
the difference in scores between having a good teacher and a bad teacher? How does 
this difference in scores compare to the overall distribution of scores. One way to 
quantify this would be to express the difference in scores between having a good 
teacher and a bad teacher in terms of the number of standard deviations of the overall 
test score distribution. I also used inter-quartile range (IQR) to describe teacher fixed 
effects. 
 
3.5.1 Estimation of teacher effects (Baseline Model, first stage results) 
First, I estimate the model which includes teacher dummies and subject dummies and 
the rich vector of individual and household characteristics as explanatory variables. The 
dependent variable is score in Year 9, with a standard deviation of 16.13, a maximum 
value of 75 and a minimum of 3. The score distribution has median 38 and mean 37.37, 
so it appears to be normally distributed and not truncated, exhibits substantial variance, 
all of which further suggests that score in Year 9 is the appropriate measure of pupil 
performance of the sampled population. The distribution of scores is given in column 1 
of Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3 shows the distribution. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Score Year 9 (Dependent variable) 
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Table 3.4: Distributions of score Year 9 and teacher fixed effects 
 
 
Score Year 9 Teacher fixed 
effects1 
Model-1 
Teacher fixed 
effects 2 
Model-2 
1
th
 Percentile 6 -25.21 -43.44 
5
th
 Percentile 11 -22.73 -37.24 
10
th
 Percentile 15 -19.47 -32.08 
25
th
 Percentile 25 -12.45 -20.05 
50
th
 Percentile 38 -4.35 -7.31 
75
th
 Percentile 50 2.49 2.54 
90
th
 Percentile 59 8.32 12.79 
95
th
 Percentile 63 11.53 18 
99
th
 Percentile 70 21.45 37.31 
99-1 gap 64 46.66 80.75 
90-10 gap 44 27.77 44.78 
75-50 gap 12 6.84 20.1 
75-25 gap 25 14.94 22.59 
50-25 gap 13 8.1 12.74 
Standard deviation 16.13 10.67 17.88 
Mean 37.36 -5.21 -8.77 
R-square - 0.57 0.74 
P- vales for F-test - 0.000 0.000 
Teacher fixed effects - Yes Yes 
Subject fixed effects - Yes Yes 
Pupil characteristics - Yes No 
Pupil fixed effects - No Yes 
Observations - 1876
21
 2361
22
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 The number of observations is different in teacher fixed effects model 1 and 2, because of missing 
values on some of the pupil characteristics. 
22
I did the pupil fixed effects on the same sample as the pupil characteristics model, i.e. 1876 
observations, and found broadly the same results. I am not comparing the results between the two 
methods, but rather presenting a different way of deriving the teacher fixed effects. Given the number of 
fixed effects being estimated in the pupil fixed effects regression, I need as many observations as 
possible hence why I keep the sample at the largest possible size. 
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Table 3.5 below describes the first stage results of equation (2) using pupil variables, 
teacher fixed effects and subject fixed effects (to control for systematic variation in 
marks across subjects). 
 
 
Table 3.5: Pupil- level regression with teacher and subject fixed effects 
 
Variables Coef. S.E. 
   
Pupils’ age -0.244 3.529 
Pupils’ age square -0.027 0.087 
Female 6.963 1.189
***
 
Log of family income 1.090 0.399
***
 
Own house -0.689 0.634 
Physical activity 0.497 0.875 
Study time at home -0.392 0.216
*
 
Health status -0.680 0.592 
Mode of transport -0.957 0.673 
Fathers' education 0.009 0.068 
Mothers' education 0.121 0.068
*
 
Family size -0.103 0.101 
Birth order 0.126 0.180 
Siblings -0.207 0.188 
Food Frequency 0.902 0.480
*
 
Breakfast 1.799 0.622
***
 
Tuition -0.142 0.568 
Urban 0.649 1.018 
Subjectdum1( Language Y9) 14.059 4.900
***
 
Subjectdum2 ( English Y9) 7.868 4.105
*
 
Subjectdum3 ( Mathematics Y9) 5.893 4.900 
Constant 37.364 35.756 
Teacher fixed effects 
Pupil fixed effects 
Subject fixed effects 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
 
Observations 1876 
 
R
2
 0.57 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01,  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
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The important part of the analysis is the teacher fixed effects (Table 3.4).  The 
importance of teacher quality can be measured by the variation in teacher fixed effects 
(Rockoff, 2004). Here each teacher is measured relative to the omitted teacher, who 
therefore has a relative fixed effect of zero, and the omitted teacher was deliberately 
chosen to be in the middle of the distribution. 
 
There is significant variation in teachers’ effects; some teacher effects are positive and 
highly significant while others are negative and significant. The estimated teacher fixed 
effects have a 10.66 standard deviation which is broad. Column 2 in Table 3.4 describes 
the teacher fixed effects in Model 1. Azam and Kingdon (2015) find a 0.511 standard 
deviation of estimated teacher fixed effects using a value added model to estimate 
teacher fixed effects and administrative data from one of the districts of India.  
 
An exceptionally good teacher having a maximum score 
23
 ( at the 99
th
 percentile) is 
related to an increase of 1.32
24
 standard deviations in pupils’ test score, while an 
exceptionally bad teacher (defined as being at the 1
st 
percentile) has a detrimental 
impact on scores of 1.55 standard deviations both relative  to the reference teacher. 
 
The most important thing to focus on when discussing these results is the gaps (75-25 
gap) as it is the difference between the quartiles that is important. The actual size at 
each percentile will depend on which teacher was chosen as the omitted category i.e. 
the actual values at the quartiles depend on who the omitted teacher was when 
estimating the fixed effects, since they are all measured relative to that omitted teacher. 
So changing the omitted teacher would change the values at the quartiles. But the 
difference between the quartiles would not change. In effect, by measuring both relative 
to the omitted teacher then calculating the difference in 'performance' is the difference 
between the teacher at the 75th and the teacher at the 25th percentile. 
 
                                                          
23
 Different studies used different definitions for good and bad teachers, for instance, Slater et al. (2012) 
defined a good teacher as being at the 75
th
 percentile and a bad teacher at 25
th
 percentile, while other 
studies, Azam and Kingdon (2015) and Clotfelter et al (2010) defined a very good teacher as being at the 
90
th
 percentile and a very bad teacher as being at the 10
th
 percentile. The present study uses the definition 
of good and bad teachers placing them at the 75
th
 and 25
th 
percentiles respectively. 
24
 This number is obtained by dividing the teacher fixed effect number at the 99
th
 percentile by the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable (pupils’ score) as reported in column 2 of Table 4. 
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A good teacher defined as being at the 75
th
 percentile is related to an increase in score 
by 0.15 of a standard deviation, while a bad teacher decreases the score by 0.77 of a 
standard deviation. Therefore, a pupil having been taught by a good teacher (75
th
 
percentile teacher) scores 0.92 of a standard deviation more than a pupil who is taught 
by a bad teacher (25
th
 percentile teacher) leaving a significant effect on pupil 
performance. Clotfelter et al. (2010) find a difference of 0.23 standard deviations in the 
predicted student achievement between the good and bad teacher, whereas the 
education literature finds a moderate difference of 0.20 standard deviations (Azam and 
Kingdon, 2015). Also comparing the difference of 0.92 standard deviations in score, to 
other variables included in the model, teacher quality has the biggest impact in terms of 
standard deviation on score. Taking into account the whole distribution of teacher 
scores, it reveals a range from -25.21 to 21.45 with a -5.21 mean value. The standard 
deviation is 10.67, which is about 0.661 of the standard deviation of the pupil scores, 
depicting a large dispersion in teacher score from the mean value -5.21.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Distributions of teacher fixed effects in Model 1 
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Briefly considering the other coefficients in the education production function reported 
in Table 3.5, studying Language in Year 9 is related to an increase of 0.86
25
 standard 
deviations in score, relative to Religion (the omitted category). Similarly, English as a 
subject is related to an increase in score up to 0.48 standard deviations, relative to 
Religion. Mathematics is not different to Religion scores in Year 9. These systematic 
differences show the importance of controlling for subject taught. 
 
Most of the other coefficients on individual and household variables hold expected 
signs. The coefficients on pupil age and pupil age squared are insignificant. The 
coefficient on female is positive and significant at the 1% level of significance, showing 
that being female is related to an increase of 0.42 standard deviations in exam scores, 
relative to male. The above finding is similar to Slater et al. (2012) for England that 
females score higher than males. Also it is broadly accepted that females perform better 
than males. The coefficient on log of family income is also positive and highly 
significant. It shows that a 1 standard deviation increase in family income leads to an 
increase of 0.07 standard deviations in exam scores. There is an established link 
between income and child educational outcomes, as shown in the research undertaken 
in chapter 2. The studies of Blanden (2004) and Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) 
find this for UK. Higher income allows parents to assist their children through different 
facilities such as books, private coaching and other supplementary materials helping 
children in their education.  
 
The coefficients on the variables indicating own house and physical activity are 
insignificant. The study time at home coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% 
level of significance; it means an additional hour of studying at home is associated with 
a 0.02 standard deviation decrease in score. This could arguably be due to those 
students who are already struggling in studies; they have to study more hours at home. 
 
Health status and mode of transport have insignificant coefficients. Fathers’ education 
is not related to score of Year 9, while the coefficient on mothers’ education is 
significant at the 10% significance level meaning that an additional year increase in 
mothers’ education has an impact of .0007 standard deviations increase in score. 
                                                          
25
 These standard deviations are obtained by dividing the respective coefficient values, β by the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable, score. 
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Alderman et al. (2001) find a strong positive link between maternal education and child 
achievement, however their study was based on primary school education. 
 
Family size, birth order and number of siblings have insignificant coefficients, though 
family size and number of siblings have negative signs which mean that more persons 
at home and a higher number of siblings reduce the exam score. Food frequency 
measured as number of meals per day turns out to have a significant coefficient at the 
10% level, showing that an additional intake of a meal leads to an increase of 0.05 
standard deviations in exam scores. The coefficient on having breakfast is significant at 
1% level of significance; this means having breakfast is related to an increase of 0.11 
standard deviations in exam scores, relative to those who miss breakfast.  
 
Tuition (extra coaching) is negatively related to exam scores and urban is positively 
related to score, though both have insignificant coefficients. The R
2 
shows that 57% of 
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by these variables, which is 
relatively high.  
 
3.5.2 Pupil fixed effects model (first stage results) 
The above model may not be able to capture the full heterogeneity in students and 
family backgrounds. To capture those, I introduce pupil fixed effects into the model. I 
estimate the same model as earlier in this section, but instead of pupil characteristics, I 
use pupil fixed effects with teacher fixed effects and subject fixed effects in the first 
stage
26
. The intuition behind including pupil fixed effects rather than pupil 
characteristics, is to see which teachers are doing better with the same pupils (and so 
within the same school) and not just which teachers are doing better with pupils with 
the same observed characteristics. It is also important to control for pupil fixed effects, 
given that I do not have prior ability controls, so this is only way to fully control for the 
type of students each teacher has.  
 
I did not use the school fixed effects, since each teacher only works within a single 
school, hence there is no variation for teachers across schools. Looking at the first stage 
results it does not make a huge difference compared to the previous specification, and 
                                                          
26
 The first stage results from the pupil fixed effects model are not presented in the chapter as there are no 
coefficients values in the model due to using pupil fixed effects, teacher fixed effects and subject fixed 
effects in the specification. 
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in fact some of the teacher fixed effects coefficients are larger in absolute size. The 
distribution of teacher fixed effects in model 2, shown in Figure 3.5, is more dispersed 
than the teacher fixed effects in model 1. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Distributions of teacher fixed effects in Model 2 
 
 
 
 
The standard deviation of teacher fixed effects in model 1 is 10.67 and teacher fixed 
effects in model 2 is 17.88. The inter-quartile range (IQR) is 22.9 while it was 14.94 in 
the case of teacher fixed effects in model 1. This finding is contrary to previous studies, 
Slater et al (2012), find that the estimation error is smaller in the pupil fixed effects 
model relative to the pupil characteristic model, suggesting that the pupil fixed effects 
model is more precise at estimating teacher fixed effects. Azam and Kingdon (2015) 
find a 0.379 standard deviation of teacher fixed effects in model 2 (pupil fixed effects) 
and a 0.513 standard deviation of teacher fixed effects in model 1 (pupil 
characteristics), however, both studies use a control for prior ability, and it may be this 
fact that makes the results of this study different to theirs. 
 
Using these new results, a pupil taught by a good teacher (being at the 75
th
 percentile) 
has an increase in exam scores of 0.15 standard deviations, while a bad teacher (being 
at the 25
th
 percentile) decreases the score of a pupil by 1.2 standard deviations. 
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deviations more than a pupil who is taught by a bad teacher (25
th
 percentile). The R
2 
shows 74 % of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by these variables. 
The results with the pupil fixed effects are theoretically more relevant, given that they 
control for the individual pupils’ characteristics (at least their fixed characteristics that 
are constant across teachers). Rockoff (2004) highlights that the most credible way to 
estimate teacher effects is to regress test score on teacher dummy variables and 
controlling for variation in student characteristics and other classroom specific 
variables. 
 
3.5.3 What explains teacher quality? 
From the first stage results, it has been clear that teacher quality is an important 
determinant of pupil performance; however, it is important to know what explains 
variation in teacher quality. Is it the teacher observable variables or process related 
variables or school related variables that explain variation in teacher fixed effects?  To 
examine this issue further, I regress estimated teacher fixed effects, against teacher and 
school variables.  
 
Results are given in Table 3.6. The dependent variable is teacher fixed effects from 
model 1; using pupil characteristics, subject fixed effects and teacher fixed effects in 
the first stage regression. The amount of variation in the estimated teacher effect 
explained by these variables is low- R
2
 is 0.20. Only 2 out of 11 variables have a 
significant coefficient, age having a non-linear relationship with teacher quality. As a 
teacher becomes older, beyond a certain point, it improves the teacher quality. It could 
be due to the fact that as a teacher becomes older he is likely equipped with more 
experience and teaching techniques, hence it may improve teacher quality. Model (4) 
uses a variable, teacher salary as an additional regressor, which is negatively related to 
estimated teacher quality, but has an insignificant coefficient. These results have an 
important implication that it is not observable characteristics that make a good teacher. 
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Table 3.6: Explaining teacher quality (teacher fixed effects in Model 1) 
 
 Teacher Quality 
Model (3) 
Teacher Quality 
Model (4) 
Teacher Quality 
Model (5) 
Teacher age -3.57** ( 1.79) -3.32** (1.69) -3.39** ( 1.62) 
Teacher age
2
 0.043** (0.02) 0.04** ( 0.02) 0.04** (0.19) 
Male teacher -0.38 (3.52) -1.37 ( 3.36) 0.59 (3.24) 
Teacher education -1.61 (2.30) 0.40 ( 2.32) 1.43( 2.28) 
Teacher training -1.05 ( 4.56) -2.29 (4.33) -1.38 ( 4.17) 
Teacher experience 1.50 (1.11) 1.76 (1.05) 1.80* ( 1.00) 
Teacher experience
2
 -0.04 ( 0.03) -0.05 ( 0.03) -0.04 ( 0.02) 
Teacher workload 0.97 (1.18) 0.68 ( 1.12) 0.61 ( 1.07) 
Authoritarian behaviour 0.10 (3.46) -0.50 ( 3.27) -0.64 ( 3.14) 
Class duration -0.45 (1.41) -1.14 (1.36) -1.09 ( 1.30) 
Class size -0.07 ( 0.09) 0.09 (0.11) 0.20 ( 0.12) 
Teacher Salary ( Rs)  -0.002 ( 0.00) 0.00006 ( 0.00) 
Private school   27.59** (13.03) 
Constant 97.66 97.01 37.59 
Observations 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.20 0.30 0.38 
P- vales for F-test 0.51 0.18 0.07 
Dependent variable is teacher fixed effects1 derived from table 5 using teacher fixed effects, subject 
fixed effects and pupil characteristics.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
 
As the first stage regression results do not control for school effects, so the estimates of 
teacher effects were not purged of the school effects, so it is important to control for 
school effects at the second stage. Strictly speaking, the teacher fixed effect estimated 
in the first stage is a combination of teacher and school effects, which is why it is 
important to control for school effects in the second stage. I estimate a third version of 
teacher quality controlling for school quality.  
 
The highly significant private school coefficient (coded as 1= private school, 0= public 
school) in the second stage results shows that the teachers with the best results are those 
teaching in private schools. So the private school teacher does better than public school 
teachers with pupils with the same characteristics. This is partly a consequence of not 
controlling for prior attainment, so that private school teachers may get the best results 
because they get the best students, not because they are the best teachers. It is clear by 
looking at the average scores of students by type of school, in Figure 3.1 and 3.2, that 
96 
 
the private school pupils on average have higher scores (the mean score of private 
school pupils is 45.95 and 33.35 for public school pupils) than those from public 
schools. This could be due to the fact that the private schools have higher fees and they 
set strict admission criteria and have a limited number of spaces. These schools set their 
own entry tests and interviews to assess the average calibre of pupils before offering 
admission to them. Generally, they make sure to admit only those who can ensure 
higher results.  
 
Although the model uses a good set of pupil control variables, it would seem that they 
are not doing enough to equalize pupil characteristics, between school types, and the 
best pupils are still going to private schools (holding constant the control variables 
mentioned above). To investigate this issue further, I estimate again these three second 
stage specifications, against teacher fixed effects, controlling for pupil fixed effects 
rather than pupil characteristics in the first stage. Results are given in Table 3.7.  
 
 
Table 3.7: Explaining teacher quality (teacher fixed effects in Model 2) 
 
 Teacher Quality 
Model (6) 
Teacher Quality 
Model (7) 
Teacher Quality 
Model (8) 
Teacher age -8.78*** ( 2.62) -8.35*** ( 2.49) -8.54*** ( 2.47) 
Teacher age
2
 0.11*** ( 0.03) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.11*** ( 0.02) 
Male teacher 3.96 ( 5.39) 2.44 ( 5.13) 3.35 ( 5.11) 
Teacher education -2.54 (3.26) 0.51 (3.33) 1.25 ( 3.33) 
Teacher training -11.42* ( 6.52) -13.54** ( 6.22) -12.17* ( 6.23) 
Teacher experience 1.53 ( 1.59) 1.98 ( 1.51) 1.92 ( 1.49) 
Teacher experience
2
 -0.05 (0.04) -0.06 ( 0.04) -0.05 ( 0.04) 
Teacher workload 1.01 ( 1.79) 0.65 ( 1.69) 0.50 ( 1.67) 
Authoritarian behaviour -0.45 (5.16) -1.20 ( 4.88) -1.54 ( 4.83) 
Class duration -1.03 ( 2.04) -2.04 (1.97) -1.99 (1.95) 
Class size 0.02 ( 0.13) 0.26 ( 0.16) 0.38** ( 0.18)  
Teacher Salary ( Rs)  -0.003** ( 0.00) -0.001 ( 0.00) 
Private school   25.89 ( 18.54 ) 
Constant 235.47 230.23 181.56 
Observations 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.40 0.48 0.51 
P- vales for F-test 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Dependent variable is teacher fixed effects2 derived from table 5 using teacher fixed effects, subject 
fixed effects and pupil fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
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Overall results remain the same, but now the private school coefficient is insignificant 
(Model 8), suggesting that the pupil fixed effects are more successfully picking up the 
differences in pupil abilities than the observable pupil characteristics. Model 7 has a 
negative significant coefficient on salary, which implies that those good performing 
teachers are rewarded less. This is due to the fact that in the current data the mean 
salary of private school teachers is 6375 Rs. while the mean salary of public school 
teachers’ is more than double that of private schools teachers’ salary i.e. 15000 Rs., and 
private schools are performing better than public schools, therefore, the coefficient on 
teacher salary is negative.  
 
Teachers’ salaries in private schools are a small fraction of the teacher salaries in 
government schools. Private school employers pay to the teacher what is called the 
market-clearing wage (i.e. the wage that individuals would get if they entered into the 
open market given their level of qualifications). In addition, it is based on the local 
unemployment rate, which is high among graduates. There are, therefore, a large 
number of educated people available, who are unemployed and are presumably willing 
to take jobs at low pay. Private schools are able to take advantage of the low market 
wage that prevails and offer low teacher salaries.  
 
On the other hand, teachers’ salaries in public sector are bureaucratically set and 
governed by Sixth Pay commission or following the Basic Pay Scale. Those salaries 
have quite a lot of rinse in them, meaning that they are non-productivity related 
salaries; they are same for all teachers across the board irrespective of whether a teacher 
is productive or not, performing well or not, regularly comes to school or is a 
chronically absentee. So arguably private school teachers have some leeway to reward 
teachers based on efforts rather than having a blanket salary structure based on seniority 
and qualifications only (Kingdon, 2017). 
 
Teacher training is negatively related to teacher quality but at the 10% level. This is 
likely to be because of reverse causality, the lower quality teachers are put in for more 
training (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011). 
 
A comparison of results using pupil variables and pupil fixed effects suggests that the 
model controlling for pupil fixed effects has not made that much difference to the 
results - presumably because there were not many selection effects of pupils to teachers 
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anyway, so that controlling for unobserved pupil characteristics does not make much 
difference. Although I only surveyed one teacher per subject in the present study there 
was more than one teacher teaching each subject in year 9 within each school, so there 
could have been an issue related to the school choosing which pupil is taught by which 
teacher within schools. There is therefore a reason for estimating the pupil fixed effects 
specification, to control for any unobserved characteristics of pupils. The pupil fixed 
effects method is a robustness check as changing from the pupil characteristics 
methodology to pupil fixed effects, the results remain similar i.e. the choice of 
specification does not make a substantial difference to the results. There still could be 
selection effects of pupils into schools however, so it is not completely random which 
teacher teaches which pupil. This can be seen in the changing significance of the 
private school coefficient between specifications. 
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3.6  Conclusions 
 
The present study uses the survey data of 611 pupils studying in Year 9 (aged 14-15 
years), from private and public schools of Pakistan in 2008-9, in one of the districts of 
Punjab, Pakistan. The survey data is linked with administrative data of the student exam 
scores, to address the issue of teacher quality using a teacher fixed effects approach. In 
particular, it evaluates the teachers in terms of the exam results of their pupils. 
 
This chapter investigates two questions: Do teachers matter and what characteristics 
make teachers good or bad relative to other teachers. Teacher fixed effects and then 
pupil fixed effects techniques to address heterogeneity in terms of pupils and home 
backgrounds are used for the estimation of teacher quality.  
 
The results have shown that teachers matter a great deal within schools. A good teacher 
defined as being at the 75
th
 percentile is related to an increase in score by 0.15 standard 
deviations, while a bad teacher decreases the score by 0.77 standard deviations. 
Therefore, pupils having been taught by a good teacher (75
th
 percentile teacher) score 
0.92 standard deviations more than the pupils who are taught by a bad teacher (25
th
 
percentile teacher) leaving a significant effect on pupil performance. Therefore, 
improving overall teacher quality in schools does seem a right direction for public 
policy. If teachers are randomly assigned across schools then school assignment is not 
very important. This may not be true as it would mean it does not matter which school 
you get in, if every school has an equal chance of having a bad teacher. So in reality it 
seems likely that teachers try to cluster according to quality. This question cannot be 
answered definitively as the present data set does not allow us to separate the pure 
teacher effect from the school effect within a school. 
 
The findings of the present study confirm the previous findings of teacher quality for 
developed countries as found in many studies in the US that there exists considerable 
variation in teacher effectiveness, thus confirming the findings of developed countries 
in a developing country setting in Pakistan. Azam and Kingdon (2015) also confirm this 
for India. In their study, teacher effects capture the impact of spending two years with a 
teacher, while the current study captures the teacher effects of spending one year with 
the teacher. 
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The above finding of teacher quality suggests that teacher quality is also important for 
academic performance at high school level, and that family background and ability are 
not the only important factors. Within schools, teacher quality differs with the same 
pupils. This is a systematic effect averaged over all pupils, rather than anecdotal for just 
one pupil. Similarly it is not due to the general level of marks in the teacher’s subject, 
since the equations control for the systematic variation in subjects marks through 
subject fixed effects. The same pupil can score a significantly different score in 
different subjects in a particular grade given different teacher quality. This debate has 
clear implications for improving teacher quality. Students can benefit by improving 
average teacher quality at schools. 
 
Rivkin et al. (2005) find that teacher quality is related to socioeconomic gaps in 
outcomes. Such a finding is also useful here: teacher assignment could play an 
important role in alleviating unequal outcomes existing in gender and social groups. 
Since the teacher quality has an effect for the entire class therefore it has a strong effect 
as compared to any student based incentives. 
 
The other part of the analysis in this chapter aimed to identify whether observed 
characteristics and classroom methods and practices explain the differences in teacher 
quality. Similarly, as found in many studies for the US and the UK and India, I find that 
teacher characteristics explain very little of teacher quality. So, observable teacher 
characteristics do not explain teacher quality well. Though the current dataset is small, 
many other authors with larger datasets confirm this (see particularly Kane et al. 
(2008)). Therefore, in a setting where teacher observed characteristics are not related to 
teacher quality, policies that reward teachers on the basis of performance are more 
effective than those based on hiring and retaining teachers with particular credentials. 
 
This suggests that it is hard to identify good teachers ex ante, but administrative data 
can be used to identify them ex post. Despite the conclusion that measuring teacher 
fixed effects is a productive path, the task remains incomplete due to lack of adequate 
data. As Slater et al. (2012) suggest, a greater role for performance management and 
personnel policies in schools is implied. 
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Also, policies related to teacher recruitment and progression must be rethought and 
redesigned. It could be done probably by looking at pupil progress analysis in the 
probationary period, sharper increases in pay on the basis of performance, mentoring, 
and more stringent hiring procedures (Kane and Staiger, 2002). 
 
Finally looking at the above results and findings from previous literature on teacher 
quality, it is very clear that further research is needed in order to identify high quality 
teachers, and then how to recruit and retain them once they are identified. Following the 
common practice, almost everywhere, compensating teachers solely on the basis of 
education, experience and training is less likely to yield an increase in teacher quality. 
So it is crucial to identify alternative sources of information on teacher quality in order 
to design policies to increase student achievement. 
 
Some caveats apply to the conclusions of the present study. The analysed sample 
consists of private and public schools from one particular district of Punjab; hence it 
cannot be claimed for other parts of the country as there might be geographical 
dimensions which are not captured by the current study due to data limitations. Also the 
sample size is small, future research with larger datasets may uncover important 
differences of teacher performance and personality.  
 
Nevertheless, the present study managed to find some important findings about teacher 
quality in a setting of a developing country with much reduced selection issues.  Many 
other studies face the issue that pure teacher effects cannot be separated from school 
effects, and the present study also faces a similar issue since it is very rare for a teacher 
to work in two schools at once. But the current dataset does have some observable 
characteristics of schools that can control for school differences, which is rare in other 
leading datasets. In addition, prior academic achievement such as score in grade 8 is not 
available in the current dataset, as used by other studies to deal with non-random 
sorting of teachers to pupils. However, a helpful feature of the data allows estimating a 
pupil fixed effects model along with the teacher fixed effects approach used in this 
study to address the issue that teachers are not randomly assigned to students within 
schools. 
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Appendix A to Chapter 3:  Matching of students to teachers 
 
This appendix describes the linking of pupils to the teachers. There are 3 data files; the 
pupil data file has all information on all pupils’ own and family level characteristics, 
plus a unique identifier for each pupil. It was in wide format containing 611 
observations on pupils. Also each pupil has their subject score for 4 subjects in Year 9, 
in separate columns for each subject. The dataset was converted from wide format to 
long format - i.e. to multiple observations for each individual with one observation for 
each subject they do, giving 611* 4= 2444 observations. The second data file is teacher 
data, which has teacherno and schoolno as identifiers and has all information from the 
teacher questionnaires. The third file is school head data, which has schoolno as an 
identifier and all information about school related variables. In the teacher dataset file, 
and by cross tabulating teacher subject with schoolno, there is only one teacher 
observed for each subject within each school.  So given that I know which school each 
of the pupils went to, then for each subject exam result I simply assign the teacher who 
teaches that subject in that school (i.e., for example in school 5, I know which teacher 
teaches each subject in school 5, so for each pupil in school 5, I assign their English 
score to the observed English teacher in Year 9, their maths score to the observed maths 
teacher in Year 9, etc.) Hence I created a teacherno variable in the pupil data file, and 
then merged teacher data into the pupil data using the teacherno variable then school 
data into the master file using the schoolno variable. 
 
 
Appendix B to Chapter 3: Data collection process 
 
Before the inauguration of the actual survey, this study was approved by the relevant 
university department board of studies meeting. Prior to undertaking the actual survey, 
a pilot study was carried out over two schools, a private and a public school, to check 
the feasibility of the actual survey. As a result of the pilot, the questionnaires were 
altered accordingly. For example, it was found that the pupil questionnaire was very 
lengthy and a few questions the pupils could not really answer and so were re-written, 
while a couple of questions had language ambiguities that were made clear in the 
updated version of the pupil questionnaire.  
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A random sampling technique was used to select the schools sample from the entire 
school population within the district under consideration. Random sampling was 
insured through the opt for lottery method, as all the schools names were written on 
pieces of papers and put into a box, in total 15 schools were drawn from the box, those 
include 6 public schools and 9 private schools. Prior to the launch of present survey, all 
schools were informed before the beginning of survey and acquired their consent to let 
the author enter the school with the assurance of confidentiality and to collect 
information from pupils, teachers and schoolheads. Among the 9 private schools, one 
school refused to collect the data, and therefore, that private school was dropped. The 
remaining 14 schools that accepted the idea were our sample.  
 
Once the sample of private and public schools were chosen using random sampling, 
611 Year 9 pupils were selected within schools. Further, to gather pupils’ information, a 
briefing was given to all Year 9 pupils in different class rooms, a day before collecting 
the actual information. In the briefing, it was explained to them that this is a research 
project related to their education and they were requested to fill out the prescribed self-
completion questionnaires. The contents of the questionnaires and the whole process 
were explained to them under the assurance of privacy and confidentiality. The time 
span to fill out the pupils’ questionnaires was 60 minutes and all were done in the 
presence of the author in all schools and in all classrooms. 
 
Moving on to the ethical practices, all Year 9 pupils within class rooms were given an 
opportunity to withdraw or not to participate if they did not wish to do so, therefore, the 
selected sample is based on their choice to participate in present survey. They were 
advised to ask their parents if they wished their children to contribute to the survey. 
This was also communicated to them in the briefing session that once they and their 
parents were happy to join the survey, they would be further requested to collect the 
information of their father, mother and siblings. However, it was observed that young 
pupils were excited about participation in the survey and mostly pupils participated 
except those who were absent on that particular date. A few did not participate but we 
do not have their information as it was optional for them to take part in the survey. The 
pupils’ participation in the current survey was observed as an independently random 
sample, since there was no basis of their selection in the survey except that participation 
was not mandatory as we were aiming for the fact that pupils’ participation in survey 
would be a random process.  
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Once pupils were chosen within school and class rooms, then we collected respective 
parents’ information using self-completion questionnaires given to young pupils which 
were returned to the school authorities in a sealed envelope, so that school heads, and 
subject teachers, collected all relevant information. It was suggested to pupils that 
where the parents were illiterate, they could fill themselves that information on their 
behalf, or if the mother was illiterate then the father could fill out the relevant mother 
information or seek help from another literate adult or elder sibling at home in filling 
out the parents’ questionnaire. All parents of sample pupils responded to the parents’ 
questionnaires and we have no missing parents’ information. 
 
Similarly, self-completion teacher and school head questionnaires were given to subject 
and head teachers and the response rate was 100% with no missing subject teacher and 
head teacher information. 
 
From school records, information that contained unique board registration numbers was 
obtained. To make sure that it was an authentic source, it was not asked of the pupils 
directly so there could be no chance of error, as it was long number composed of serial 
numbers, and letters. Subsequently, survey data were matched to the administrative data 
of pupils’ exam scores of the higher education board using the unique pupil identifiers. 
Information on their exams scores were therefore observed in Year 9, Year 10, Year 11 
to Year 12, over a four year period, to obtain longitudinal data of pupils exam scores. 
 
During a follow-up survey, the distance variable was calculated by driving from each 
individual’s home to the nearest post-compulsory educational institutions. Further 
details can be found in the data sections of Chapter 3 and 4.  
 
To summarise, this is very comprehensive and rich dataset having information on all 
related aspects of young pupils’ lives: education, families, subject teachers, school 
heads and exam sores. It is representative of rural, urban, private public, male, female 
and the mix of socioeconomic backgrounds. The setup of the survey was purpose-built 
with careful planning, meticulousness and almost no chance of measurement error  
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Chapter 4:  
 
Selection Effects and Post-Compulsory Education in 
Pakistan 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Participation in post-compulsory education can be simply defined as continuing into 
further education beyond the age when it is no longer compulsory.  There could be 
many benefits in doing so but most likely it could be related to higher future earnings. 
Substantial evidence is available that participation in higher education leads to higher 
future wages (see, amongst others, Oreopoulos, 2006; Leigh and Ryan, 2008; Neal and 
Johnson 1996; Walker and Zhu, 2003) and not going on welfare (Herrnstein and 
Murray, 2010). Therefore, it is important to increase participation in post-compulsory 
education and also it is an issue in education policy
27
 how to increase participation in 
post-compulsory education. The above issue can be discussed in two perspectives, first, 
is how to increase the participation in post-compulsory education and the second is 
what are the factors that lead to the higher academic achievement of pupils once they 
are at the post-compulsory education level. 
 
Regarding the participation in post-compulsory education, a considerable literature 
exists studying the factors that affect the decision to participate in post-compulsory 
education (for example, Ashford et al., 1993; Clark, 2011; Gray et al., 1993; Lenton                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
, 2005; McIntosh, 2001; Payne, 1998 and Rice, 1999). Most studies have found that 
prior attainment and family socioeconomic status (SES) are the most important factors 
determining the participation in post-compulsory education. The intergenerational 
mobility literature has a direct relevance to this topic – suggesting that parents’ 
education and income are positively related to children’s participation in post-
compulsory education (Chevalier, 2004). However, over and above the effect of these 
factors, geography and neighbourhood also determine the participation in college and 
                                                          
27
 Its importance can be seen in education policy, as in the UK, it is always a priority of government to 
increase school leaving age, most recently school leaving age has been increased to age 18 in 2015. 
However, it could be full-time education or spending 20 or more hours per week in training or 
volunteering.   
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university education or institutional choice (Gibbons and Vignoles, 2012; Gorard and 
Smith, 2006; Faggian and McCann, 2009; Long, 2004; Alam and Winters, 2009). 
 
One important constraint while discussing participation in post-compulsory education is 
proximity to an institution providing post-compulsory education, which is seldom 
explored in research. Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) are the first
28
 to study the impact 
of distance to an institution on the decision to participate in post-compulsory education 
in the UK. They find an overall small negative effect- higher distance reduces the 
participation in post-compulsory education. Therefore, one of the aims of the present 
study is to investigate the specific aspect of geography (distance to nearest institution 
providing post-compulsory education), along with other key drivers such as prior 
attainment and family SES, that influence participation in post-compulsory education, 
which hitherto has been given less attention relative to other determinants.  
 
There are different reasons involved in studying this particular aspect of participation in 
post-compulsory education. One is the different cost associated with higher distances to 
the nearest Further Education institution. In financial terms it is the travel and 
reallocation costs involved, in terms of temporal, commuting time, and in psychological 
terms the inconvenience and unpleasantness of lengthy commuting every day. Human 
capital theory suggests that education is an investment decision taken by pupils 
anticipating that the present value of future benefits outweighs the present costs 
(Becker, 1994). Therefore due to costs involved in greater distances to nearest 
institutions, it has an obvious impact on the likelihood to participate in post-compulsory 
education. 
 
Distance could have a differential effect on the participation in post-compulsory 
education in urban and rural settings. There are two things to be considered here. One, 
distances are likely to be less in urban areas relative to rural areas, and two, urban areas 
are equipped with better connectivity. So, living in an urban area served with better 
transport facilities, being distant for several miles from an institution might have a 
different impact to those living in rural areas for whom it may be hard to commute 
without private transport. It is important to know the link between distance and 
likelihood of participation as it is an issue for all pupils who do not live within easy 
                                                          
28
 Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) are the first to study the impact of distance on immediate post-
compulsory education choices at age 16. 
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walking distance of their nearest education institution. So, type of area can make a 
difference in the decision to participate in post-compulsory education and availability 
of local schools/institutions delivering the desired program of study. Similarly, distance 
effects might vary by gender as it depends on whether parents allow their children to 
commute, especially in developing countries, where girls have less mobility and face 
more restrictions than boys regarding schooling (Lloyd et al., 2009). 
 
Another reason for studying the impact of characteristics such as urban/rural on the 
likelihood to participate in post-compulsory education is that they are more amenable to 
change as compared to other long term determinants like prior attainment and home 
background. For instance, providing improved transport and subsidizing the travel cost 
both could have a clear effect in lowering the cost of education, which in turn could 
improve the likelihood to participate in post-compulsory education. 
 
The other motivation of the current study is that it is jointly investigating the 
determinants of participation and performance in post-compulsory education. 
Previously no other study has investigated these two perspectives together: i.e. 
participation and performance at post-compulsory education level. 
 
Pakistan is a developing country facing different challenges in its education system, 
high school dropouts being one of them. According to a local NGO
29
, 35000 young 
people dropout from high school every year. Individuals having a high school diploma 
earn relatively more compared to those with a lower level of education (Frenette, 2006). 
Therefore, it is important to look at why young people drop out from education or for 
those participating in higher education, what are the main factors behind their 
participation. Pakistan is a good case for investigating the determinants of educational 
outcomes for the following reasons. First, despite the vast and growing literature 
examining educational outcomes in developing countries, it contributes to the literature 
on educational outcomes in Pakistan that is still in its infancy. Second, Pakistan is an 
interesting place to study the impact of accessibility and availability of higher education 
institutions on participation in post-compulsory education as Pakistan’s educational 
system gives flexibility to everyone to choose any school, private or public according to 
their affordability. So there is vast variation in terms of enrolment and access across 
                                                          
29
 There are no official statistics available on school dropouts in Pakistan; this is the report of an NGO 
“Alif Ailaan” finding that Pakistan has the highest school dropout rate in the world. 
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schools in such an education system (Asahi, 2014). Also schools are not allocated 
according to catchment area as is the case in the UK. Therefore, there could be an issue 
of accessibility and availability of education institutes. Generally, poor people are most 
likely to send their children to public schools where the education is free and 
compulsory up to Grade 10 (age 15-16) and rich people are more likely to send their 
children to private schools which charge high fees. 
 
The present study uses survey data on 611 pupils from one of the districts of Pakistan, 
studying in Year 12 at age 17-18 years, to explore the determinants of performance and 
participation in post-compulsory education, controlling for previous attainment in Year 
9 and Year 10, the second last and last years of compulsory grades respectively. A 
Heckman model is used when analysing performance in order to control for potential 
sample selection bias resulting due to unobserved characteristics being associated with 
the decision to leave (or continue in) education after achieving compulsory education. 
Proximity to nearest post-compulsory institution measured as distance and living in an 
urban location are used as instruments for selection into post-compulsory schooling, 
since both measure the availability and accessibility of post-compulsory institutions. 
The results show a lack of significant selection effects, which suggests that 
participation and performance are not jointly determined. Participation is determined by 
the availability of post-compulsory institutions, while performance in Year 12 is driven 
by the ability which is measured by previous attainment. The results further highlight 
that distance reduces participation most for those living in rural areas.  
 
To summarize the present study contributes to the literature in the following ways. (1) 
It is the first study (to the best of my knowledge) in the economics literature jointly 
investigating the determinants of participation and performance in post-compulsory 
education (Year 12) in developed and developing countries which further helps to 
understand whether participation and performance are jointly determined or they are 
independent processes. (2) It is the second study in the literature, and the first in 
developing countries, investigating the effects of proximity to nearest institution 
providing post-compulsory education. (3) It is also the first study in Pakistan looking at 
the determinants of performance in higher grades, Year 12 taken at age 17-18, 
conditional on participation. (4) The present study takes into account the differences of 
regional (urban/rural) disaggregation in the analysis of participation in Pakistan.  
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This study is different from the Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) study as they measure 
distance “as a crow files” which could be substantially different from real distance 
while this study measures the distance in a unique way by driving from pupils’ homes 
to nearest education institution using data on homes and schools location. The latter 
arguably is the exact distance, previously all studies on distance have not measured 
distance using this method. It is similar to their study as it also looks at immediate post-
compulsory education choices at age 16 but they do not consider performance in post-
compulsory education. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 reviews the relevant 
literature on performance and participation in post-compulsory education in developed 
and developing countries, section 4.3 describes the data and discusses the key variables 
used in the analysis, section 4.4 presents the methodology employed, description and 
summary statistics of variables used, section 4.5 discusses the results using OLS, Probit 
and Heckman selection methods, and section 4.6 discusses the policy implications and 
concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Literature Review  
 
This section reviews the literature, including developed and developing countries on 
determinants of academic achievements/performance in addition to participation in 
education.  
 
4.2.1 Participation in Post-Compulsory Education 
The participation in post-compulsory education is a question often explored in 
literature. Firstly, the level of education participation usually discussed is the post-
compulsory (Dickerson and McIntosh, 2013) and university level (Gibbons and 
Vignoles, 2012; Spiess and Wrohlich, 2010; Frenette, 2006).  Secondly, regarding 
factors, previous attainment, family SES, labour market conditions, and finally, the 
distance and rural-urban dichotomy are the ones most commonly discussed. 
 
A study by McIntosh (2001) seeks to explain changes in the proportion of young people 
at the age of 16, 17 and 18 in four European countries (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden 
and England) who decide to participate in post compulsory education. The analysis 
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further proceeds using the Engle and Granger two step method. It is a time series study 
rather than a cross section covering the period from 1960 to 1994. The findings reveal 
that prior academic attainment before the end of compulsory schooling is the key 
variable in explaining the continuation into post compulsory education. It implies that 
the better performance during compulsory schooling gives more confidence to female 
pupils in their own ability to proceed into further education than males. The impact of 
local labour market conditions measured as the level of youth unemployment has a 
small effect on the decision to participate into post compulsory education. 
 
Similarly, Bradley and Lenton (2005) analyse the magnitude, timings and determinants 
of dropouts from post compulsory education in Britain using data from Youth Cohort 
Surveys (YCS) over the period 1985-1994. The results show that the risk of dropout 
depends on the young people’s ethnicity, prior attainment, family socioeconomic status 
(SES) and the state of the labour market. Students are more likely to participate in 
education if the local labour market is weak as education becomes more attractive due 
to a high local unemployment rate. By the same token, Clark (2011) assesses the 
relationship between the local labour market and enrolment in post compulsory 
education in England. The key finding of the study is that local unemployment has a 
major impact on enrolment in post compulsory education in England. Clark finds a 
different result to earlier papers because he has a panel of regions and can estimate the 
unemployment effect off variation within regions over time. 
 
Turning to papers looking at Pakistan, Lloyd et al. (2009) assess different factors 
responsible for primary and middle school dropout in Punjab, Pakistan over six years 
from 1997-2004. The dataset tracks longitudinal changes in both school and family 
environment. Results suggest girls dropout more than boys, and both school and family 
factors are significant. Attending a government primary school and the family 
experiencing unwanted birth (used as an instrument for family being affected by a 
household shock) will increase the likelihood of dropout, while living in a better-off 
neighbourhood, mother having any education and availability of post primary schooling 
reduce the chances of dropouts. For boys it is also true that living in a well-off 
neighbourhood will reduce the probability of dropping out. 
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An equally significant aspect of participation could be the geographical one discussed 
in the following literature. In terms of the post-compulsory participation education 
decision, Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) are the first to investigate the effect of 
distance to nearest education institution on a pupil’s immediate post compulsory 
participation decision in England. Their study highlights the small overall effect of the 
distance variable; an additional kilometre in distance will lead to a 1.5 percentage 
points decrease in the probability of participation in post compulsory academic study. 
The marginal effects of the study show the strong correlation between post compulsory 
participation, prior attainment and family background. Also they found that distance 
affects women more than men. The distance has more significant impact on young 
people who are on the margin of participation in post compulsory education (according 
to their prior attainment and family background). 
 
To be able to understand the effect of distance on the participation in university 
education, Frenette (2006) studies the link between distance from home to university on 
participation in university education using Canadian Household Survey data and 
matching that with a university postal codes database. The main finding of the study is 
that distance to nearest school negatively affects the probability of attending university. 
The pupils living within the commuting distance are more likely to attend university 
than the pupils who live far away, out of commuting distance. Further, distance to the 
school is found to matter more for those from lower-income families. In a more recent 
study, Frenette (2009) study shows that the creation of new universities increases the 
enrolment rate in local youth, which in turn suggests that distance does indeed matter. 
 
Also, Spiess and Wrohlich (2010) analyse the impact of distance between home to the 
nearest university on the decision to participate in higher education using a German 
panel dataset. Estimates using a discrete choice model show that along with parental 
education and gender, distance indeed matters. Further they found that distance has a 
stronger negative effect for those who belong to lower income families, however, they 
do no control for the academic background of pupils. They measure three types of 
distance variable in their dataset: (1) distance to the nearest university, (2) distance to 
the nearest university of applied sciences, (3) the minimum of the two distances. They 
find that those who live further than 12 km are at a disadvantage in accessing university 
compared to those who live closer to the university, 6 km. Further, results show that the 
impact of distance is mainly driven by transaction costs rather than neighbourhood/spill 
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over effects. They differentiate between transaction costs and neighbourhood effects 
using an interaction term between two variables “living in a university town” and the 
“student population density”. 
 
Additionally, Gibbons and Vignoles (2012) study the effect of distance on participation 
and choice in higher education (university) in England. Results find little effect of 
geographical distance on the participation decision, but a strong effect on the choice of 
institutions in England. 
 
In the economics of education literature, proximity to relevant education institution is 
considered to be a reliable instrument, for example for education in a wage equation. 
The choice of instrument for schooling is generally an area of debate. It is often hard to 
find a valid exclusion restriction given data constraints; however, potential benefits 
justify the effort. The ideal experiment would be random assignment into education but 
that is rare. Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) suggest that in the field of returns to 
education, distance from an education institution is a valid instrument for education or 
qualifications acquired, while Card (1995), Dee (2004) and Rouse (1995) suggest 
proximity to college as a valid instrument for education attainment/schooling. The basic 
intuition for using distance as an instrument is that it substantially reduces the costs of 
attending a relevant academic institution, particularly for those from an unprivileged 
background. Also in lieu of distance, some other studies use a rural/urban dummy in 
analyzing participation in university or post-secondary education, such as Kane and 
Spizman (1994) and Christofides et al., (2001) for the US and Canada respectively. 
However these studies do not draw direct inferences on distance, the motivation behind 
them to prove to the reader that rural pupils live further from university than urban 
pupils. 
 
There is a long lasting debate in the field of sociology of education discussing whether 
regional differences matter for education outcomes (Sixt, 2007) particularly considering 
segregation among rural and urban areas. For this the most commonly used variables 
are: population density or a rural/urban dummy. For example, Christofides et al., (2001) 
study the impact of rural and urban differences on the enrolment into higher education. 
The issue related to these studies is that they implicitly assume that youth living in 
urban areas are closer to education institutions than rural youth and hence more likely 
to participate in education. 
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Despite the fact that existing evidence suggests that distance clearly matters for the 
participation in education and education attainment, at the same time, the numerical 
effects of distance vary substantially among different studies as mentioned above. 
 
 
4.2.2 Determinants of Performance 
There is literature available on general determinants of performance, taking various 
determinants at a time. Kasirye (2009) investigates the impact of SES and school 
variables on the learning achievements of grade 6 (age 12) students using the standard 
OLS and school fixed effects education production function in Uganda. Due to high 
dropout in schools, the data has non–random allocation of children into schools. The 
base results of their study after controlling for selection do not change. They find that 
among the most important determinants of child educational outcomes is teacher 
training then teacher ability: the number of teachers with two years of compulsory 
teacher training has a strong impact. However, other teacher and head teacher 
characteristics have an insignificant influence on learning outcomes. Moreover, a child 
having its own place to sit in the classroom positively increases school performance 
while parental education has an impact on child educational outcomes only for boys, 
but not for girls as fathers’ education is significant for males. 
 
Another study by Garcia (2014) in one of the most developed and industrialized regions 
in Russia highlights the importance of gender, nationality, peers, and health status 
factors in explaining the educational outcomes of young people who are in Year 9 at 
age 15 of their study. Girls’ performance in education is better than boys. 
 
Engin-Demir (2009) estimates the effects of student, family and school characteristics 
on the academic achievement of 719 sixth, seventh and eighth grade school students 
between the ages of 12-14 in urban Turkey. The findings of the study indicate that 
among all sets of variables, student characteristics (for student characteristics they use 
hours devoted to study per week, female, and student well-being measured as a 
combined effect of two variables, 1) student perception about their teacher treatment in 
class ranked as bad, good or very good, 2) number of friends students have) are the 
most important variables explaining the large variation in student academic 
achievement. The family (fathers’ education, family income) and school characteristics 
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(student-teacher ratio, number of students in a class, and teacher education and in-
service teacher training) are also significantly related to academic achievement but their 
effects are small. The variation in academic achievements is explained as 15 percent by 
student characteristics, 4.3 percent by school characteristics and 5.4 percent by family 
characteristics. 
 
Aslam (2009) using a dataset from the Lahore district of Pakistan analyses the 
determinants of pupil performance across public and private schools and across subjects 
in grade 8 using an OLS educational production function. She finds that a large number 
of pupil, family and school related factors are important in explaining variation in pupil 
learning outcomes, however, it is not apparent which factors are most important: home 
background, school or teacher related. 
 
Zhao and Glewwe et al. (2010) look at basic determinants of school attainment using 
household survey data from one of the less developed provinces of China, Gansu. 
Using number of years of schooling as an outcome variable, a censored ordered logit 
estimate demonstrates that mothers’ education and attitudes towards children’s 
education are strongly significant. The children whose mothers have 6 years of primary 
schooling are 1.4 times more likely to go to school as compared to children whose 
mothers have no education. Teacher experience at lower secondary level has a positive 
impact on school attainment. School resources especially having a science lab increase 
school attainment by 1.8 times. 
 
In addition to the above literature, a body of the whole intergenerational mobility 
literature particularly Chevalier et al. (2013) and Black et al. (2005) supports that 
parents’ education has a positive and significant impact on children’s education. 
 
To summarise, it can be seen from both strands of literature, that distance could be a 
potential deterrent in determining the participation into further education, further, there 
is no previous study that examines the performance in post compulsory education in 
terms of exams scores in Year 12 controlling for selection into that level of education, 
hence, the present work adds to the literature.  
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Also, distance is very rarely used as an instrument due to the complex data requirement, 
the current study adds to the empirical field of education economics where an 
instrument is required as a valid exclusion restriction to identify the exogenous 
variation to control for the selection into education. There is a criticism that distance 
and urban/rural location should not be used as interchangeably (Frenette, 2006), thus, 
the current analysis uses these two variables as separate controls in the selection 
equation while studying the impact of geographical constraints on the participation 
decision.  
 
 
4.3 Data 
 
This chapter uses survey data collected by the author on 611 pupils studying in Year 9 
at age 14-15 in 2008-09 using a random sampling technique on private and public 
schools from one of the districts of Punjab, Pakistan. The first wave of data is collected 
from pupils, their families, subject teachers and school heads using pupil, family, 
teacher and school head questionnaires respectively in Year 9. Later the data on pupils 
are matched with administrative examination board data using unique pupil identifiers 
to get their test scores information. Further details can be found in the data section of 
the previous chapter. Overall, it is a comprehensive survey data set having information 
on the characteristics of individual pupils, their families, teachers, schools, exams 
scores and some geographic variables. Second, third and fourth waves collected the 
data again on exam scores of sampled pupils studying in Year 10 aged 15-16 in 2009-
10, Year 11 aged 16-17 in 2010-11, and Year 12 aged 17-18 in 2011-12. The current 
study uses the pupils’ score in Year 9, Year 10, and Year 12. Year 9 and Year 10 are 
the last two years of compulsory schooling as in Pakistan compulsory schooling is from 
Year 1 to Year 10. Year 11 and Year 12 are post-compulsory schooling years.   
 
A follow-up survey was conducted in 2013-14 in order to create the distance variable. 
The variable distance to nearest post-compulsory education institution in this survey, 
measured in kilometres, was calculated using information about their actual home 
address which was recorded for all the sampled students at the time of the first survey. 
Also information is available on all education institutions providing post-compulsory 
education in that district in the dataset; therefore, the distance variable is created for all 
the sampled people by driving from their homes to the respective nearest feasible 
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education institution, not the schools which they actually attended. It could be possible 
that the nearest education institution differed from the actual school attended. So the 
idea is to capture the accessibility for an individual to the nearest post-compulsory 
education institution. It is worth noting the effort in collecting the dataset which makes 
analysis accurate leaving less chance of measurement error.  
 
The variable, Year 12 aggregated marks, used in this chapter benefits from certain 
properties. The outcome variable (marks achieved) is the end-of-course exam that 
includes the theoretical as well as practical syllabus that is designed and relevant to 
high school students. A more convincing aspect of the outcome variable is that the 
scores used in the study (Year 9 score in chapter 3 and Year 12 in chapter 4) are not 
low stake assessments, otherwise it might worry the researcher that students did not try 
to perform well in low-stakes tests (Kortetz, 2008), in this way low stakes exams may 
not be a true measure of students’ true learning gains. The dataset also contains the 
prior academic performance score, which is vital in explaining educational outcomes, 
particularly investigating post-compulsory education performance.  
 
Table 4.1 below gives a description of the sample of students having missing 
observations in the dataset. Initially, 611 pupils were randomly drawn from the student 
population at the selected schools. After that academic records of all sampled pupils 
have been tracked in Year 9, 10, 11 and 12. By the end of Year 12, 47% pupils are no 
longer participating in education.  
 
The issue in the current dataset is that there appears  to be two drop-out points, some 
are not completing Year 10 (or not doing the exams at least) while others are not 
participating in Year  11/12. Looking at Table 4.1, everyone except for one person who 
studies in Year 11 also studies in Year 12. So when I define the participation variable as 
whether they are observed in Year 12 or not, I am considering all those who are in post-
compulsory education or not (there is just that one person who did participate after the 
end of compulsory education, in Year 11, but did not continue to Year 12, who is 
dropped from the dataset). So the group of non-participators in post-compulsory 
education include a group who drop out after Year 9 and a group who drop out after 
Year 10. The issue regarding the drop-out in Year 10 is addressed in the robustness 
section at the end of the chapter. 
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Table 4.1: Percentage of Schools Dropouts Pupils in Data 
 
 Respondents 
Percentage of 
original sample 
Education 
dropouts 
Initial Sample 611 - - 
Academic progress 
recorded in Year 9 
591 96% 4% 
Academic progress 
recorded in Year 10 
441 72% 28% 
Academic progress 
recorded in Year 11 
326 53% 47% 
Academic progress 
recorded in Year 12 
325 53% 47% 
Notes: The above table tracks the records of academic performance of individuals over a period of time 
from Year 9 to Year 12 collected through a survey and later recorded through the matched administrative 
dataset from BISE, Bahawalpur using a unique pupil identifier. The last column shows the percentage of 
pupils who dropout from education within the observed sample. 
 
The education dropout in the dataset is not random sample attrition due to the facts 
explained below. 
 
As far as education dropouts/missing pupils in the dataset as illustrated in Table 4.1 are 
concerned, they could be missing for reasons other than dropout: for example they 
could be missing because they have moved to another district. Using their unique pupil 
identifier (Board Registration Number) they can however be searched for in two other 
adjacent districts, Bahawalnagar
30
 and Rahimyarkhan
31
, along with the Bahawalpur 
district, as the BISE Bahawalpur, is responsible for registration of students and 
conducting exams in all these three districts of Punjab. Therefore, after searching for all 
missing pupils in the administrative data in all three districts, it could be ruled out that 
they are missing due to migration to another district. However it could be possible that 
they move to another district further away, where they no longer can be tracked. 
However, this is unlikely as the Bahawalpur district is an agricultural district not an 
industrial or Cantonment (under the control of military) area, so migration
32
 is less 
likely to happen in the Bahawalpur district. 
                                                          
30
 Bahawalnagar, one of the districts in the Punjab province of Pakistan, consists of five sub-districts. 
31
 Rahimyarkhan is one of the cities and districts in the Punjab province in Pakistan. Administratively, it 
is divided into four sub-districts. 
32
 Migration means transfer of a student or a candidate from one institution/board to another 
institution/board for seeking of higher education. This type of migration is allowed by the board on the 
request of an applicant under a convincing reason with the consensus of both the heads of the institutions 
until 31st December of the academic year. This type of migration is allowed by the board if the candidate 
fulfils all the legal formalities specified by the board in this regard i.e. attestation of migration application 
from the last attended college, prescribed fees etc. 
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Second, they could be missing due to not responding to the survey, as there is sample 
attrition in general. But this is not the case as all information in the adopted 
questionnaires is collected at the beginning of the survey, and the unique pupil 
identifier as well so that in later sweeps their exams results are tracked through 
administrative data. 
 
Third, sometimes results could be pending for some pupils due to: (1) Unfair means 
cases, such as cheating or communicating to another candidate or not following the 
exam’s rules/instructions, misbehaving with the exams staff etc. Disciplinary action 
may follow in this regard against that candidate. (2) Results declared later due to 
incomplete documents or fees, this could happen if a candidate fails to provide required 
documents and fees. Results could be withheld until he/she clears the documents or 
fees. But all those numbers kept pending are given in the Board Gazette separate under 
the heading of Results Later. I checked this carefully and did not find a single case like 
this. 
 
Fourth, it is more likely that they dropout from education, as comparing the 
characteristics of pupils who dropout to those who participated in Year 12, 85% pupils 
are from public school and their average prior attainment (Year 9 score) is 205 out of 
525, which is lower than those who remain in the sample (298).  90% of dropout pupils 
are from rural areas, also they have a lower level of fathers’ education, mothers’ 
education and fathers’ income and hence have a greater level of disadvantage. 
 
Also it is possible that after failing
33
 in exams due to lower scores they left that stream 
of education (that particular academic year) and reappear in the Supplementary
34
 exam. 
In that case they would be given a different board registration number, which I do not 
know. However, I also searched for them in the administrative online data of the 
Supplementary Exam in all three districts, through inputting their names and fathers’ 
                                                          
33
 Generally, in order to pass a particular subject/paper a candidate must obtain 33% of the total marks of 
each subject, otherwise, it would be considered as “Fail” and to pass the overall grade/year, he must score 
33% of the total marks of all subjects of that year. In case of failure he has to appear again in the exam. 
34
 The supplementary exam is the additional exam arranged for those who are not able to pass the annual 
exam at the first attempt or they do not appear in the exam due to other reasons such as illness, absence 
etc. Also those who pass the grade but want to again appear in the exam to improve their scores to get 
admission into a required institution to meet their eligibility or merit criteria, can take it as a second 
opportunity. Supplementary exams are scheduled after the specific duration of annual exams, so that 
students can get ready in order to appear in exams. Generally the exams rules stay the same as regular 
exams. 
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names in the search box and I did not find any of them there. As in the online 
administrative data available on the website of BISE, exam records can be searched 
either using pupil name and fathers’ name or board registration number. Therefore, all 
the above arguments make the claim stronger that these are education dropouts that are 
observed, and all possible measures have been taken to trace these missing pupils had 
they still been in education. Therefore, the missing observations in Year 12 are almost 
certainly because they are no longer in education and not simply due to non response to 
a survey. It is therefore people making a choice whether they participate in post 
compulsory education or not which is why I need to control for selection to control for 
sample selection bias. To take up those techniques, the dataset has sufficient valid 
exclusion restrictions e.g. proximity to post-compulsory educational institution.  
 
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
The classic example of correcting a model for selection bias (using the Heckman 
sample selectivity correction approach) is the estimation of the wage equation where a 
wage equation is estimated for only those who participated in the labour market and 
data on wages are missing for those who did not enter into the market who are 
unemployed. Selection bias refers to a problem when an outcome equation is estimated 
for a restricted or sub sample for which data are not a random draw from a population; 
instead it has been observed for a particular restricted group or a sub sample of a 
population (Heckman, 1979). If this is the case then OLS estimation will give 
biased/misleading estimates if the same variables that determine selection into the 
sample also affect the outcome variable of interest. It is obvious that one cannot 
estimate the determinants of raw performance of pupils in a particular grade, unless 
sample selection has been taken into account. This is due to the fact that pupils who 
dropped out from education are more likely to be those with low ability, less motivated, 
from low quality schools and from unprivileged home backgrounds (Alivernini and 
Lucidi, 2011; Chowdry et al., 2013).  
 
In order to overcome the omitted variable bias prior academic achievement Year 9 
score is used as a proxy of ability. There could be an issue here, as Year 10 is the last 
year of compulsory education then it should be year 10 test scores that are used as 
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measures of past ability rather than Year 9. The main analysis is done on the Year 9 
sample, because of the larger sample size. Additional analysis in the robustness checks 
section is therefore taken using Year 10 score as a measure of past ability rather than 
Year 9.  
 
Since not every pupil is observed in Year 12, and some people have already dropped 
out of education before entering into post-compulsory education, which is represented 
as participating in Year 12, this requires a correction for selection bias, where the 
selection is on whether the students are still in education in Year 12 or not. The 
Heckman Selection Model is used to account for this selectivity bias. Note that 28% of 
pupils dropped out in Year 10 and 47% in Year 11 as previously explained in Table 4.1.  
It is therefore important to determine whether there are two separate decisions that need 
to be modelled, i.e., decision 1 - taking the Year 10 exams or not, and decision 2 - 
participating in post-compulsory schooling in Years 11 and 12 or not. The analysis 
therefore checks the validity of treating the two decisions as a single decision to drop 
out, by separately considering the second decision in isolation, modelling the selection 
into post-compulsory education conditional of having completed the Year 10 exams.  
 
The procedure has two steps i.e. it estimates two equations: The first is the 
participation/selection equation using a binary dependent variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the pupil is present in the estimation sample for Year 12, 0 otherwise. The 
second stage is to estimate the performance equation, accounting for the probability of 
selection into Year 12.  
 
Participation Model: 
Thus, the following model takes participation in Year 12/ post-compulsory education Pi 
as a binary choice variable.  
 
Where 
Pit = 1 if pupil participated in Year 12 examination 
Pit = 0 if pupil did not participate in Year 12 examination  
And the model of participation in post-compulsory education is 
Pit = f (Yit-k, Iit-k, Fit-k, Sit-k, S it, distanceit-k, urit-k) 
 
Yit-k   is the prior attainment of pupil i measured as the total score in Year 9. 
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Iit-k is the measure of pupil attributes of pupil i in Year 9 such as age, health problems, 
gender and birth order. 
 
Fit-k captures the family characteristics of pupil i measured in Year 9 such as fathers’ 
education, mothers’ education, fathers’ income, parents’ own house. 
 
Sit-k captures the type of school attended (private or public school) by pupil in Year 9. 
 
Sit is the type of institution attended in Year 12 
 
The participation model has two additional variables: distanceit-k, distance to nearest 
post-compulsory education institution and urit-k, a dummy for urban location in which a 
pupil lives.  
 
The variable distance to nearest post-compulsory institution, measured in kilometres, is 
the “actual” measured distance from pupils’ homes to the nearest post-compulsory 
education institution. Thus it is a continuous variable having a mean of 8 km. It is 
picked as an instrument as while this should affect the likelihood of attending post-
compulsory grade i.e. Year 12, it should have no impact on Year 12 performance of 
pupils. To account for non linearity, log of distance is used in this study (Newbold and 
Brown, 2015). 
 
Distance is a good instrument but is very rarely used as an instrument due to data 
availability while discussing post-compulsory education. However, there could be an 
issue related to this variable that it might be the case that the distance is higher but the 
public transport is better. To account for this, I also used another instrument, urban.  
 
The variable named as urban is measured as a dummy variable having the value 1 if the 
pupil is living in an urban area and 0 if he/she is living in a village area (rural location), 
again this is a convincing instrument as rural areas have no access or limited access to 
post-compulsory schools and fewer transport facilities relative to urban areas. The 
urban location also has no direct effect on pupils’ performance in Year 12 but it has a 
direct influence on participation into post-compulsory education. However, there could 
be differential resources between the two locations which impact on performance, such 
as kind of institution. Therefore, I used a separate control for kind of institution 
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attended in Year 12 and Year 9 in the model. However, this is only one potential 
difference in resources, and there still could be other remaining differences between the 
two types of area. 
 
Previously mentioned in the literature review, another potential criticism of using only 
the urban dummy in studies exploring variation in education participation due to 
regional differences assumes that the urban areas are nearer to school, college, and 
university. It may not be the case, due to some education institutions being easily 
accessed by nearby pupils while some medium size urban areas have no education 
institutions at all. Therefore, it can be argued that the urban dummy and distance cannot 
be used interchangeably. In response to the above criticism, the current study controls 
for both distance and the urban dummy separately.                
                                       
Therefore, the present dataset has several variables which might be considered as 
convincing identifying variables. The main point in choosing an instrument is that the 
instrument determining the participation should not affect the outcome variable of 
performance in post-compulsory education. The correlation between instruments and 
participation and performance is described below in Table 4.2. It is clear that 
participation is strongly correlated with distance and the urban dummy, having a 
correlation coefficient of 0.86 and 0.91 respectively. Relative to participation, 
performance measured as Year 12 score is weakly correlated with these instruments. 
Clearly these statistics show that these are good instruments fulfilling the basic criteria 
of instruments. 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation between instruments, participation and performance 
 
Instruments Participation (as 1, 0) 
First stage 
Performance (Total marks Year 12) 
Second stage 
Distance -0.801(P-value, 0.000) -0.197(P-value, 0.000) 
Urban dummy 0.916(P-value, 0.000) 0.054(P-value, 0.324) 
Notes: This table gives the Pearson correlation between instruments (Log of distance and urban dummy) 
and participation in to post-compulsory education and performance in Year 12, measured as total marks 
in Year 12. 
 
However, it might be the case that using time spent on commuting might directly 
reduce the time available for school work, reducing achievement. Also, the different 
neighbourhood conditions in urban areas might influence achievement directly. Firm 
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evidence on the issue requires some kind of a test, but that ideal test does not exist. 
Often researchers have to rely on an exclusion restriction that is empirically significant 
in the first stage probit selection equation and insignificant in the equation of interest. 
Therefore these instruments are tried in the second stage equation to see empirically if 
they affect the outcome variable, achievement. The details of these tests are given in the 
robustness checks section. Both instruments are found to have insignificant coefficients 
in the achievements model, further justifying our choice of exclusion restrictions and 
therefore, they seem to be valid exclusion restrictions in the current context. 
 
Subsequently, the idea to use the above two variables as instruments is that both are 
measuring the availability of post-compulsory institutions.  Both of these variables 
capture the access to a post-compulsory education institution. It is important to 
incorporate these two variables additionally into the participation model since these 
enable us to look at the incidence of participation in post-compulsory education across 
rural-urban geography. More importantly these are the exclusion restrictions for 
identifying the participation equation. However, further relevance of instruments is 
tested to check if they are genuine valid exclusion restrictions. They could have an 
effect on performance (presented in robustness section). 
 
Additionally, the present study used the interaction of log of distance to nearest post-
compulsory education institution and urban in the participation equation, to see whether 
distance matters more for those in a rural setting than in an urban setting which has a 
significant relevance to disadvantaged people. Individuals who live in rural areas 
typically have less access to public transport, higher distance to travel and a greater 
level of disadvantage. As a consequence, the participation of individuals living in rural 
areas may be more affected by the distance to the nearest school. In the current dataset, 
the average distance to nearest school for pupils from urban areas is 2km, while it is 
16.6 km for pupils living in rural areas, which shows a huge difference regarding 
location. Further the interaction of log of distance and male and mode of transport are 
also used to see any particular differences. 
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Participation Equation: 
 
The first stage equation is estimating whether or not a pupil is in education in Year 12 
using a probit model since participation is a binary variable taking values 0 and 1.  
 
Pit = γ1Zit + εit          (1) 
 
Where Zit denotes the vector of all those variables influencing the participation into 
post- compulsory education and γ1 is the vector of parameters and εit is the disturbance 
term, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σε
2
. 
 
Performance Model: 
 
Generally economists have used a production function to approach the issues of school 
quality and examination of education performance. An educational production function 
takes into account the relationship between educational inputs and educational output 
also called an ‘input-output’ approach.  
 
Instead of a contemporaneous specification, which assumes observed achievements are 
determined by only current inputs, an education production function with a modified 
traditional value-added model was used (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2012). It is modified as 
it does not use all past inputs, instead some current inputs are also used such as kind of 
institution attended in Year 12. It is called a value-added model as it takes into account 
the effect of prior attainment in an earlier period and it is important to control for this as 
it gives an indication of achievement that an individual brings to the classroom i.e. the 
effect of previous teachers and school, and individual ability (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). 
 
Yit = f (Yit-k, Iit-k, Fit-k, Sit-k, S it, uit)        
 
Where 
 
Yit is the achievement of student i measured by the total score obtained by a pupil in 
Year 12. 
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uit is the error-term, assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and constant 
variance. 
 
Therefore, the second stage equation can be written from the above performance model 
as: 
 
Performance Equation: 
 
Yit = βXit + uit        (2) 
 
Where  
 
Yit is the academic performance measured by Year 12 total score of the i
th
 pupil. Xit is 
the vector of the i
th pupil’s individual, family and school characteristics, containing all 
variables mentioned in the performance model except distance and the urban dummy, β 
is the vector of parameters and uit is the disturbance term, normally distributed with 
mean 0 and variance σu.
2
 Following the Heckman (1979) technique, the performance 
equation can be corrected for selectivity bias by introducing a term λi, called the inverse 
Mills ratio from the first stage regression, as an additional regressor in equation (2). 
Equation (3) is modelling Year 12 performance, once the Heckman lambda term is 
introduced.  
 
 So that 
 
 Yit = βXit + δλit+ uit  (3) 
 
Where 
 λi = 
     
      
 
 (.) is the standard normal probability density function and  (.) is the normal 
cumulative distribution function. The coefficient on the lambda term is the measure of 
sample selection bias. If this is statistically different from zero, the null hypothesis, “no 
sample selection bias” is rejected. 
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Often, in the Heckman model the main interest lies in the second stage equation, and 
the selection equation is just to control for bias, but in this case, the selection equation 
which is participation into post-compulsory education (who is still in education in Year 
12) is interesting in itself. In other words, it is possible to argue that the Heckman 
model has served a dual purpose, one, it controlled for selection bias, so that 
performance conditional on participation can be studied, and the second, it shows why 
people dropped out from education (why they did not participate into Year 12). 
 
Though using Heckman methodology, the parameters of interest in the model can be 
identified via non-linearity (when an exclusion restriction is not utilised) of the probit 
function, it is preferred to incorporate a valid exclusion restriction as it leads to less 
multicollinearity not only among predictors but also between error terms, due to less 
correlation between the X vector and the inverse Mills ratio (Bushway et al., 2007). The 
crucial step for the Heckman model to work in the presence of an exclusion restriction 
(to ‘identify’ the model) is, there must be at least one variable in the 
participation/selection equation, that must not be in the performance equation. This 
variable is called the instrument/exclusion restriction. Hence it facilitates the 
identification.  
 
A lack of suitable exclusion restriction leads to biased parameter estimates due to 
potential endogeneity and OLS is not appropriate to use. The instrument and exclusion 
restriction are very similar to each other (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Hence in the 
existing case, it must have at least one variable that will directly affect participation 
(whether a pupil is still in education in Year 12 or not), but will have no impact on their 
performance in post-compulsory education (once they are there). 
 
The description of variables used in this study is given in Table 4.3.  
 
The Year 12 score is the sum of scores in all 7 subjects offered. Among them, four 
subjects are compulsory (Language, English, Religion and Pakistan Studies) and 3 are 
optional depending upon the field of study opted. In total five fields of study exist in 
Year 12. These are the Premedical group, Pre-engineering group, General science 
group, Humanities group, and Commerce group. Maximum total marks in Year 12 are 
1150. The total score for each subject is 200 except Islamic Studies and Pakistan 
Studies, these two subjects have 75 each. 
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Prior Attainment (Year 9 score) is the overall/aggregate score in 7 subjects being 
offered in Year 9 in schools. In total 4 subjects are compulsory (Language, English, 
Religion and Mathematics) while 3 subjects are elective, different in two fields of 
study. In Year 9 only two fields of study are offered: Science and Arts. The maximum 
total score in Year 9 is 625. 
 
The type of institution in Year 12 variable captures the kind of institution attended in 
Year 12. There are three categories for this variable: appearing in the exam after 
attending private school, public school and as an independent candidate. Candidates 
attending a private or public institution can send their exams admissions as a “regular” 
candidate as they are on the roll of their respective attended institution, in this case, that 
institution sends their admission on their behalf; while those who do not attend any 
formal institution due to non-availability of higher education institution within travel 
distance or due to health problems appear as independent candidates. Generally, rural 
youth and females or disabled prefer to appear as an independent candidate. They do 
self-study and preparation for exams, and send their exams admissions independently 
through their respective registered board.  
 
There are certain subjects/disciplines which cannot be taken as a private candidate, 
particularly science subjects such as physics, chemistry, and biology.  As these subjects 
have practical exams along with theoretical exams, attending regular classes is the 
requirement for them, so these cannot be taken by the private candidates. In the current 
dataset, 45.88% pupils attended a private institute, 43.38% a public institute and 
10.77% of pupils appeared as independent candidates. 
 
In Year 9 there are only two categories of type of institute attended: private and public 
school. This is due to the reason that the time when the survey was initiated in Year 9, 
all the sampled pupils were taken directly from schools. So there is no category of the 
independent candidate in Year 9. I use the separate control for type of institution 
attended in Year 9 and Year 12 in the participation and performance equation 
respectively. In Year 9, 69.98% of pupils are from public schools.  
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Table 4.3: Description of Variables 
 
Variables Description 
Score in Year 12 (dependent variable) Total marks obtained by  pupil in Year 12 
Pupil age Age of pupil measured in years 
Male Dummy variable equals 1 if male and 0 for female 
Own House Dummy variable equals 1 if parents own a house 
Number of Siblings Number of brothers and sisters  pupil has 
Fathers’ Education Father’s education measured in years 
Mothers’ Education Mother’s education measured in years 
Birth Order  Pupil’s standing among other siblings 
Health Status Dummy variable equals 1 if  pupil has a chronic disease 
Type of Institution in Year 12 
(Reference category: Private Institution) 
1 if pupil attended private institution, 2 for public Institution 
and 3 if appeared in exam as an independent candidate not 
through any institution 
Number of Rooms Number of rooms available at home 
Private Coaching (tuition)  Dummy variable equals 1 if pupil takes private coaching 
other than school 
Mode of Transport Dummy variable equals 1 if pupil uses car or bus to reach 
school and 0, if he/she walks. 
Study Time at Home per day Dummy variable equals 1 if  pupil studies at home more than 
2 hours per day 
Private School Year 9 Dummy variable equals 1 if pupil attended private school in 
Year 9 and 0 for public school. 
Prior Attainment Year 9 Academic total score of Year 9 
Father Income per month  Income of father measured in Rupees 
Log of Distance Distance measured in km, from home to nearest secondary 
institution, not the school which they actually attended 
Urban Dummy variable (0/1) equals 1 if pupil is living in urban area 
and 0 for rural area 
Notes: Number of rooms is checked by adjusting for household size but results remain the same. 
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Variables Obs. Mean  S.D. Min. Max. 
Score in Year 12 (out of  total 
marks for Year 12, 1150) 
292 630.88 167.62 232 1020 
Pupil age (Years) 553 15.20 1.26 10 20 
Pupil age missing 553 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Male 553 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Own house 553 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Number of siblings 553 4.69 2.04 0 16 
Fathers’ education (Years) 553 10.01 5.13 0 20 
Mothers’ education (Years) 553 6.44 5.77 0 18 
Fathers’ income per month (Rs.) 553 18839.25 46595.21 0 1000000 
Birth order 553 3.06 1.85 1 11 
Health problems 553 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Public institution Y12 292 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Private institution Y12 292 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Independent institution Y12 292 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Number of rooms 553 4.40 2.53 1 18 
Private Coaching (Tuition) 553 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Mode of transport 553 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Study hours per day  553 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Private school Year 9 553 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Prior attainment Year 9 (Total 
score in Year 9 is 625) 
553 253.20 87.78 57 449 
Distance ( kms) 553 8.43 8.15 0.5 40 
Urban 553 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Notes: 1: The number of observations here are different to those in table 1.The difference is due to usable 
sample. 2: Pupils’ age missing variable is to allow for the low number of observations on this variable. 3: 
To get a relevance the mean income would be equal to 140£ per month approximately. 
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4.5 Results and Discussions 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. Section 4.5.1 presents the results from the 
participation model and Section 4.5.2 discusses the raw and selection corrected results 
of performance analysis. 
 
4.5.1 Determinants of Participation in Post-Compulsory Education, Probit Model 
Table 5 represents the probit analysis of equation (2) showing determinants of 
participation in post-compulsory education, the dependent variable is measured as a 
binary variable, having a value of 1, if a pupil participated in a  post-compulsory grade 
and a value of 0, if he/she  dropped out i.e. did not participate in post-compulsory 
education. The second column shows the marginal effects and standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
 
The coefficient on log of distance shows that the further pupils live from a post-
compulsory institution, the less likely they are to undertake post-compulsory education. 
So a 1% increase in distance reduces the likelihood of participation by 0.07 percentage 
points (or equivalently, we could say a 10% rise in distance reduces the likelihood of 
participation by 0.7 percentage points. 
 
The coefficient on the urban variable shows that pupils living in an urban locality are 
more likely to participate in post-compulsory education, living in an urban area 
increases the probability of participation in post-compulsory education by 30 
percentage points relative to those living in a rural area. This is in line with the general 
hypothesis that urban areas have more transport available and more facilities. Both 
coefficients are highly significant and used as instruments at the first stage in the 
participation equation. 
 
Mother’s education is negatively related to the likelihood of participation in post-
compulsory education, a one year increase in mother’s education, decreases the 
probability of participation in the post-compulsory grade, by 0.6 percentage points. This 
is surprising and is in contrast to the hypothesis that mothers’ education has a positive 
impact on children’s educational outcomes (Chevalier, 2004). This could be due to the 
fact that controls for the factors that the mother's education effect works through (for 
example children of well-educated mothers being highly able and/or going to good 
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schools), are included and so could capture some of the positive influence of mother's 
education. 
 
Private school attended in Year 9, which is measured as a dummy variable, equals 1 for 
private school and 0 for public school, has a negative coefficient, implying that 
attending private school in Year 9, decreases the likelihood of participation in post-
compulsory education, by 10.31 percentage points holding other things constant. This is 
also a surprising result and it could also be due to controlling for prior ability as it could 
take away the private school effect. 
 
As previously described, the distance variable was calculated by driving from each 
individual home to the nearest post-compulsory educational institutions (details are 
described on page 111). The average distance for public schools is 10.87Km and for 
private schools is 3.3Km  
Looking at the private school effect, shows the counter intuitive result for private 
schools in the participation model, that those in private school in Year 9 are less likely 
to participate post-compulsory. This could be because those in private school are in 
communities without a nearby public school, and so have fewer opportunities to 
participate post-compulsory. The descriptive statistics of distance by type of school are 
consistent with this (average distance for public schools is 10.87Km and for private 
schools is 3.3Km). 
Additionally, an interaction between distance and private school in the participation 
model was tried and the coefficient is positive and significant (results are not reported). 
This implies that the negative impact of distance is less for those going to private 
school. This is also corroborated by the fact that the average distance of private schools 
is less than public schools. A final possibility is that the expected private school 
advantage is due to high attainment students in such schools, so that a positive private 
school effect on participation might emerge if we no longer for control for prior 
attainment. However after dropping the prior attainment variable, the private school 
result remains the same (results available from author on request). 
 
The mode of transport variable has a positive effect on the probability of participation 
in post-compulsory education, using bus/car as a mode of transport increases the 
likelihood of participation in post-compulsory education by 6.2 percentage points. As 
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the mode of transport  is used as a proxy for accessibility and also it could be an 
indication of poverty, so it implies that  accessibility and a lower level of poverty have 
a positive effect on participation in post-compulsory education and vice versa. 
 
Studying at home more than two hours decreases the probability of participating in 
post-compulsory education by 6.9 percentage points. It could be due to those struggling 
in their studies, need more time to catch-up. 
 
Prior ability has no significant effect on participation in post-compulsory education. 
This result is different from previous findings for developed countries (McIntosh, 
2001).  
 
The overall results suggest that participation in post-compulsory education is mainly 
determined by the distance to the nearest educational institution and living in an urban 
area. This is interesting; both variables measure the availability of post-compulsory 
education institutions for young people and have clear implications for youth education 
in remote areas. If more institutions are made available to pupils living far from post-
compulsory education institutes, participation in education can be increased. These 
results are consistent with the results from previous studies (Dickerson and McIntosh, 
2013; Frenette, 2006; Spiess and Wrohlich, 2010). 
 
Though results from the present analysis suggest that lower distance increases 
participation, however, the reason driving the distance effect is not clear. It could be 
either financial cost or commuting cost due to frequent long travelling. So if higher 
distance reduces the incentive to participate in further education due to financial cost 
then provision of subsidized travel to those participating in further education would be 
an optimal policy. 
 
However, if distance affects the decision to participate because of commuting cost, then 
the effective policy would be to improve the quality of transport services through 
increasing the frequency of travel services and reducing the travel time, perhaps giving 
the priority to public transport on congested roads. Admittedly, it is much easier to 
target financial travel subsidies than general travel services. 
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Table 4.5: Probit Model: First stage, Participation in Post-Compulsory 
Education 
 
Variables Marginal Effects Standard Errors 
 Model1  
Log of distance -0.071*** (0.029) 
Urban dummy 0.303*** (0.070) 
Age 0.002 (0.009) 
Age missing 0.021 (0.154) 
Male -0.011 (0.026) 
Own house -0.003 (0.027) 
Number of siblings -0.009 (0.008) 
Fathers’ education 0.004 (0.003) 
Mothers’ education -0.006* (0.003) 
Fathers’ income -2.26 (1.230) 
Birth order 0.014* (0.008) 
Health status -0.036 (0.023) 
Private school Year 9 -0.103*** ( 0.044) 
Number of rooms at home -0.002 (0.004) 
Mode of Transport 0.061** (0.027) 
Private coaching -0.001 (0.021) 
Study time home -0.069** (0.032) 
Prior attainment Year 9 -0.000 (0.000) 
Observations 553  
Table 5 presents the Marginal Effects (M E) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory 
education.  Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Model 1 is the first stage using the log of distance and urban dummy as instruments. 
The main analysis was done on the year 9 sample, because of the larger sample size compared to Year 10 
sample. 
 
Model 1 used log of distance and urban dummy variables determining the participation 
in post compulsory education in the selection equation, as in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.6 gives the first stage results for interaction effects between distance to nearest 
compulsory institution and the urban dummy, on the probability of participation in 
post-compulsory education. An interaction between distance and urban is tried in the 
first stage selection equation, to see if distance has more impact in rural areas where 
transport is not as good. 
 
The coefficient on the urban dummy is insignificant which suggests that if pupils live at 
zero distance from a school ( literally next door to a school) then it does not make any 
difference to their participation whether they live in an urban area or rural area- the 
school is right there for them. 
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Table 4.6: First stage results: Probit model, participation in post-
compulsory education, Interactions Effects (Distance*urban) 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance -0.229* (0.134) 
Interaction, Log of distance X urban dummy 0.174 (0.135) 
Urban dummy -0.101 (0.318) 
Prior attainment Year 9 -0.00 (0.000) 
Number of observations 553  
Marginal effects (M.E) on the probability of participation in post-compulsory education. 
Standard errors (SE) in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The interaction term has a positive coefficient, it suggests distance has a greater impact 
in rural areas, though it is statistically insignificant due to the high standard errors. 
 
It can be argued that the natural way to include mode of transport would be to interact it 
with log of distance: having a car, for instance, will have a bigger effect if you live 
further away.  This has been tried and results remain the same (Table 4.7) and the 
interaction term also has a significant coefficient (though when we include the separate 
term mode of transport along with its interaction with distance, results remain the same 
except the interaction term becomes insignificant due to the higher standard error). The 
interaction term has positive coefficient meaning that using car/motor cycle, bus as a 
mode of transport (more accessibility) will lead to a higher effect on participation rates 
the larger the distance needed to be travelled relative to using these modes: cycle/walk 
as transport. 
 
 
Table 4.7: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education, Interactions Effects (Distance*Mode of transport) 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance -0.079*** (0.033) 
Urban dummy 0.304*** (0.071) 
Interaction, Log of distance X Mode of transport 0.015 (0.024) 
Mode of transport 0.044 (0.038) 
Prior attainment Year 9  -0.000 (0.000) 
Number of observations 553  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
135 
 
Additionally the interaction between distance and male is tried to see if distance 
reduces participation more for girls relative to boys. The interaction term has a negative 
coefficient which suggests that distance has a more negative impact for boys than girls. 
This is surprising and contrary to our hypothesis since in Pakistan, girls face more 
restrictions regarding their mobility and education particularly in higher classes due to 
cultural and religious issues and due to gender inequality widespread in most Asian 
countries (Ali et al., 2011). However, the male interaction has an insignificant 
coefficient. Results are presented in Table 4.8. 
 
It could be expected that the interaction terms would attract significant coefficients, but 
the interaction terms are quite difficult to find a significant coefficient for, particularly 
in a small sample, because by definition they are correlated with other explanatory 
variables which in turn raises standard errors. Therefore, none of the interaction terms 
have significant coefficients due to small sample size. 
  
In all three models using interaction terms it should be noted that the coefficient on 
total marks Year 9 which capture the effect of prior attainment is highly significant in 
the performance equation and insignificant in the participation equation. 
 
 
Table 4.8: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education, Interactions Effects (Distance*Male) 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance -0.068*** (0.029) 
Urban dummy 0.297*** (0.070) 
Interaction, Log of distance X Male -0.013 (0.025) 
Male 0.040 (0.039) 
Prior attainment Year 9 -0.000 (0.000) 
Number of observations 553  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.5.2 Determinants of Performance in Post-Compulsory Education 
 
4.5.2.1 Determinants of Performance using OLS 
The first column in Table 4.9 displays the coefficients of determinants of performance 
in post-compulsory education (Year 12) produced through OLS regression of equation 
(1). The dependent variable in this model is total score in Year 12, having a SD of 167 
and a mean of 630. 
 
Among the different determinants of performance in the post-compulsory grade, the 
statistically significant coefficients are on the variables private institution in Year 12, 
taking an exam as an independent candidate in Year 12, study time at home and prior 
attainment in Year 9. 
 
The results imply that attending a public school/institution relative to a private 
institution in the post-compulsory grade decreases performance on the exam by 0.24 of 
a standard deviation of marks.  Similarly, appearing in the exam as an independent 
candidate not through an institution is associated with a decrease of 0.12 of a standard 
deviation of marks in the post-compulsory grade. These findings are consistent with 
previous literature: Aslam (2009); Kingdon (1996), stating the hypothesis regarding the 
relative efficiency of private and public schools report that private schools are better 
than public schools. This could be mainly due to poor resources at public school, higher 
proportion of pupils at schools relative to low number of teachers etc.  
 
Study at home more than 2 hours is associated with positive performance in post-
compulsory education; studying time at home has a positive impact on performance by 
0.07 of a SD of marks in the post-compulsory grade. The variable most strongly 
associated with performance in post-compulsory education is prior attainment in Year 
9. It implies that a 1 SD increase in prior attainment in Year 9 is associated with an 
increase of 0.79
35
 of a SD of marks in the post-compulsory grade. It is also in accord 
with previous literature such as Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) that highlights the 
positive effect of past educational performance on current educational outcomes. All 
other variables in this model have statistically insignificant coefficients. The R
2
 has a 
value of 0.67, and overall, the F test is significant. However, these are raw coefficients 
on all variables in the model, as selection bias is not taken in to account. 
                                                          
35
 These standard deviations are obtained by multiplying the respective coefficient values, beta, to its 
standard deviation and then dividing the product by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
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4.5.3.2 Refined Determinants of Performance in Post-Compulsory Education 
(controlling for selection into post- compulsory education using Heckman 
Selection Model) 
 
Table 4.9 describes the determinants of performance (Outcome equation), three models 
are estimated, the only difference is, model 2 gives the OLS, raw coefficients of 
determinants of performance in post-compulsory education, while, the later models 3 
and 4 account for sample selection. 
 
The log of distance and urban dummy are used as instruments in the first stage in model 
3. The log of distance and interaction between the log of distance and urban dummy are 
used as instruments in the first stage in model 4. 
 
It is possible that results reported in model 2 of table 4.9 are biased, due to the fact that 
every student is not observed in Year 12 and 47% of pupils do not participate in post-
compulsory education, hence leaving the sample non-random. The pupils observed in 
post-compulsory education may be more able, motivated and with better human capital 
relative to those who dropped out. There is a test below for the table of ρ=0, which is 
not rejected. Results show no selection effects as the test of rho (rho is the correlation 
between the errors in the two equations) in the Heckman model is insignificant in 
model 3. The value of χ2
 
is 1.91, with P-value 0.167, hence, the null hypothesis (ρ=0, 
that is there is no sample selection bias) cannot be rejected. Similarly, the value of χ2 is 
1.84 in model 4, with P-value 0.174, again suggesting that the null hypothesis of no 
sample selection, i.e., ρ=0, is not rejected. 
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Table 4.9: Determinants of Performance in Post-compulsory Education: 
Second stage results, Heckman correction model 
 
Variables Model 2 (OLS) 
Coefficients 
S.E 
Model 3 (Heckman) 
Coefficients 
S.E 
 Model 4 (Heckman) 
Coefficients 
S.E 
 Age -2.797 -3.893  -3.785 
 (5.507) (5.427)  (5.429) 
Age missing -35.540 
(85.154) 
-50.963 
(83.876) 
 -49.292 
(83.922) 
Male -3.818 -7.389  -7.686 
 (14.535) (14.335)  (15.743) 
Own house -8.274 -10.835  -11.212 
 (16.077) (15.718)  (15.743) 
Number of siblings 4.588 4.009  4.011 
 (4.627) (4.546)  (4.551) 
Fathers’ education -1.625 -1.640  -1.646 
 (1.699) (1.657)  (1.660) 
Mothers’ education 1.543 1.457  1.402 
 (1.518) (1.478)  (1.482) 
Fathers’ Income -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Birth order -3.373 -2.451  -2.409 
 (4.672) (4.351)  (4.357) 
Health status -13.984 -14.679  -15.002 
 (13.642) (13.357)  (13.385) 
Public Institute Year 12 -79.223*** -78.294***  -78.114*** 
 (14.558) (14.381)  (14.393) 
Independent candidate Year 12 -67.353*** -64.904***  -64.862*** 
 (23.390) (22.864)  (22.865) 
Number of rooms at home 3.6555 2.918  2.884 
 (32.870) (2.829)  (2.835) 
Mode of transport -16.141 -15.388  -15.356 
 (13.471) (13.117)  (13.133) 
Private coaching -20.247 -17.298  -17.164 
 (12.553) (12.261)  (12.282) 
Study time home 5.972* 22.070*  21.651 
 (114.349) (14.108)  (14.148) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.520*** 1.510***  1.513*** 
 (0.104) (0.103)  (0.103) 
Constant 256.552** 279.284***  277.861*** 
 (92.642) (91.788)  (91.911) 
Observations 295 553  553 
Rho - 0.386  0.416 
 - 0.246  0.257 
Lambda - 37.790  40.828 
 - 24.542  25.807 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  
Model 2- OLS 
Model 3 - Heckman selection corrected model (Second stage) - χ2 = 1.91, P- value = 0.167, Probit: First 
stage uses the log of distance and urban dummy as instruments. 
Model 4 - Heckman selection corrected model (Second stage) using interaction term between log of 
distance and urban - χ2 = 1.84, P-value = 0.174, Probit: First stage uses the log of distance, urban dummy 
and its interaction 
 
 
Also by looking at all the results in model 2, 3 and 4 suggests that broadly results do 
not change which is an indication of no selection bias. This suggests that performance 
once in post-compulsory education is mainly caused by ability (the coefficients on prior 
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attainment in Year 9 are also useful here as they are significant in the performance 
equation). Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 show the second stage results of using interaction 
terms (distance*urban, distance*mode of transport and distance*male in first stage 
respectively). The inclusion of the interaction terms in the first stage does not change 
any second stage results.  
 
 
Table 4.10: Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-
compulsory education: Dependent variable Year 12 score 
 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9  1.512*** (0.103) 
Rho 0.416 (0.257) 
Lambda 40.828 (25.807) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 1.84, P- value = 0.174 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4.11: Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-
compulsory education: Dependent variable Year 12 score 
 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.512*** (0.103) 
Rho 0.419 (0.248) 
Lambda 41.100 (24.877) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ
2 =
 2.12, P- value = 0.14 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4.12: Second stage results: Determinants of performance in post-
compulsory education: Dependent variable Year 12 score 
 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.510*** (0.103) 
Rho 0.397 (0.245) 
Lambda 38.941 (24.465) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ
2 =
 1.99, P- value = 0.15 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
It should also be noted that in all the above models using interactions terms, the lambda 
reported in the last rows of table 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12, which is the coefficient on the 
Inverse Mills Ratio, is not significant which shows the lack of selectivity. Rho is the 
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correlation coefficient between the error terms in the two equations (participation and 
performance) and is also of interest - again it is not significant, suggesting they are two 
unrelated processes. 
 
 
4.6 Robustness checks 
 
In this section several robustness checks are applied to see if the results are affected 
radically. 
 
4.6.1 Change in sample used to Year 10 
This section checks whether results remain robust to some change in the specification, 
for example the sample used, using those who participated in Year 10 rather than Year 
9 as the basis of the sample. The issue is having a sample of those who participated 
until the end of Year 10. One potential criticism of the main analysis of this chapter is 
that there could be a further selection issue as there is one more year of compulsory 
schooling involved, which is Year 10, after that being considered (Year 9) and from 
which some individuals drop out. The analysis is therefore redone focussing on the 
participation choices of only those who made it to the end of Year 10 and sat the final 
exams in compulsory schooling. 
 
The analysis is redone for Year 10 completers only, to compare the results to those 
obtained when using the full sample from Year 9.  If the results are qualitatively 
similar, this would suggest that the process influencing the continuation decision at the 
end of Year 10 is the same as that influencing the continuation decision earlier in Year 
9 - i.e. there is only one decision/process rather than two processes. 
 
So the only thing that differs is that the group of non-participators in post-compulsory 
education include a group who drop out after Year 9 and a group who drop out after 
Year 10. It is the fact that the sample is restricted to those who complete year 10 that is 
relevant. The usable sample when using Year 10 marks is 417. The results for first 
stage equation are given in table 4.13. Looking at the distance coefficient in the first 
stage equation in Table 4.13, it is significant at the 10% level in the participation 
equation and also is not significantly different from the distance coefficient when using 
the Year 9 sample in Table 4.5. The urban dummy coefficient also has a similar result 
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when using the Year 9 sample. The second stage results from the Heckman model are 
presented in Table 4.14 and they also show broadly the same pattern as when using the 
Year 9 sample. 
 
 
Table 4.13: Participation equation, Probit model: first stage using Year 10 
sample 
 
Variables Marginal Effects Standard 
Errors 
Log of distance -0.046* (0.027) 
Urban dummy 0.279*** (0.000) 
Age 0.002 (0.009) 
Age missing 0.029 (0.146) 
Male -0.015 (0.026) 
Own house -0.035 (0.030) 
Number of siblings -0.014* (0.008) 
Fathers’ education 0.003 (0.003) 
Mothers’ education -0.004 (0.003) 
Fathers’ income 6.13 (1.18) 
Birth order 0.018** (0.008) 
Health status -0.025 (0.024) 
Private school Year 9 -0.079** ( 0.040) 
Number of rooms at home -0.001 (0.005) 
Mode of Transport 0.060** (0.027) 
Private coaching -0.027 (0.022) 
Study time home -0.062** (0.030) 
Prior attainment Year 9 -0.000 (0.000) 
Observations 417  
1. Table 4.13 presents the marginal effects (M E) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory 
education. 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.14: Determinants of Performance in Post-compulsory Education: 
Second stage results using Year 10 sample 
 
 Model 5 
(OLS) 
Model 6 
(Heckman) 
 Model 7 (Heckman) 
Variables Coefficients Coefficients  Coefficients 
 S. E. S.E.  S.E. 
 Age -1.204 -3.159  -2.978 
 (5.838) (5.740)  (5.7444) 
Age missing -8.619 
(90.126) 
-38.516 
(88.59) 
 -36.090 
(88.666) 
Male -9.426 -16.212  -16.699 
 (17.181) (15.767)  (15.787) 
Own house 4.925 2.061  1.009 
 (17.181) (16.670)  (16.742) 
Number of siblings 8.654* 7.104  6.916 
 (5.042) (4.953)  (4.966) 
Fathers’ education -0.092 -0.462  -0.469 
 (1.882) (1.830)  (1.834) 
Mothers’ education -0.204 0.098  -0.181 
 (1.710) (1.660)  (1.663) 
Fathers’ Income -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Birth order -2.267 -0.042  0.143 
 (4.897) (4.839)  (4.848) 
Health status -15.006 -12.360  -12.769 
 (14.336) (13.972)  (13.992) 
Public Institute Year 12 -69.071*** -69.281***  -68.802*** 
 (15.738) (15.370)  (15.347) 
Independent candidate Year 
12 
-67.402*** -70.863***  -70.811*** 
 (26.654) (25.717)  (25.707) 
Number of rooms at home 2.144 1.8161  1.807 
 (3.163) (3.081)  (3.085) 
Mode of transport -4.694 2.787  -2.896 
 (14.666) (14.222)  (14.245) 
Private coaching -32.238 -30.981  -31.134 
 (13.415) (13.029)  (13.054) 
Study time home 12.043* 11.188*  10.695 
 (15.400) (14.222)  (15.016) 
Prior attainment Year 9 0.784*** 0.775***  0.778*** 
 (0.057) (0.056)  (0.056) 
Constant 116.505 154.836  152.652 
 (103.271) (102.272)  (102.390) 
Observations 266 417  417 
Rho - 0.387  0.513 
 - 0.230  0.229 
Lambda - 43.668  51.293 
  23.411  23.604 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  
Model 5- OLS 
Model 6 - Heckman selection corrected model (Second stage) - χ2 = 2.38, P- value = 0.123, Probit: First 
stage uses the log of distance and urban dummy as instruments. 
Model 7 - Heckman selection corrected model (Second stage) using interaction term between log of 
distance and urban - χ2 = 2.70, P-value = 0.1001, Probit: First stage uses the log of distance, urban 
dummy and its interaction. 
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After finding the same pattern of results as when looking at Year 9, it can be argued 
that the two decisions  (complete compulsory schooling and proceed into post-
compulsory education) do not need to be modelled separately, but rather there is really 
one decision and basically to treat the “complete Year 10” decision and “enter Year 11” 
decision as a single decision whether to continue or not - whether to participate in post-
compulsory education or not, with those choosing not to do the Year10 exams simply 
dropping out a little earlier because they may know that they are not going to continue 
anyway. 
 
4.6.2 Using different dependent variable 
The results are also robust to change in the dependent variable, using a common subject 
score in Year 12, English Year 12 instead of total marks in Year 12 and controlling for 
a respective subject score in Year 9 (English Year 9) and Year 10 (English Year 10) 
separately. The results are presented in Table 4.15 and 4.16. These tables show that the 
results remain qualitatively the same when using subject score in Year 12 compared to 
total Year 12 score. 
 
Table 4.15: First stage results
36
: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 9 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance -0.837*** (0.351) 
Urban dummy 3.562*** (0.723) 
Prior attainment Year 9 ( English Year 9 score) 0.011 (0.012) 
Number of observations 552  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 9 sample: Dependent variable Year 12 English subject 
score 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 ( English Year 9 score) 0.995*** (0.078) 
Rho 0.268 (0.195) 
Lambda 3.538 (2.607) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 1.54, P- value = 0.21 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
36
 In the interest of brevity, only coefficients of interest are shown in most of the results tables and both 
first stage and second stage are put together 
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Table 4.16: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 10 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance -0.719** (0.392) 
Urban dummy 3.683*** (0.806) 
Prior attainment Year 10 ( English Year10 score) -0.004 (0.0134) 
Number of observations 416  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 10 sample: Dependent variable Year 12 English 
subject score 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 10 ( English Year10 score) 0.885*** (0.067) 
Rho 0.336 (0.219) 
Lambda 4.335 (2.875) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 1.70, P- value = 0.19 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.6.3 Distance to the nearest school of the same kind 
It can be argued that it is not the distance to the nearest school that matters, but the 
distance to the nearest school of the type the family would consider (for example 
arguing that if a family would only consider going to a private school, then the fact that 
a public school is only 1 mile away would be irrelevant, it would be how close the 
nearest private school is that would be relevant).  
 
To address the potential criticism of the main results that the distance variable was not 
reflecting a real choice for some people, who wanted to send their children to a 
different type of school, a new distance variable is created and used in performing this 
further analysis. So the idea in calculating the new distance variable for young people is 
whether the school for which distance is measured is the same type as what they want 
to attend in the post-compulsory phase. 
 
The results using the new distance variable in Table 4.17 show that when we restrict the 
sample to those for whom the distance variable does reflect their choice of type of 
school, the qualitative nature of the results is unaffected. 
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Table 4.17: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 9 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Distance to nearest same type of school -0.862*** (0.352) 
Urban dummy 3.351*** (0.728) 
Prior attainment Year 9 0.000 (0.002) 
Number of observations 460  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 9 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.604*** (0.121) 
Rho 0.350 (0.259) 
Lambda 33.041 (24.843) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 1.55, P- value = 0.21 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.6.4 Check for valid exclusion restrictions 
It can be argued that distance and the urban dummy could also affect performance (e.g. 
if living far away makes you miss classes), and so they are not valid exclusion 
restrictions. 
 
To confirm, these instruments are tried in the performance equation, then tested 
empirically, to see if they attract significant coefficients in the performance equation. 
The findings show that they attracted insignificant coefficients in the performance 
equation. So the results, given in Table 4.18 and 4.19 empirically support them being 
genuine exclusion restrictions in the particular context of this study. The results are 
robust for the Year 10 sample as well, which are given in Table 4.20 and 4.21. 
 
One other potential concern would be about where people live being endogenous - i.e. 
they have specifically chosen their house location for the access it gives to schools- as 
people choosing where to live could potentially affect the instruments: distance and 
urban, for reasons that also might affect participation. For example, if those who value 
education more choose to deliberately live near schools. Distance, in this case, would 
not be a random exogenous variable but would have been endogenously determined. 
 
146 
 
Evidence suggests that this does happen in the UK (Allen et al., 2010). For example, in 
Britain, most schools are allocated on the basis of the catchment area: it is mainly due 
to the fact that places are usually offered first to children, who live nearest to a school 
(Gibbons, 2012). 
 
It is less relevant in Pakistan though as such decision-making is not usual in Pakistan. 
Generally, people in Pakistan do not choose their house and move location for this 
reason as it is hard for them to afford due to the additional cost involved in relocation. 
 Also, there is no official policy to assign school places on the basis of catchment area 
as there are no defined catchment areas or postcodes. Parents can choose any school 
depending upon mainly their affordability and then preferences. So this criticism is 
probably not very important in the existing case. 
 
 
Table 4.18: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 9 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance  -2.461*** (0.229) 
Prior attainment Year 9 0.001 (0.001) 
Number of observations 553  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 9 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.506*** (0.103) 
Urban dummy 19.192 (81.126) 
Rho 0.239 (0.347) 
Lambda 23.333 (34.25) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 0.55, P- value = 0.48 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.19: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 9 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Urban dummy 5.00*** (0.494) 
Prior attainment Year 9 -0.000 (0.002) 
Number of observations 553  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 9 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.503*** (0.103) 
Log of distance -8.244 (14.250) 
Rho 0.394 (0.239) 
Lambda 38.661 (23.998) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 2.01, P- value = 0.15 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4.20: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 10 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance  -2.403*** (0.264) 
Prior attainment Year 10 0.000 (0.001) 
Number of observations 417  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 10 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year10 0.778*** (0.057) 
Urban dummy 63.081 (70.677) 
Rho 0.485 (0.292) 
Lambda 48.798 (30.499) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 1.38, P- value = 0.24 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.21: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 10 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Urban dummy 4.987*** (0.576) 
Prior attainment Year 10 -0.000 (0.001) 
Number of observations 417  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 10 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 10 0.775*** (0.057) 
Log of distance 0.913 (14.903) 
Rho 0.370 (0.247) 
Lambda 38.828 (24.998) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 21.60, P- value = 0.20 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.6.5 Different combinations of the instruments 
The results are also robust to different combinations of the instruments. The following 
uses either an urban dummy or log of distance separately as a sole restriction and 
compares the results to those given earlier using both variables together as exclusion 
restrictions. The results are robust across Year 9 (Tables 4.22 and 4.23) and Year 10 
sample (Tables 4.24 and 4.25). The results remain qualitatively similar to those 
presented earlier. 
 
Table 4.22: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 9 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance -2.456*** (0.227) 
Prior attainment Year 9 0.001 (0.001) 
Number of observations 553  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 9 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.506*** (0.102) 
Rho 0.181 (0.243) 
Lambda 17.651 (23.841) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 0.56, P- value = 0.45 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.23: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 9 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Urban dummy 4.968*** (0.489) 
Prior attainment Year 9 0.001 (0.002) 
Number of observations 553  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 9 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 9 1.530*** (0.101) 
Rho 0.358 (0.234) 
Lambda 35.104 (23.8344) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 01.85, P- value = 0.17 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4.24: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 10 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Log of distance -2.364*** (0.255) 
Prior attainment Year 10 0.000 (0.001) 
Number of observations 417  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 10 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 10 0.777*** (0.056) 
Rho 0.275 (0.298) 
Lambda 27.395 (29.918) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 0.75, P- value = 0.38 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.25: First stage results: Probit model for participation in post-
compulsory education using Year 10 sample 
 
Covariates M.E (S.E) 
Urban dummy 4.963*** (0.568) 
Prior attainment Year 10 0.000 (0.001) 
Number of observations 417  
Marginal effects (ME) on the probability of participation into post-compulsory education.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Second stage results: Determinants of Performance in post-compulsory 
education using Year 10 sample: Dependent variable total score in Year 12 
Covariates Coefficients (S.E) 
Prior attainment Year 10 0.786*** (0.056) 
Rho 0.358 (0.234) 
Lambda 35.104 (23.8344) 
Heckman selection corrected model (ρ = 0) - χ2 = 2.07, P- value = 0.15 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In all results tables for the Year 9 and 10 samples estimated so far, the lambda, which is 
the coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio, is not significant showing the lack of 
selectivity. Rho is the correlation coefficient between the error terms in the two 
equations (participation and performance) and is also not significant in all results tables, 
suggesting they are two unrelated processes. Also, there is a test below all of the results 
tables of ρ=0, which is not rejected. These strongly support that participation and 
performance are two independent processes and there is no selectivity bias.  
 
On top of this, significant coefficients on the log of distance and urban dummy in every 
participation model suggest that participation is mainly driven by accessibility. Given 
that we consider all of these factors in a multivariate setting (participation and 
performance), it could be due to the fact that at age 14-15 (participation model) distance 
from school is more relevant relative to those at age 17-18 (performance model).  
 
Also the prior attainment has an insignificant coefficient in all estimated participation 
models while it has a significant coefficient in all performance models after controlling 
for selection into post-compulsory education, this strongly supports that after taking 
into account the selection into post-compulsory education performance depends on 
ability.  
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4.7 Conclusions 
 
Participation and performance in education are discussed in the literature through 
different perspectives. A number of studies have explored participation in higher 
education in developed countries with the main findings being that previous attainment 
and family background are the variables most associated with participation (Lenton, 
2005; McIntosh 2001). However, a very small number of studies have discussed the 
geography of education with respect to participation in post-compulsory education 
(Dickerson & McIntosh, 2013). An enormous literature is available discussing different 
determinants of education outcomes in developed and developing countries (Engin-
Demir, 2009; Aslam and Siddiqui, 2003). However, participation and performance in 
post-compulsory education have not been considered jointly before. 
 
Therefore, to fill the gap existing in the literature on the field of education, this chapter 
jointly explored the determinants of participation and performance in post-compulsory 
education controlling for the selection effects using unique survey data on pupils 
studying in Year 12 at age 17-18 from one of the districts of Punjab, Pakistan in 2011-
12. The present survey data is also linked with administrative data on student exams 
scores, together with the teachers, schools and family levels survey data. 
 
The two main features of this study are 1) Investigate the performance controlling for 
the selection into post-compulsory education. 2) Participation and performance are 
studied using a control for prior ability, which is rare. 
 
Additionally, this chapter focuses on the impact of accessibility and availability of 
institutions on participation in education. Accessibility is defined as the distance from 
pupils’ homes to the nearest post-compulsory education institutions and availability is 
defined as the location where pupils live – urban or rural area. The distance (km) 
variable is created in the follow-up survey conducted in 2013-14 using actual travel 
distance by driving from pupils’ homes to the nearest post-compulsory education 
institutions using information on the location of their homes collected in 2008-09 at the 
time the survey was initiated. 
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Further, an interaction of accessibility and availability i.e. interaction between the log 
of distance and urban is used to see whether distance affects participation differently 
across urban – rural locations. 
 
The Heckman selection model is used to study participation and performance jointly 
using distance and urban as exclusion restrictions. The value of the coefficient of rho, 
which tells about the bias associated due to any non-random selection of the post-
compulsory participating sample, is insignificant suggesting that participation and 
performance are two completely different processes. The key variables strongly 
associated with participation are distance and urban while performance is mainly 
associated with ability and type of institution attended i.e. the coefficients on prior 
ability in Year 9 is highly significant in the performance equation and insignificant in 
the participation equation. 
 
Thus those participating in post-compulsory education are not necessarily the most 
able, but those with the best access to post-compulsory education. It suggests that 
participation in further and higher education can be increased by giving more access to 
further education institutions within travel distance to young pupils, either by increasing 
the number of further education institutions or upgrading the existing secondary schools 
up to the level of further education institutions. Up-gradation of existing institutions 
would likely be less costly than establishing new institutions. As distance is a deterrent 
to participate in further education, then, distance learning can be considered as a policy 
response. Due to the rapid increase in technology, it could be possible by giving remote 
access to libraries, developing websites via posting teaching materials, use of podcasts 
and video of lectures and classes, online submission of assignments, all these can make 
distance learning an engaging possibility. 
 
With respect to distance, the current analysis is not able to identify the cause of reduced 
participation due to higher distance. If distance reduces participation due to longer 
travel time that involves longer commuting and mental boredom, then, reducing the 
travel time by increasing the amount of public transport is an effective policy. If 
distance reduces participation due to financial issues, then giving a subsidy, grant or 
loan to the young pupils would be an appropriate option for example, the Canada 
Student Loan Program (CSLP) provides loans to poor pupils (Frenette, 2006). 
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Further, the results find that participation is more an urban phenomenon than rural, with 
distance reducing participation more for those living in rural areas. Provision of more 
further education institutions in rural areas and targeting rural pupils for further 
education subsidy more than urban pupils as they already have the greater level of 
disadvantage would be an optimal policy. The distance learning policy discussed in the 
above scenario may not be appropriate in rural areas as there is currently only limited 
availability of technology. The most rural areas in developing countries do not have 
access to the internet or very low strength signals, without which distance learning 
might not be possible. 
 
Given the unique nature of the analysis describing the participation and performance in 
detail, it is obvious that the sample size is small. However, the current analysis expects 
reduced bias due to controlling for prior ability and selection in post-compulsory 
education institutions. Also the distance and urban dummy variables seem to be strong 
exclusion restrictions under this particular study, however, one should be cautious 
before generalising to other parts of Pakistan, or indeed to other countries. For-
example, Bahawalpur district is an agricultural state in South Punjab, while other 
metropolitan areas may exhibit different patterns of participation or performance. 
 
Finally, regarding the econometric point of view, the paper increases the confidence of 
the reader and researcher proving distance as a valid exclusion restriction where they 
require an instrument for educational outcomes such as qualification acquired or 
graduation in estimated wage equations and has relevance to any empirical field of 
study. 
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Chapter 5:  
Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has analysed three related, yet independent empirical chapters, each 
exploring important topics in the area of economics of education. Throughout the three 
chapters that form the core of this thesis, I have looked at the determinants of pupils’ 
educational outcomes in high stakes exams in order to contribute to the existing 
literature and the gaps that are present within it. At present the evidence on 
intergenerational mobility of education and teacher quality is less clear cut and arguably 
undeveloped particularly within the teacher quality field in developing countries. Also, 
performance in post-compulsory education after taking selection into post-compulsory 
education into account has never been discussed before. Clearly, there is scope to build 
upon existing research and explore these issues together. To summarise, Chapter 2 
looked at the effect of fathers’ education and mothers’ education on the education of 
their children. Chapter 3 explored two questions: “what is the impact of being taught by 
high quality and low quality teachers on pupils’ performance” and “what characteristics 
of teachers make them high performing and low-performing teachers”. Chapter 4 
investigated the performance in post-compulsory education after controlling for the 
selection into post-compulsory education.  
 
5.1 Thesis Summary 
The first empirical chapter, chapter 2, examined the impact of parents’ education on 
children’s education where children’s education is measured in the main analysis as 
their GCSE exams score (GCSE total points score) which is the sum of total 
performance across all GCSEs taken at age 16. The data used were from England, using 
the first wave of the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) matched 
to the National Pupil Database (NPD) to perform the analysis.  
 
The main concern in estimating the intergenerational mobility of education is to isolate 
the effects of parents’ education due to parents’ genes and parents’ parenting style. 
These are “nature” and “nurture” effects respectively. IV methodology is used, and the 
raising of the school leaving age (RoSLA) of 1972 in England is used as an instrument 
to identify the exogenous variation in parents’ education that is orthogonal to parents’ 
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genes. If we still find the effect on children’s education then it could only be due to the 
effect of upbringing. 
 
The chapter contributed to the existing literature on intergenerational mobility in 
several ways. Firstly, it used a more comprehensive measure of pupil performance in 
England at age 16. Most previous studies are limited in using achieving five or more 
GCSEs at grade C or above as a measure of pupil outcomes that does not include the 
information that we have in the NPD. Secondly, we estimated the effect of fathers’ 
education and mothers’ education separately using separate specifications, which helps 
to evaluate the effect of each parent’s education specifically. In addition the strength of 
the current analysis is that it estimates a model controlling for the education of both 
parents which is less common in existing literature. 
 
The initial results from OLS models show that there is a positive effect of fathers’ 
education and mothers’ education on pupils’ outcomes. The results from the IV model 
confirm the findings from the OLS model, while additionally, results suggest that when 
controlling for both parents’ education, then mothers’ education is positively related to 
children’s education while effects of fathers’ education are not significant. 
Interestingly, these findings are robust when splitting the sample across daughters and 
sons. 
 
Remaining in the field of education and similarly focusing on the determinants of 
performance, Chapter 3 answers two main questions about teacher quality. Firstly, does 
teacher quality matter? Secondly, what determines teacher quality? Using a survey 
dataset linked to the administrative dataset of the exam board in one of the districts of 
Punjab, Pakistan. 
 
The survey data has detailed information on pupils’ individual, family, peers, schools 
and teachers characteristics. The outcome variable is measured as the exam score of 
Year 9 pupils at age 14-15 in 2008-2009 using a unique pupil identifier through exam 
board data, namely the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE). 
 
Using a standard education production function, a teacher fixed effects approach is 
employed that allows us to pick up the effect of all teacher invariant characteristics 
across pupils. The key point in the analysis is that I observe different teachers teaching 
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the same pupils in the same schools. Therefore, pupil and school characteristics are in 
effect being held constant, and any variation in pupil performance across subjects for 
the same pupil is attributed to the effects of different teachers. The first stage estimates 
of teacher fixed effects tell about how each teacher does with the pupils (within a 
school) relative to other teachers with the same pupils.  
 
The analysis in this chapter also exploits the within pupils variation i.e., the pupil fixed 
effects approach addressed the issue of non-random assignments of teacher to students. 
If more able pupils are assigned to more able teachers then it would be a threat for the 
validity of the analysis as the resulting estimates would be biased upward or downward. 
The pupil fixed effects approach also serves as the proxy for prior ability which is not 
available in the dataset. Further, in the second stage, the estimated teacher effect is 
regressed on teacher variables in order to know which specific characteristics drive the 
differences in performance picked up by these teacher fixed effects.  
 
First stage results from the teacher fixed effects approach show that there is a 
considerable variation in teachers’ effects. Some teacher effects are positive and highly 
significant while others are negative and significant making them high performing and 
low performing teachers. A good teacher defined as placed at the 75
th
 percentile is 
related to an increase in pupil test scores by 0.15 of a standard deviation, while a bad 
teacher decreases the score by 0.77 of a standard deviation. Therefore, a pupil having 
been taught by a good teacher placed at the 75
th
 percentile teacher scores 0.92 of a 
standard deviation more than a pupil who is taught by a bad teacher placed at the 25
th
 
percentile teacher leaving a significant effect on pupil performance. 
 
The results from the pupil fixed effects approach show that, a pupil taught by a good 
teacher placed at the 75
th
 percentile has an increase in exam scores of 0.15 standard 
deviations, while a bad teacher placed at the 25
th
 percentile decreases the score of a 
pupil by 1.2 standard deviations. Therefore, a pupil taught by a good teacher placed at 
the 75
th
 percentile scores 1.35 standard deviations more than a pupil who is taught by a 
bad teacher placed at the 25
th
 percentile. The results from pupil fixed effects are more 
pertinent given that they control for unobserved pupils’ characteristics. The second 
stage results show that observable teacher characteristics explain little of this variation 
in teacher quality. 
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The final empirical chapter, chapter 4, examines the effect of distance to nearest post-
compulsory education institutes on the immediate participation in post-compulsory 
education and studies the socio-economic factors affecting achievement in post-
compulsory education (Year 12) conditional on that participation. There is a limited 
literature that investigates the effect of distance on the immediate participation in post 
compulsory education. A study by Dickerson and McIntosh (2013) is the only study to 
examine the impact of distance on immediate post-compulsory education choices at age 
16 but they do not study performance in post-compulsory education. 
 
The data used in this chapter is the same as in chapter 3. The first wave collects the data 
on the 611 pupils and their family, school and teachers. Second, third and fourth waves 
collected the data again on exams scores on sampled pupils studying in Year 10 aged 
15-16 in 2009-10, Year 11 aged 16-17 in 2010-11, and Year 12 aged 17-18 in 2011-12. 
The current study uses the pupils’ score in Year 9, Year 10, and Year 12. Year 9 and 
Year 10 are the last two years of compulsory schooling as in Pakistan compulsory 
schooling is from Year 1 to Year 10. Year 11 and Year 12 are post-compulsory 
schooling years. The distance variable is created during the follow-up survey later. 
 
A value-added achievement production function is used to estimate the determinants of 
performance controlling for selection into post-compulsory education. The Heckman 
selection model is used to account for the selection bias resulting from a choice whether 
pupils continue or not after completing the certain level of education.  
 
The analysis presented several findings. Firstly, distance has a negative impact on the 
likelihood of participation in post-compulsory education. Secondly, living in urban area 
has a positive effect on the probability of participation in post-compulsory education. 
Thirdly, after taking into account the selection into post-compulsory education, prior 
ability has a positive effect on the performance. Finally, a lack of significant selection 
effects shows that participation and performance are not dependent on each other. 
Several checks are carried out to gauge the validity of instruments used and distance 
and urban dummy are found as genuine exclusion restrictions.  
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5.2 Policy Implication and Avenues for Future Research 
As education is important for later life outcomes (e.g. employment, earnings, health), so 
it is very important to understand what the determinants of education outcomes are, in 
order to design programs that are most effective at improving such outcomes. 
 
The findings of chapter 2 indicated that after taking into account the endogeneity of 
parents’ education, there is a positive association between parents’ education and 
children’ education when using the raising of the school leaving age in 1972 as an 
instrument for parents’ education. This finding implies that intergenerational spillovers 
may provide a compelling argument for policies designed to encourage young people to 
remain in schools for longer and reinforce the policies to increases the participation in 
education. In this regard the recent reform of education in the UK in 2015 that increases 
the de facto education/training participation age until 18 seems a promising step in the 
appropriate direction.  
 
Since the RoSLA effects identify a substantial nurture component to intergenerational 
mobility, it is possible to design policies that improve pupil performance for those with 
parents who have low education by providing support to improve parenting style to 
match that which high education parents are able to provide for their children. If 
intergenerational mobility had no nurture effects then such policies would be 
ineffective. 
 
Future research that could be done on the true transmission mechanism if there is any, 
for example the mothers affected as a result of school leaving age policies are less 
likely to smoke or drink during pregnancy. Obviously, this new research requires a rich 
dataset. 
 
Additionally, future work to disentangle the effect of reform for men and women from 
marriage market effects may be important as it helps to account for the asymmetry 
across fathers and mothers. So far it is not clear as reform may have an effect on the 
marriage options of individuals that in turn may affect them differently since the 
estimates on fathers’ education seem noisy. This needs to be explored further. 
 
The results from the first part of the analysis of chapter 3 corroborate the previous 
findings of teacher quality in developed countries, US and UK (Hanushek and Rivikin, 
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2006; Aaronson et al., 2007; Slater et al., 2012) and for a developing country, India 
(Azam and Kingdon, 2015) that there is a substantial variation in teacher effects even 
after controlling for subject fixed effects. Teacher quality therefore is very important 
for pupils’ performance in high stakes exams in a developing countries context. This 
means that teachers matter and within schools teacher quality varies a lot. There could 
be the most effective teachers having a positive effect on their pupils’ performance and 
there could be less effective teachers having a negative effect on pupils’ performance. 
This suggest that pupils could reap benefits from polices that improve the overall 
teaching quality at schools. It is also an indication to policy makers that it is important 
to improve average quality of teaching.  Given that teacher quality plays an important 
role in explaining pupils’ performance, teacher assignment could be used as a means for 
reducing unequal educational outcomes across gender and social groups. Improving 
teacher quality seems less costly compared to student based incentives as improving 
teacher quality would be applicable for the entire class. 
 
The findings from the second part of chapter 3 show that, as found in US studies, 
teacher observable characteristics do not explain variation in teacher quality in our 
dataset. This implies that it is hard to identify good teachers ex ante, but administrative 
data can be used to identify them ex post. This brings room for performance 
management and personnel policies at schools within public policy. Furthermore, 
teacher progression policies may be radically rethought if ex ante discrimination is 
hard. In addition, polices to hire teachers on the basis of resume characteristics should 
be reviewed and improved. 
 
As far as policy implications of chapter 4 are concerned, the analysis suggested that 
distance to the nearest education institution and living in a rural areas limit the 
participation in post-compulsory education. However, the current analysis is unable to 
identify the mechanism of these effects being negative. There could be two options to 
take in response: if distance has a negative effect due to the financial cost associated 
with it, then providing a subsidy on travelling would be relevant. If distance is 
negatively affecting participation due to long frequent commuting, then improving the 
road infrastructure and transport would be an effective policy so that the travel time 
could be reduced. However, improving overall transport would be more costly. 
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In addition, together building more schools and improving transportation network can 
have substantial positive effects both for the rural youth and those living far from 
schools as it facilitates the accessibility. 
 
The research carried out in chapter 4 serves an econometric advantage that distance to 
nearest education institution seems a valid instrument for participation in post-
compulsory education as found by Dickerson and McIntosh (2013), with an assumption 
that household location is judged as exogenous. This is relevant to any empirical field 
where an instrument is required for education.  
 
Finally, each chapter of this thesis individually contributed to the literature on a wider 
perspective, factors affecting pupils’ performance in high-stakes exams with a 
particular focus on intergenerational mobility of education in the UK and teacher 
quality and determinants of participation and performance in post-compulsory 
education in Pakistan. At present, given the lack of consensus in the field of 
intergenerational mobility, teacher quality and virtually non-existent research in the 
field of economics of education in developing countries particularly in Pakistan, it 
develops scope to build upon the existing research. In its entirety, this thesis sheds light 
on the wider determinants of pupils’ performance in high stakes exams including in the 
subareas of parents, teachers and socio-economic determinants and call for further 
research to investigate how policy makers may intervene to increase pupils’ 
performance. The research presented in all three chapters therefore provides a step 
further towards closing the gaps in the previous literature within the field of economics 
of education. We hope that analysis within this thesis provides important suggestions 
for future researchers, education economists and stimulates research in this area. 
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Questionnaire 
(STUDENT) 
PART – I 
Child Characteristics 
 
Name : _________________________   Father’s name: __________ 
 
1. Date of Birth:      2. Sex:   Male / Female  
3. Group: ________ Science / Arts   4. Class Roll No. __________ 
5. Board Examination Roll No. _______  6. Height: __________ 
7. Weight: ________________________  8. Age: ____________ 
9. Do you participate in extra curricular activities?  Yes / No   
10. If yes, what type of activities?  
 a.  Debates  
 b. Drama  
 c.  Music  
 d. Painting 
 e. -----------  
11.  In which position you come in class.  
 a.  1
st
  
 b. 2
nd
  
 c. 3
rd 
  d.         ----------- 
12. What is your hobby?  
 a.  Stamp collection  
 b. Coin collection 
 c. Gardening    
 d. ____________________ 
13. Do you perform any physical activity?   Yes / No  
14. If yes, what type of physical activity.   
 a. Games  
 b. Walk  
 c. Exercise  
d. ----------- 
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15. How much time you spend in a week on such activity. __________Hours 
16.  What is your wish to become a.  
 a. Doctor  
 b. Engineer  
 c. Pilot 
 d. Teacher  
  e. ------------  
 f. None 
17. Do you take tuition?    Yes / No.  
18. If yes, for how much time?  ___________Hours 
19. Do you get daily homework from school? Yes / No 
20. If yes, how much time you spend on homework daily ________ Hours.  
21. Who helps you in your study?  
 a.  Mother  
 b. Father 
 c. Brother  
 d. Sister  
 e. ----------- 
22. Are you suffering from any chronic disease?   Yes / No  
23. If yes what type of disease.  
 a. Cough  
 b. Cold  
 c. Week eyesight  
 d. Asthma  
 e. -----------    
24. Does your disease affect your work?  Yes / No  
25. How do you go to school? 
 a. Bicycle  
 b. Motor Cycle  
 c. Car 
 d. school bus  
 e. walk 
 
26. How long does it take for you to reach to school from home? 
___________Hours 
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27.  Do you get pocket money? Yes/no  
28.        If yes, how much Rs_______ daily.  
 
  PART – 2 
Family Characteristics 
 
1. Father’s Education:         
2. Father’s Profession           
3. Father’s Income: Monthly (Rs.)         
4. Mother’s Education:         
5. Mother’s Profession           
6. Mother’s Income: Monthly (Rs.)        
7. Locality where you live.________________________________________ 
8. Residence:  
 a.  Rental  
 b. Own 
c. Sharing  
9. How many rooms in your home  
10. Total Family Size____________  
11. a. Number of sisters ________ 
 b. Number of Brothers ______ 
12. Information about children from first child to youngest. 
 
S.No Age Sex Class / 
Education 
School / 
Occupation  
Monthly 
income 
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13. What is your number among children?______________ 
14. Who else is the earning member in the family not accounted 
above?___________________ 
15. Total monthly of all members as mentioned in no 14.  
16. How many time you take eat in a day.  
 a.  One Time  
 b. Two Times  
 c. Three Times   
 d. Four Times 
 e. __________  
17.      Do you take breakfast daily? Yes/no 
18.     If no, how many times in a week?________ 
19       Do you take eatable in school break daily?  Yes/no 
20. Weekly nutritional chart. (food items consumed).  
  
Food items Yes / No Days in a Week Quantity 
Milk     
Yogurt     
Bread      
Meat     
Vegetable     
Fruit     
Juice     
Egg     
Rice     
Pulses     
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Questionnaire 
SCHOOL HEAD 
 
Name: _______________________________ School Name:_________________ 
Age: _________________________________ Gender: _____________________ 
Qualification: _________________________ Training: ____________________ 
Total Teaching: ________________________ Administration Experience: _____ 
Experience in present school: _____________ Present Position in School: ______ 
Tuition Fee per Month (9
th
 Class): _________ Other Expenditure (9
th
 Class): ___ 
Total enrolment of school: _______________ 9
th
 Class enrolment: ____________  
How many teachers are in school?   Male ____ Female ______ 
No of teachers teaching 9
th
 class: ____________ 
Qualification of 9
th
 Class Teachers / Training _________________________________ 
Monthly salary of teachers: ________________ 
School efforts to improve skills of teachers.___________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Do you think that school infrastructure is enough according to the needs of students.     
Yes / No 
 
Facilities:  
Sr. 
No. 
Facilities  Yes / No  If Yes How Many 
01 Canteen    
02 Library   No of Books  
03 Computer Lab   No of Computers  
04 Sports Complex   Area of Sports Complex 
05 Play ground   Area of play ground  
06 Class Rooms   No of class rooms  
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Note: Please tick the (√) the box that comes closest to your views. 
 
Responses:  SA=Strongly Agree,    A= Agree,    UD= Un decided,                     
                    DA= Disagree,        SDA= Strongly Disagree.  
Sr.No Statement SDA DA UD A SA 
 
1 
Honesty 
I am honest with my profession. 
     
2 I advise my teacher to be dutiful.      
3 I develop nobleness in students personality      
 
4 
Competent 
I am competent as school head. 
     
5 I make efforts to enhance competency of my staff.      
 
6 
Forward looking 
I always do futuristic planning. 
     
7 I look forward to shape new school environment.      
 
8 
Inspiration 
I inspire my staff to work hard. 
     
9 I inspire students to achieve their goals.      
 
10 
Intelligent 
I know my responsibilities.  
     
11 I do my duties skillfully.       
 
12 
Fair Minded 
I take decision impartially. 
     
13 I am fair-Minded toward student’s promotion.      
14 I am fair-Minded toward teacher’s promotion.      
 
15 
Broad-Minded 
I accept criticism with open mind. 
     
16 I promote broad mindedness in the staff.      
 
17 
Courageous 
I take bold steps for development of school. 
     
18 I face difficulties with courage.        
 
19 
Straight-Forward 
I am straightforward in my dealing. 
     
 
20 
Imaginative 
I am not imaginative for new ideas. 
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21 
Planning 
I divide my time appropriately. 
     
22 I always prepare the plan before doing my work.      
 
23 
Organizing 
I organize things properly. 
     
 
24 
Staffing  
I appoint the staff according to requirement.  
     
 
25 
Directing  
I give direction to the teachers to increase their 
efficiency. 
     
26 I give direction to the students to develop their 
confidence. 
     
 
27 
Co-ordination 
I always co-ordinate with teachers. 
     
28 I always co-ordinate with students.      
 
29 
Innovating  
I introduce innovative skills of the teachers. 
     
30 I introduce innovative skills of the students.      
 
31 
Controlling  
I control all academic activities nicely.  
     
 
32 
Budgeting  
I formulate school budget properly. 
     
 
33 
Decision-Making 
I need to be authoritative as school head. 
     
34 I have decision making power to solve the school 
problems 
     
 
35 
Human Relation 
I always consult my teachers on important school 
matters. 
     
36 I solve school problems friendly.      
 
37 
Reporting 
I highlight school performance. 
     
38 I covey to teachers all new information.      
 Communication      
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39 I communicate my ideas to the students. 
40 I communicate modern pedagogy to the teachers.      
 
41 
Leading 
I develop leadership qualities among teachers. 
     
42 I develop leadership qualities among students.      
 
43 
Problem solving 
I solve teacher’s problems properly. 
     
44 I solve student’s problems properly.      
 
45 
Motivation 
I motivate teachers to develop leadership qualities. 
     
46 I motivate students to play active role in school 
activities. 
     
 
47 
Vision 
I have vision about the future needs. 
     
 
48 
Voice 
I talk my teachers politely. 
     
 
49 
Credibility 
I have credibility among teachers. 
     
50 Commitment  
I am committed to my job. 
     
 
51 
Devotion  
I am devoted to my profession. 
     
 
52 
Assumption 
I don’t believe on assumptions only. 
     
 
53 
Management of school Plant 
I take special care of school plants. 
     
 
54 
Co-curricular activities 
I arrange co-curricular activities for personality 
development. 
     
 
55 
Management of Human Resources 
I assign duties to the teachers according to their 
expertise. 
     
 
56 
Management of Financial Recourses 
I spend financial resources with care.   . 
     
170 
 
Questionnaire 
(School Teacher) 
 
Please check or list the relevant response. 
1. Name School Teacher:  _____________________________ 
Designation:  ______________________________ 
School Name:  ______________________________ 
Age   ______________________________ 
Sex: _____________   Subject: ________________ 
a. Male 
b. Female 
2. Qualification:  a.    B.A/B.Sc   Teaching Training 
c. M.A/M.Sc    a. B.Ed 
d. M.Phil/Ph.D   b. M.Ed 
e. Other    c. PTC 
d. Others 
3. Teaching Experience: a. Less than 5 years 
    b. 6 – 10 years 
    c. 11 – 15 years 
    d. 16 – 25 years 
    e. __________________ 
4. Duration of Class: a. 40 min 
    b. 50 min 
    c. 1 hour 
    d. _____________________ 
5. Daily work Load: a. 2 Classes / day 
    b. 3 Classes / day 
    c. _______________________ 
6. Class Size (Number of Students) ____________________ Students 
7. Which teaching ethod you usually use in classroom? 
    a. Lecture method 
    b. Discussion method 
    c. Panel discussion 
    d. Demonstration method 
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    e. Activity method 
    f. Any other method 
8. Do you prepare your lesson plan? a. Fortnightly 
      b. Weekly 
      c. Daily 
      d. No formal planning 
9. Do you teach the students by keeping their individual mental caliber in your 
mind? 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
      c. Some times 
10. Do you give assignments in terms? 
      a. Problems 
      b. Memorizing facts 
      c. Doing Text Book exercises 
      d. Writing articles on certain topics. 
11. How many times do you organize panel discussion during a month. 
      a. Once 
      b. Twice 
      c. Thrice 
      d. More than that 
12. Check the types of tests you give to your pupils? 
      a. Oral 
      b. Essay type 
      c. Objective Type 
      d. Objective plus Easy type 
13. Are you satisfied with the results of class students? 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
      c. To some extent 
14. In your opinion which one is the best way of keeping class discipline? 
      a. Authoritarian 
      b. Democratic 
15. What type of behavior do you adopt while teaching? 
      a. Democratic 
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      b. Sympathetic 
      c. Aggressive 
16. Have you attended any refresher courses? 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
17. Are you satisfied with the teaching course that you are teaching during a job? 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
      c. To some extent 
18. Do you give the students a free hand to express? 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
      c. Some times 
19. Are all the basic facilities of classroom sufficient for the current strength of 
students? 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
      c. Some extend 
20. Which areas of service rules are giving you satisfaction for your work? 
      a. Salary package 
      b. Leaves granted 
      c. Job security 
21. In orde4r to perform your duties smoothly school administration supports you 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
      c. Some Times 
22. To achieve a good academic career what is important for students? 
      a. Teachers 
      b. Parents 
      c. School 
      d. School Heads 
      e. Others 
23. Why do the children normally miss school. 
      a. Illness 
      b. No Transport 
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      c. House Work 
      d. Others 
24. What suggestion are needed to improve quality of education? 
 i.
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ii.
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 iii.
 ________________________________________________________________ 
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